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ABSTRACT
OPEN QUESTIONS AND CONSEQUENTIALIST CONDITIONALS: CENTRAL
PUZZLES IN MOOREAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
February 2003
JEAN-PAUL VESSEL, B.A., NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
Moore’s Open Question Arguments are among the most influential
arguments in 20 th Century metaethical thought. But, surprisingly, there is a fair
amount of confusion concerning what the Open Question Arguments actually are,
how the Moorean passages should be interpreted, and what they are intended to
show. Thus, the early chapters are devoted to clarificatory matters, including the
exposing ol a variety ot contemporary attacks upon Moore's arguments as misguided
by indicating where they rest upon faulty interpretations of Moorean passages.
Providing what I take to be accurate formulations of Moore's famous arguments,
responding to historically important preliminary objections, and, finally, presenting
various shortcomings of these arguments constitute the remaining themes of the
early chapters.
Next, I pursue an explanation of what I call the ‘Open Question
phenomenon’: the inclination that many have to endorse Moore’s “open question”
premises. I survey a variety of popular noncognitivist explanations, arguing that
each of them is unsatisfactory. I then present a novel semantic explanation of the
phenomenon and use it to construct an augmented Moorean Open Question
Argument, one capable of overcoming the shortcomings of Moore's originals.
VII
The latter chapters are dedicated to an investigation of Moore’s preferred
normative theory a version of objective consequentialism. I argue that the standard
semantic account of subjunctive conditionals fails to capture the nature of certain
subjunctive conditionals relevant to the normative evaluation of alternatives from an
objective consequentialist perspective. I then present a modified version of the
standard account in an effort to remedy the problem.
Next, I present a novel objection against all extant versions of objective
consequentialism. I then introduce and utilize the concept of an “objective”
subjunctive probability in the transformation of a subjective version of
consequentialism into an objective version, one capable of dealing with the
difficulties posed by the objection.
I conclude the dissertation with a final chapter in which I defend possibilist
(as opposed to subjunctive) versions of consequentialism from a contemporary
objection. In doing so, I elucidate a theoretical advantage that possibilist theories
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G. E. Moore is widely regarded as one of the greatest moral philosophers of the
Twentieth Century. His Principia Ethica—first published in 1903—is viewed by
many as the origin of the contemporary dialogue concerning a number of the most
fundamental topics in moral philosophy. Moore's formulation of ideal utilitarianism in
Principia Ethica grafts a sleek consequentialist normative framework onto a novel
quasi-hedonistic axiology, marking seminal contributions in both the normative ethics
of behavior and axiology. His clarification of the fundamental questions of axiology is
an important, perhaps unparalleled contribution to value theory. But what many
believe to be Moore's most important contribution to philosophical ethics lies in his
pioneering work in metaethics.
In the first chapter of Principia Ethica
,
Moore presents a series of arguments
—
famously known as the Open Question Arguments—that are intended to show that any
naturalistic interpretation of the moral predicates is bound for failure. The apparent
plausibility of these arguments is then used by Moore to establish his own somewhat
notorious non-natural interpretation of the moral predicates. It is upon these Open
Question Arguments and related metaethical concerns that the first four chapters of my
dissertation primarily focus.
Moore's Open Question Arguments are among the most influential arguments
in 20th Century metaethical thought. Several of Moore's contemporaries defended
various forms of metaethical non-naturalism by appeal to Open Question Arguments
(See Ross 1930 and 1939, Broad 1930, and Ewing 1953). Some contemporary
cognitivists embrace the force of Moore’s arguments against naturalism (Horgan and
Timmons 1992a and 1992b, and Lewy 1970). And noncognitivists—as well as those
who defend various hybrid accounts of moral terminology—have used Open Question
Arguments to fuel their own emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical
programs (See Ayer 1952; Stevenson 1944 and 1963; Hare 1952; Blackburn 1984 and
1998; and Gibbard 1984, 1985, and 1999).
But, surprisingly, there is a fair amount of confusion and controversy
concerning what the Open Question Arguments actually are, how the Moorean
passages should be interpreted, and what they are intended to show (Compare Darwall,
Gibbard, and Railton 1997b; Sayre-McCord 1988; Sturgeon 1985 and 1992; Feldman
1978; and Harman 1977, for a sample). Thus, the first chapter of the dissertation is
devoted to clarificatory matters, including the exposing of a variety of contemporary
attacks upon Moore's arguments as misguided by indicating where they rest upon
faulty interpretations of Moorean passages. Providing what I take to be accurate
formulations of Moore's famous arguments, responding to historically important
preliminary objections, and, finally, presenting various shortcomings of these
arguments constitute the remaining themes of the first two chapters.
The third and fourth chapters are dedicated to an explanation of what I call the
‘Open Question phenomenon’: the inclination that many have to endorse Moore’s
“open question” premises. In Chapter 3 I survey some of the more popular
noncognitivist explanations of the Open Question phenomenon, arguing that while
there are indeed interesting noncognitive meaning components associated with ethical
terminology that aren’t captured by the type of naturalistic analyses that Moore found
objectionable, they fail to account fully for the Open Question phenomenon. There are
2
certain contexts in which ethical terms appear to be stripped of any usually
accompanying noncognitivist meaning components yet still retain “open question”
features.
In Chapter 4 I introduce a couple of semantic concepts—character (Kaplan
1979) and role—that I use (i) to provide a novel justification for Moore’s Open
Question premises and (ii) to set a standard for future naturalistic analyses of ethical
terminology. In providing this semantic explanation of the Open Question
phenomenon, I generate an augmented Moorean Open Question Argument that I take
to be both philosophically interesting and a vehicle that aptly addresses the problems
with metaethical naturalism that Moore probably meant to target.
The final three chapters are dedicated to an investigation of Moore’s preferred
normative theory—a version of objective consequentialism. In Chapter Five of
Principia Ethica and in his shorter work Ethics
,
Moore introduces a subjunctive
formulation of consequentialism, subjunctive because the normative status of an
alternative is determined by what would happen were that alternative performed when
compared with what would happen were each of its alternatives performed.
In Chapter 5 I argue that the standard semantic account of subjunctive
conditionals fails to capture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals relevant to
the normative evaluation of alternatives from an objective consequentialist
perspective. 1 then present a modified version of the standard account in an effort to
remedy the problem. This modification—one that amounts to the adoption of a
“weakly-centered” (as opposed to a “strongly-centered ’) analysis for subjunctive
conditionals
—
prevents any facts concerning whether or not an alternative is actually
3
performed from being relevant to that alternative s normative status from the
perspective of subjunctive, objective consequentialist theories.
In Chapter 6 I argue that cill extant objective formulations of consequentialism
fail to deliver the normative implications that the spirit of objective consequentialism
requires. My argument rests upon an objection based upon the claim that certain pairs
of subjunctive conditionals with identical antecedents and incompatible consequents
turn out to be such that neither is true. (They both turn out to be either false or
indeterminate, depending on your favorite semantic analysis of “morally relevant”
subjunctive conditionals ). I then introduce the concept of an “objective” subjunctive
probability. I utilize this concept in the transformation of a subjective version of
consequentialism into an objective version, one capable of dealing with the difficulties
posed by the objection. I end the chapter by indicating that something like these
objective subjunctive probabilities must play an essential role in the construction of
any plausible version of objective consequentialism to come.
I conclude the dissertation with a final chapter in which I defend possibilist (as
opposed to subjunctive
)
versions of consequentialism from a contemporary objection.





Just about a century ago, G. E. Moore laid the groundwork for a hundred years
of metaethical debate in the much misinterpreted Section 13 ofPrincipia Ethica
(1) The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is
disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may
be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that,
whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, with
significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good. To
take, for instance, one of the more plausible, because one of the more
complicated, of such proposed definitions, it may easily be thought, at
first sight, that to be good may mean to be that which we desire to
desire. Thus if we apply this definition to a particular instance and say
‘When we think that A is good, we are thinking that A is one of the
things which we desire to desire,’ our proposition may seem quite
plausible. But, if we carry the investigation further, and ask ourselves
‘Is it good to desire to desire A?’ it is apparent, on a little reflection,
that this question is itself as intelligible, as the original question ‘Is A
good?’—that we are, in fact, now asking for exactly the same
information about the desire to desire A, for which we formerly asked
with regard to A itself. But it is also apparent that the meaning of this
second question cannot be correctly analysed into ‘Is the desire to
desire A one off the things which we desire to desire?’: we have not
before our minds anything so complicated as the question ‘Do we
desire to desire to desire to desire A?’ Moreover any one can easily
convince himself by inspection that the predicate of this proposition
—
‘good’—is positively different from the notion of ‘desiring to desire’
which enters into its subject: ‘That we should desire to desire A is
good’ is not merely equivalent to ‘That A should be good is good.’ It
may indeed be true that what we desire to desire is always also good;
perhaps, even the converse may be true; but it is very doubtful whether
this is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very well what is
meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we have two different notions
before our minds.
(2) And the same consideration is sufficient to dismiss the hypothesis
that ‘good’ has no meaning whatsoever. It is very natural to make the
mistake of supposing that what is universally true is of such a nature
that its negation would be self-contradictory: the importance which has
been assigned to analytic propositions in the history of philosophy
shews how what seems to be a universal ethical principle is in fact an
identical proposition; that, if for example, whatever is called ‘good’
seems to be pleasant, the proposition ‘Pleasure is the good’ does not
assert a connection between two different notions, but involves only
one, that of pleasure, which is easily recognised as a distinct entity. But
whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually before
his mind when he asks the question ‘Is pleasure (or whatever it may be)
after all good?’ can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely
wondering whether pleasure is pleasant. And if he will try this
experiment with each suggested definition in succession, he may
become expert enough to recognise that in every case he has before his
mind a unique object, with regard to the connection of which with any
other object, a distinct question may be asked Every one does in fact
understand the question ‘Is this good?’ When he thinks of it, his state
of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked ‘Is this
pleasant, or desired, or approved?’ It has a distinct meaning for him,
even though he may not recognise in what respect it is distinct. 1
Within these passages is contained Moore’s famous Open Question Arguments
—
arguments that metaethicists of any stripe must eventually come to grips with. And
these arguments against metaethical naturalism
2
—the view that (i) moral terms can be
assigned naturalistic interpretations and (ii) moral properties are identical to natural
properties'—have provoked puzzlement and controversy among philosophers ever
since their genesis.
1 Moore (1993), pp. 67-68
2
While the Open Question Arguments presented in §13 are intended to undermine
various forms of metaethical naturalism as well as metaethical naturalism in general,
Moore presents Open Question Arguments against what he calls “metaphysical”
analyses of intrinsic goodness in Chapter IV ofPrincipm Ethica, see especially §74
3 My conception of metaethical naturalism is inherited from Fred Feldman. Assuming
that the meanings of all moral predicates are either identical to or partially
constructible from the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’, Feldman describes the
naturalist position in metaethics in the following way:
The main thesis of the naturalist, put in linguistic terms, is that “x is
good” can be defined exclusively by use of some combination of
naturalistic expressions. Put in metaphysical terms, the naturalist’s
view is that goodness can be analyzed purely by reference to some
combination of naturalistic properties. (Feldman 1978, p. 179)
6
Several of Moore’s contemporaries defended various forms of metaethical




To this day, some contemporary cognitivists embrace the force of
Moore’s Open Question Arguments against metaethical naturalism
.
5 And
noncognitivists—as well as those who defend various hybrid accounts of moral
terminology—have traditionally used Open Question Arguments to fuel their own
emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical programs
.
6
[Metaethical] naturalists agree on two main points. First, “x is good”
and the other moral terms can be defined Second, none of the
definitions needs to employ an irreducibly moral term; every one of
them can ultimately be paraphrased entirely of terms of naturalistic
expressions. (Feldman 1978, p. 180)
4
Ross (1930), pp. 8, 92-94, and his (1939), p. 27; the concluding chapter of Broad’s
(1930), Broad (1985), pp. 265f; and Ewing (1953), pp. 90f Interestingly, Bertrand
Russell found the Open Question Arguments very persuasive yet never explicitly
committed himself in print to metaethical nonnaturalism. But perhaps the early
Russell should be classified with the metaethical nonnaturalists nonetheless, for he
admitted that he didn’t disagree with anything in Chapter I of Principia Ethica. See
his reviews of Principia Ethica—(1903) and (1904)—for details. Russell would later
change his mind, finding metaethical noncognitivism more attractive than Moore’s
preferred position. Also see Kolnai (1980) for a slightly more contemporary
metaethical nonnaturalist who has been influenced by Moore’s Open Question
Argument.
5
Florgan, T. and Timmons, M. (1992a) and (1992b), Gampel (1997), Lewy (1970),
and, possibly. Prior (1949) and Rosati (1995).
6 Ayer uses an Open Question Argument to motivate emotivism in Ayer (1952), pp.
104f. While disputing that Moore’s Open Question Arguments entail the impossibility
of analytic reductions of fundamental ethical terms, Stevenson uses an Open Question
Argument to establish that there is an emotive meaning component of such terms that
cannot be captured by their analytic definitions; see Stevenson (1944), pp 272f, and
his (1963), pp 15, 30, 134 Flare adopts an altered version of an Open Question
Argument to bolster a prescriptivist metaethical program in his (1952), pp 81-92.
And recent writers use Moore’s arguments to block metaethical quasi-realism and
metaethical expressivism from naturalistic attacks. See Blackburn (1984), pp. 167-
7
This is not to suggest, however, that Open Question Arguments don’t have
their fair share of detractors. That Moore’s arguments are question-begging, that the
strategies employed in the arguments commit its advocates to unenviable positions
with respect to the Paradox of Analysis, and that the assumptions Moore relies upon in
his arguments are incompatible with the popular Kripke-Putnam causal theory of
reference are but a sample of the serious objections that have been lodged against
Open Question Arguments. But before attending to these objections, a bit of
preliminary work is required.
Many recent commentators have suggested that Moore’s Open Question
Arguments are complete wrecks. Their deployment has been labeled “accident
prone,”
7
simple to dismiss,* and just plain invalid. 9
Whatever flaws Moore’s arguments contain, 10 these recent allegations are
completely unfounded. In fact, many of these attacks seem to result from critical
misinterpretations of Moore’s passages, serving as a testament to how unwieldy these
passages have proved to be for philosophers.
171, and his (1998), pp. 1 4f Also see Gibbard (1984), pp. 200-206, as well as his
( 1 985), p. 6, and his ( 1 990), pp 11, 16-17, 1 9-22, 1 1 8, and 1 86.
7
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997b), p. 3.
8
Sturgeon (1992), p. 799. Also see Sturgeon (1985), p. 26: “So I do not think that
Moore’s open question argument shows anything of interest.” Lycan (1988) echoes
Sturgeon’s sentiments: “In any case, the Open Question Argument simply fails; it is
bankrupt.” (201)
9 Harman (1977), p 1 9. Putnam implies as much in his (1981), p. 208. Sturgeon also
seems sympathetic to this diagnosis of Moore’s argument; see his (1985), pp 25-26
and his (1992), pp. 799-800.
8
I’m interested in defending a version of Moore’s argument against these recent
objections. In what follows, I expose a couple of these influential attacks on Open
Question Arguments as misguided by indicating where they rest upon faulty Moorean
interpretations. Next, I provide what I take to be an accurate interpretation of an Open
Question Argument that Moore presents in §13 ofPrincipia Ethica, before indicating
the precise point at which it seems to falter And finally—by way of providing an
explanation for what I call the ‘Open Question phenomenon’—I present a slightly
modified version of Moore’s Open Question Argument that may very well establish
the problem with various naturalist analyses of ethical predicates that Moore was onto,
an argument that might in the end turn out to be not so easy to dismiss.
To see precisely just how cumbersome Moore’s Open Question passages have
been for philosophers, it would be helpful to take a close look at the interpretations of,
first, a sympathetic Moore scholar, and then, one of Moore’s most severe critics.
1 . 1 Regan’s Interpretation
Under the listing ‘Moore, G. E ’ in the Encyclopedia ofEthics can be found
Tom Regan’s characterization of Moore’s Open Question Argument Regan—
a
dedicated Moore scholar—writes:
Moore marshals a number of arguments that purport to prove Good’s
indefinability. The most famous is the so-called “open question
argument.” If Good were complex, then it would be possible to
enumerate its parts in a definition. Abstractly considered, this would
take the form “Good means ‘A and B’ ” But, argues Moore, to ask “Is
it good that Good is ‘A and B’?” is a significant question, which it
10 Whether “open question” arguments are question-begging or present insurmountable
difficulties in the philosophy of language seem to be substantial concerns—concerns to
be addressed later.
9
could not be if ‘Good’ were defined as ‘A and B\ For it is not
significant to ask, “Is it A and B that A and B is ‘A and B’?” 11
Regan begins his presentation of Moore’s argument by asking us to consider the
abstract form of what a successful analysis of the concept of goodness might be like:
AS: Good means ‘A and B’, 12
which should be read as “The concept (or property) of goodness is the intension of ‘A
and B\” The term Good is used by Regan as a concept (or property) referring term
The terms A and B are, presumably, intended to be interpreted as schematic place
holders. The replacing of these terms with certain predicates (or perhaps the
nominative counterparts of certain predicates) is purported to yield a well-formed
statement of a prospective analysis of the concept of goodness.
Regan then presents what I interpret as the following two question schemas:
QS1: Is it good that Good is ‘A and B’?
QS2: Is it A and B that A and B is ‘A and B’?n
11
Regan (1992), p. 821.
Note that the use of two schematic placeholders in the analysis schema ensures that
Regan’s “open question” argument is intended only as a method to undermine complex
conceptions of intrinsic goodness—an interpretation that is perfectly compatible with
two passages in the opening paragraph of §13. But there is a problem with this
interpretation There are Open Question Arguments in §13 designed to cast doubt
upon the identification of intrinsic goodness with a simple
,
naturalistic property—
namely, pleasure. Moore describes the term ‘pleasure’ as indefinable, and the concept
that is expresses as simple, in §12 ofPrincipia Ethica. However, Moore appears to
have distanced himself from the position that the concept of pleasure is simple and
indefinable in his (1993b):
That I myself was thinking of a class of predicates like ‘is a state of
pleasure’ in some respect quite other than that of being analysable, is
plainly shown by the fact that, in this very passage, in which I am
insisting that ‘Pleasure is good’ does not mean Pleasure is pleasure, I
nevertheless declare (falsely, as I now think) that ‘pleasure’ is
unanalysable. (12)
10
Regan appears to be interpreting Moore as arguing for the claim that while questions
generated by substituting the placeholders in QS1 with elements of the appropriate
grammatical category are significant, questions generated in this way from QS2 are
clearly not. And since questions generated from QS1 are alleged to have a property
that questions generated from QS2 clearly lack, Regan infers, on Moore’s behalf, that
such questions must differ in meaning, and thus, via a plausible substitution principle,
that there are no two predicates that can be plugged into the analysis schema above in
a way that would preserve the success of the analysis. It is from such an argument that
Regan apparently believes that Moore inferred one of his most famous doctrines: that
no analysis of the concept of intrinsic goodness is possible—it must be a simple,
unanalyzable concept.
It’s interesting to note that there are some similarities between Moore’s text
and Regan’s reconstruction. I’m strongly inclined to believe that the argument Regan
attributes to Moore is extracted from the following passage in §13:
The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is
disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may
be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that,
whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, with
significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good 14
But despite any similarities, there are overriding reasons to reject Regan’s
reconstruction as a plausible interpretation of Moore’s thoughts.
13
I’m uncertain as to what role the single quotes in these question schemas are
intended to play.
14 Moore (1993), p. 67.
11
Regan s reconstruction stems from perhaps the murkiest passage in Principici
Ethica
,
so it shouldn t be surprising that there may be some controversy as to how it
would be best interpreted. One reason, however, why Regan’s construction should be
rejected has to do with the fact that Moore clarifies the quotation above with his
famous “desire to desire” Open Question Argument—an argument that, under any
plausible interpretation, is clearly incompatible with what Regan attributes to Moore 15
A more important reason why we should reject Regan’s account is that, as
stated, it appears to contain a number of formal flaws. Recall Regan’s schemas:
AS: Good means ‘A and B’,
QS1: Is it good that Good is ‘A and B’?
QS2: Is it A and B that A and B is ‘A and B’?
One might be led to believe, upon a quick reading of Regan’s discussion, that the
schematic placeholders A and B in the schemas above can be replaced by items of the
same grammatical category in all of their instances to generate well formed
prospective analyses in the first case and well formed questions in the other two cases.
But such a belief would be mistaken.
In Regan’s analysis schema (AS), predicates are the appropriate items for
substitution: the substitution ofA and B with predicates is purported to yield a
prospective analysis. But in QS1, the placeholders seem to be located within a
15
This can be gleaned by inspection. The quotation from which Regan extracts his
argument is the first sentence of the extended quotation located on the first page of this
chapter. The remainder of the paragraph is dedicated to the presentation of the “desire
to desire” Open Question Argument, which is intended to be an instance of the type of
argument that Moore is describing in the quotation with which Regan is working. For
a lucid and plausible interpretation of Moore’s “desire to desire” Open Question
Argument, see Feldman (1978), pp. 199-202.
12
concept (or property) identity sentence “schema.” Thus, the appropriate grammatical
items for substitution in QS1 are concept (or property) referring terms. QS2 is even
more problematic. The appropriate items for substitution of the first instances ofA
and B are predicates, while the second and third instances, just as in QS1, call for
concept (or property) referring terms as substitutes. With his presentation plagued by
these formal problems, it becomes fairly difficult to get a grasp upon exactly what
argument Regan means to present here.
One might hope to improve matters by interpreting what appear to be the
concept identity schemas embedded within QS1 and QS2 as abbreviated versions of
the analysis schema (AS). 16 On such an interpretation, QS1 and QS2 should be read
this way:
QS 1 ’ : Is it good that Good means ‘A and B’?
QS2’: Is it A and B that A and B means ‘A and B’?
But even on this interpretation, QS2’ is difficult to interpret; for while predicates are
the appropriate substitutes for the first and third instances ofA and B in the
construction of questions from QS2’, the second instances require concept (or
property) referring terms as substitutes to achieve the intended results.
We could tinker further. Perhaps the second instances ofA and B in QS2’ are
the result of a slip of the hand. In that case, QS2’ might be re-interpreted like this:
QS2”: Is it A and B that Good means ‘A and B’?
If QS1’ and QS2” are the question schemas that Regan means to be discussing, then
Moore’s Open Question Argument is believed to rest upon the claim that while
16 An interpretation of this sort might be motivated by its compatibility with the quoted
passage above.
13
questions generated in the appropriate way from QS1 are significant, questions
generated in the appropriate way from QS2” are not.
Problems still remain. First of all, it seems highly unlikely that Moore had any
of the question schemas (or questions that can be generated via the schemas) we have
considered in mind when developing his own Open Question Arguments in §13 of
Principia E/hica. And for good reason too: Regan’s reconstruction doesn’t seem quite
capable of capturing the Open Question phenomenon with which Moore was so
concerned.
Notice that the question schemas presently under consideration
—
QS1’ and
QS2”—have been constructed so as to be able to generate questions about
philosophical analyses. Questions generated from QS1’, for example, ask of
prospective analyses whether they themselves are good. Questions generated from
QS2” are presumably intended to fulfill similar roles: to ask of various prospective
analyses whether or not they have certain properties. But, aside from the absence of
any textual justification, it’s doubtful that Moore would have believed our two
question schemas capable of bringing the Open Question phenomenon to our attention.
An example might serve to illustrate why.
Consider a prospective analysis of goodness:
HD: Good means ‘pleasant and desired’.
Now, using this prospective analysis and our question schemas, we can generate the
following questions:
Ql’: Is it good that Good means ‘pleasant and desired' 9
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Q2 Is it pleasant and desired that Good means "pleasant and
desired’?
Regan assures us that the Open Question phenomenon will exhibit itself upon
contemplation of the meanings of these two questions. On Regan’s interpretation, we
might be expected to find that Ql’ is in some interesting sense significant while Q2”
is not, where significant questions might be considered to be those whose answers
aren’t provided by their meanings alone. 17 Close examination of these questions,
however, seems to suggest that either both are significant or both are not. Allow me to
explain.
Ql’ asks whether the “fact” that Good means ‘pleasant and desired’ is
intrinsically good. The answer to this question seems to be “No.” Propositions
expressed by “analysis” statements simply can’t possess positive intrinsic goodness.
Perhaps certain states of affairs—especially those involving interesting states of
consciousness—are candidates for bearers of intrinsic goodness, 18 but propositions
expressed by statements of analysis are not
Similar remarks apply to question Q2”. Q2” asks whether the “fact” that
Good means ‘pleasant and desired’ is pleasant and desired. Again, the answer clearly
appears to be “No.” Why? Because propositions expressed by statements of analysis
are not among the kinds of thing that even could be pleasant Sensations, sunsets, and
17
I’ll stick with this somewhat loose account of significance for now. A slightly more
in depth discussion of the concepts of open questions and significant questions is just
on the horizon.
18
This appears to be Moore’s view; see Chapter VI ofPrincipia Ethicci.
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various experiences might turn out to be pleasant, but propositions expressed by
statements of analysis? I think not.
The answers to both of our questions appear to be the same, and for similar
reasons. Both questions seem to involve, at least to some extent, a sort of linguistic
error. They ask of a prospective analysis whether it falls under the extension of a
predicate that it simply can’t fall under. In virtue of this feature, each of the questions
appears to be significant yet uninteresting. I think that I know the correct answer to
each question in virtue of the meanings of its words and recognition of the linguistic
error that seems to be committed in each 19 Failing to uncover any interesting
differences regarding significance between the two questions, we should be led to the
conclusion that Regan has failed to identify the sort of questions that can be used to
exhibit the Open Question phenomenon that Moore utilized in his attempts to
19
Consider what I take to be an analogous case involving a similar linguistic error.
Let the following serve as a prospective analysis:
MS: Brother means ‘male and sibling’.
Now for our questions:
Q3: Is it a brother that Brother means ‘male and sibling’?
Q4: Is it a male and a sibling that Brother means ‘male and sibling’?
(Perhaps Q3 and Q4 should be replaced with the more grammatical Q5 and Q6:
Q5: Is the proposition that Brother means ‘male and sibling’ a brother?
Q6: Is the proposition that Brother means ‘male and sibling’ a male and a sibling?)
My commentary on this case is predictable. On the (perhaps highly unlikely)
assumption that there aren’t any serious category mistakes committed in Q3 and Q4
(or Q5 and Q6), I’m inclined to say that the answer to both questions is “No.”
Propositions expressed by statements of analysis aren’t things that can even possibly
be brothers or males or siblings. Thus, if one is significant, then, as I see it, the other
must be as well. Julie Petty and Clay Splawn suggested the usefulness of this second
case in further illustrating what I believe to problems with the first
16
undermine metaethical naturalism. Thus, in addition to the formal problems discussed
above, a principle of charity should prevent us from believing that Regan’s
reconstruction mirrors Moore’s thoughts to any substantial extent Perhaps a more
caustic interpreter ofMoore will fare better.
1.2 Sturgeon’s Interpretation
Among contemporary critics of Moore’s Open Question Arguments, Nicholas
Sturgeon appears to be the most hostile. Sturgeon doesn’t “think that Moore’s open
question argument shows anything of interest;” 20 rather, he believes it to be relatively
simple to dismiss. 21 But Sturgeon’s hostility may in fact be unfounded, indicating that
his grasp of Moore’s influential arguments may not be so firm Here’s how Sturgeon
formulates Moore’s Open Question Argument:
Moore assumes (a) that each of the theories under attack will provide
an explicit reductive identification for moral properties, such as
“Goodness = conformity to the nature of the universe” or “Goodness =
pleasure”; (b) that such property-identifications can be true only if the
terms flanking the identity sign are synonymous for a competent
speaker; and (c) that the terms can be shown not to be synonymous by
the mere fact that a competent speaker could conceivably doubt the
identity statement—by the fact, that is, that it remains an “open
question” whether the identification is correct. Thus both simple
doctrines fail simply on the grounds that doubt about them is
22
imaginable.
Sturgeon appears to be under the impression that Moore’s argument turns upon
whether or not someone is able to doubt a certain kind of identity statement. If we
20
Sturgeon (1985), p. 26.
21




allow goodness’ and ‘pleasure’ to serve as property referring terms, 23 we can
characterize Sturgeon’s interpretation of Moore’s argument in the following way.
Consider the popular “hedonic” property identification:
G=P: goodness = pleasure
Sturgeon interprets Moore as suggesting that if it is possible for a competent speaker
to doubt the identity statement G=P, then G=P is false. And presumably. Sturgeon
would interpret Moore’s general attack upon metaethical naturalism as resting upon
the plausibility of a generalized version of the argument
Note, first of all, that Sturgeon’s reconstruction is not true to the Moorean
texts. How support could be generated for the idea that Moore might have used
something like the possibility of doubting property-identity statements in his Open
Question Arguments is puzzling. Moreover, as shall soon become clear, strapping
Moore with such a position does him a serious injustice. 24 And while there are some
passages that might be interpreted as property-identity statements in §13, it is clear
that they are not intended to play crucial roles in the central premises of his Open
Question Arguments. No textual justification can be provided for the claim that the
... ,
~
‘Pleasure’ is a tricky word that is commonly used to refer to a variety of different
things. Unfortunately, both Moore and Sturgeon use it on occasion to refer to a certain
property (or notion) that I would prefer to call ‘pleasantness’. But I will stick with
their nomenclature—for now.
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Roger Hancock seems to be the first to construct an “open question” argument with
“property-identity” statements playing prominent roles in the central premises; see his
(1960), pp. 329f. But Hancock, unlike Sturgeon, presents his interpretation of
Moore’s argument in an attempt to nail down the notion of a significant question that
Moore makes use of in an earlier Open Question Argument Furthermore, Hancock’s
“property-identity” statements are completely different in form, and substance, from
Sturgeon’s P=G. Hancock interprets Moore as doubting whether two different
predicates designate (or express) the same property in certain sentences—a much more
charitable and accurate interpretation of Moore’s thoughts
18
Open Question Arguments turn upon whether certain property identity statements can
be doubted. Rather, Moore is interested in the meanings of certain interpretations of
the predicates ‘x is good’ and ‘x is pleasant’, as well as certain others.
Furthermore, as the argument is stated, it remains unclear as to how the
inference from the fact that a property-identity statement can be doubted to its falsity
is supposed to work. With no textual justification for the inference, it seems
reasonable to ask why Moore, or anyone for that matter, would make such an
inference. Surely it’s possible for people to doubt true property identity statements,
isn’t it? And this possibility might indicate that further elucidation of the inference
that Sturgeon attributes to Moore is in order.
Perhaps Sturgeon’s interpretation relies upon some unstated yet implicit
premises, which may serve to explicate the structure of the inference that Sturgeon




It is possible that a competent speaker doubts that goodness is identical
to pleasure
2. It is not possible that a competent speaker doubts that pleasure is
identical to pleasure.
3. If (1) and (2), then the proposition that goodness is identical to pleasure
is not identical to the proposition that pleasure is identical to pleasure.
4. If the proposition that goodness is identical to pleasure is not identical
to the proposition that pleasure is identical to pleasure, then goodness is
not identical to pleasure
5. Thus, goodness is not identical to pleasure.
25 The generalized version of Sturgeon’s argument might be characterized as follows:
6. For any natural property N, it is possible that a competent speaker
doubts that goodness is identical to N.
7. For any natural property N, it is not possible that a competent speaker
doubts that N is identical to N.
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Some might be led to think that this version of Sturgeon s argument accurately
characterizes an Open Question Argument presented by Moore in §13 ofPrincipia
Ethica. Moore certainly believed premise (1) to be true; he in fact doubted that
pleasure is identical to goodness. And I think Moore would be very sympathetic to
premise (2) as well. The proposition that premise (2) proclaims to be impossible to
doubt is a tautology, and the principle that tautologies are impossible to doubt seems
safe enough. Premise (3) rests upon the plausible principle that should a competent
speaker stand in a doubting relation to one proposition, but not to another, then the two
propositions are not identical—a principle that the Moore of Principia Ethica surely
endorsed 26 The question now is whether Moore would endorse anything like premise
(4), and this seems highly unlikely, for, among other reasons, it conflicts with any
plausible Moorean solution to the Paradox of Analysis 27
8. If (6) and (7), then for any natural property N, the proposition that
goodness is identical to N is not identical to the proposition that N is
identical to N.
9. If for any natural property N, the proposition that goodness is identical
to N is not identical to the proposition that N is identical to N, then for
any natural property N, goodness is not identical to N.
10. Thus, for any natural property N, goodness is not identical to N.
26
See the last sentence of the extended quotation on the first page of this chapter
where Moore presents his “doubting” Open Question Argument. For further
justification, see Moore’s influential “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), where he
presents an account of mind-independent concepts that can be combined to form
propositions. And these propositions, Moore suggests, are capable of playing the role
of mind-independent objects of thought.
27
Moore’s Open Question Arguments and the Paradox of Analysis have been
purported to be very tightly linked. In fact, one of the most popular contemporary
objections to Moorean Open Question Arguments is that even if success is temporarily
granted to the arguments, the very strategies employed in them will plunge advocates
into the Paradox of Analysis without any escape routes. For critical discussion of the
20
Throughout his philosophical career, Moore struggled to come to grips with the
nature of analysis and the prospects of analyzing certain concepts and propositions
And while he himself admitted that he never succeeded in providing a solution to his
famous “Paradox of Analysis,” 28 he did believe that the correct solution, whatever it
may be, must make for clear distinctions between the propositions expressed by the
following sentences. 29
B 1 : Something is a brother iff it is a male sibling.
B2: To be a brother is to be a male sibling.
Moore doesn’t believe that B1 and B2 express identical propositions. He does,
however, believe that if B 1 were false, then B2 would be as well. 30 Thus, on Moore’s
view, the falsity of a universally quantified statement like B1 entails the falsity of the
“concept identification” statement B2. But Moore does not believe that the
proposition expressed by B2, on at least one interpretation, is identical to that
expressed by
B3: To be a brother is to be a brother,
31
even though (i) B2 and B3 are “concept-identity” statements and (ii) he does believe
that the proposition expressed by B1 is identical to that expressed by
B4: Something is a brother if and only if it is a brother.
objection, see Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1997b); Lewy (1970); Langford (1968),
and Moore (1968).
28 Moore (1968), pp. 660-667.
29
Ibid. Also see Lewy (1970), pp. 30 Iff.
30
Ibid.
31 Moore (1968), pp. 660-667.
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Thus, a Moorean treatment of analysis must allow for the possibility that the while the
concept of a brother is identical to the concept of a male sibling, the proposition
expressed by B2 is not identical to the proposition expressed by B3 (on at least one
interpretation). In other words, while Moore agrees that the concept of a brother is
identical to the concept of a male sibling, he does not believe that the intension of ‘the
concept of a brother’ (or, on a Fregean interpretation, the concept of the concept of a
brother) is identical to the intension of ‘the concept of a male sibling’. And it is this
sort of difference among intensions that might make for informative analyses on a
Moorean (and Church-Fregean 32 ) account.
To see precisely how premise (4) stands in conflict with Moorean solutions to
the Paradox of Analysis, an examination of its role in the argument is called for.
Consider the following sentences:
G=P: Goodness is identical to pleasure
P=P: Pleasure is identical to pleasure
Given the truth of premises (1) and (2), premise (3) implies that the propositions
expressed by G=P and P=P are not identical. But upon inspection, one notices that the
only difference between the two sentences is that the term ‘Goodness’ in G=P has
been substituted with the term ‘Pleasure’ in P=P. A defender of premise (4) would
have us conclude from this fact that goodness is not identical to pleasure. Doing so,
however, would not only violate the spirit of Moorean analysis but probably would
commit us to an inference error as old as the morning star and the evening star.
32
See Church (1946) for a Fregean solution to the Paradox of Analysis that meets
Moore’s constraints. For further support for the Church-Fregean solution, see White
(1948).
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Moorean analysis rests upon the possibility that terms (or phrases) with
identical extensions can differ intensionally. The phrases ‘to be a brother’ and ‘to be a
male sibling serve as an example of this alleged phenomenon, allowing Moore to
distinguish the propositions expressed by (B2) and (B3) above. But it would be
absolutely unjustifiable to attribute to Moore the view that to be a brother is not to be a
male sibling in virtue of the facts that (i) (B2) and (B3) express non-identical
propositions and (ii) the only difference between the sentences is that the phrase ‘male
sibling’ in (B2) is substituted with the term ‘brother’ in (B3). They only thing that
should, perhaps, be inferred from these facts is that there are certain intensional—not
extensional—differences between the terms in these sentences. 13
Returning to Sturgeon’s reconstruction, the only inference Moore would be
willing to make from premises ( 1 )-(3) is that the intension of the term ‘goodness’
differs from the intension of the term ‘pleasure’. But of what value would it be for
Moore to try to show this? Differences among intensions don’t always make for
differences among extensions. Moore would be forced to admit that the difference
between the intensions of the two terms doesn’t have any clear impact upon the
hedonist’s proposal that goodness is identical to pleasantness, something that Moore’s
anti-hedonistic Open Question Argument is surely intended to show
While incompatibility with constraints of Moorean analysis suggests that it is
highly unlikely that Moore ever endorsed anything like premise (4), a less
anachronistic application of the principle of charity should prevent us from attributing
33 And if not intensional, then these facts might indicate that there are differences
concerning some other extension-determining feature of meaning between these terms.
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anything like it to Moore. 34 If the reasoning behind premise (4) could be justified,
then perhaps Frege’s most important lessons would have been for naught.
If property-referring terms are definite descriptions, then the reasoning behind
premise (4) would suggest that one who doubts that the morning star is identical to the
evening star but doesn t doubt that the morning star is identical to the morning star
could justifiably infer that the morning star isn’t identical to the evening star. But
Frege taught us long ago that reasoning in this way is fallacious. Such doubts might
be used to distinguish the intensions of the two descriptions, but nothing about their
extensions follows from them. And similar considerations would apply should
property-referring terms turn out to be best analyzed by reference to definite
descriptions in some way or other
With Moore’s view of analysis (as well as the principle of charity) in mind, it
becomes puzzling as to why Moore would take the possibility of doubting certain
property-identity (or concept-identity) statements to show anything of great
importance. My suggestion is that he didn’t and that Sturgeon’s characterization fails
34
Fred Feldman brought the following objection to my attention
35
Perhaps Sturgeon would choose this place to dig in his heels. Following Carnap
(1947) and Quine (1964), we might construct property-referring terms from open
sentences in the following way. Take the predicate ‘x is a brother’, for example. We
can use a lambda operator (or an abstraction operator), to construct a name for the
intension of the predicate from the open sentence that I am using as the name of the
predicate: A,x(x is a brother). The same procedure can be used to construct a name for
the predicate ‘x is a male sibling’: \x(x is a male sibling). Sturgeon might argue that
since the two property-referring terms were canonically formed from predicates
identical in meaning, they too must be identical in meaning. We might then interpret
Sturgeon as arguing “down” from differences in meaning between the two property-
referring terms to differences in meaning between the two predicates. But, again,
these inferences must be justified by independent arguments—arguments that would,
in effect, undermine any Moorean (of for that matter, Fregean) solution to the Paradox
of Analysis.
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to capture the substance of that which Moore put forth in his famous Open Question
passages.
1.3 Moore’s Message
Let’s return to the relevant portion of §13 in Principia Ethica :
It is very natural to make the mistake of supposing that what is
universally true is of such a nature that its negation would be self-
contradictory: the importance which has been assigned to analytic
propositions in the history of philosophy shews how what seems to be a
universal ethical principle is in fact an identical proposition; that, if for
example, whatever is called ‘good’ seems to be pleasant, the
proposition 'Pleasure is the good’ does not assert a connection between
two different notions, but involves only one, that of pleasure, which is
easily recognised as a distinct entity. But whoever will attentively
consider with himself what is actually before his mind when he asks the
question ‘Is pleasure (or whatever it may be) after all good?’ can easily
satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering whether pleasure is
pleasant. And if he will try this experiment with each suggested
definition in succession, he may become expert enough to recognise
that in every case he has before his mind a unique object, with regard to
the connection of which with any other object, a distinct question may
be asked. Every one does in fact understand the question ‘Is this
good?’ When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it
would be, were he asked ‘Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?’ It
has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in
what respect it is distinct. 36
There does seem to be an interesting Open Question Argument contained in the
passage, one that appears to have eluded our commentators’ grasps.
Moore is, initially, considering the inference people might be liable to make
from a “universal ethical principle” to a proposition about the identity of what Moore
calls “notions.” To illustrate Moore’s idea clearly, we can interpret Moore’s sentence
“whatever is called ‘good’ seems to be pleasant” as
36 Moore (1993), p. 68.
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GP: Vx(x is good 3 x is pleasant). 37
37 •How to interpret what Moore means by a “universal truth” in this context is a
delicate and difficult matter; the notions of universal and necessary truth were by no
means clearly characterized at the turn of the century.
Many (perhaps Sturgeon himself, and certainly Baldwin (1990, p 87)) would
probably interpret Moore’s universal statement that “whatever is called ‘good’ seems
to be pleasant’ as
GP’: Necessarily
,
Vx(x is good 3 x is pleasant).
My own hesitancy to interpret Moore in this way stems from (i) passages in Chapter
IV of Principia Ethica, (ii) Moore’s other writings on necessity and universality, and
(iii) the manner in which some of Moore’s contemporaries interpreted his work.
In “Necessity” (1900), published a few years earlier than Principia Ethica,
Moore takes great pains to distinguish necessary from universal truths, rejecting the
view “that every necessary proposition is one which asserts that some property is to be
found in every instance in which some other property is found.” The relevant question
here is whether Moore failed to include the term ‘possible’ between ‘every’ and
‘instance’ in his claim. IfMoore equated universal truths with truths asserting that
some particular property is to be found in every possible instance in which some other
particular property is found, then GP’ would probably reflect more accurately the
meaning of Moore’s claim in Principia Ethica.
Later writings, however, suggest that Moore did not have GP’ in mind in his
discussion universal truths. In his Philosophical Studies ( 1 922), Moore writes:
Thus what is meant by saying that “Whatever is a right angle, is also an
angle” is a necessary truth, is, so far as I can see, simply that the
proposition “(x is a right angle) entails (x is an angle)” is also true.
This seems to me to give what has, in fact, been generally meant in
philosophy by “necessary truths,” e.g. by Leibniz, and to point out the
distinction between them and those true universal propositions which
are “mere matters of fact.” (302)
This passage might be interpreted as suggesting that the set of true universal
propositions can be partitioned into two: one containing the set of all analytic
propositions, the other containing all true universally quantified propositions (such as
GP, perhaps) that are mere matters offact. And mere matters of fact seem to be
contingently true rather than necessarily so. This interpretation, thus, lends itself to a
GP rather that a GP’ formulation of Moore’s universal claim, for Moore disputes that
his universal claim is analytically true, but agrees, at least for the sake of argument,
that it might very well be true.
Another reason lending support to the GP interpretation stems from an
interpretation of Moore’s Open Question Argument put forth by one of Moore’s
contemporaries and fellow metaethical nonnaturalists, A C. Ewing.
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If we can show it to be even possible that it might be true of something
that it was A but false that it was BC or vice versa, it is enough to
overthrow the definition. For, if BC really were what A meant, it
would be self-contradictory to suggest that a man could be a father
(except in a metaphorical sense) without being a male parent. Thus,
even if it were a fact that we always desire what is good and what is
good alone, the corresponding definition of good in terms of desire
could still be refuted by pointing out that, even if this be in fact true,
there would be no contradiction in supposing it false Even if it be a
fact, it must still be admitted that it is just an empirical fact about
human nature which might for anything we can see have been quite
different, and not something which follows verbally from a knowledge
of the way in which we use the term “good.” With any one we can on
inspection see that the property given in the definition might without
any contradiction be supposed to belong to something that was not
good, and that therefore it cannot be an adequate definition. (Ewing
1953, p 91)
But while granting the consistency of Ewing’s interpretation with a GP
interpretation of Moore’s statement, there are at least two reasons to suggest that the
GP’ formulation is most appropriate. The first is that Moore admits of “necessary
connections” between, say, moral rightness and intrinsic value, while denying that
there are any analytically true propositions that connect the two (See Moore’s 1968,
pp. 562f). Some might infer from this fact that Moore believes all universally true
ethical statements (ethical statements being, roughly, statements containing ethical
predicates, or their nominative or adverbial counterparts) to be necessarily true. But
this inference would be wholly unjustified. Even if it were the case that everyone
believed of all good things that they were in fact good, the truth of such a universal
ethical proposition would be a clear case of a contingent universal ethical truth.
A second, and more important, reason why a GP’ interpretation might be
considered more accurate is that no one is likely to infer the property-identification
statement P=G’ (the property of pleasantness is identical to the property of goodness)
from a contingent, universally quantified statement like GP, well at least not anyone
nowadays. While necessary coextension of predicates may lead naturally to belief in
certain property-identity statements, actual coextension of predicates does not See
(Lewis 1986a, pp. 50ff) for a clear discussion of these matters. Thus, it might be
believed that the inference of P=G’ from GP’ is the only interesting possible inference
in this situation. While I will stick with my GP interpretation of Moore’s claim, I am
sensitive to the fact that probably no contemporary philosopher would make the
inference from GP to P=G’. And it is this fact that might have led Sturgeon to
interpret Moore’s central premise as involving the possibility of doubting a certain
property-identity statement (P=G’)—a statement that many would believe to be
inconsequentially distinct from a certain statement indicating a necessary coextension
of predicates (Necessarily, Vx(Px iff Gx)).
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And we can interpret Moore’s “identical proposition” that “Pleasure is the good” as
P=G: The notion of pleasure is identical to the notion of goodness.
Moore worries that the conceivable truth ofGP will convince people to identify the
notion of pleasure with that of goodness, thus leading them down the path of
Whether a naturalistic predicate is necessarily
,
rather than merely accidentally
,
coextensive with an ethical predicate seems to be of utmost importance. Moore, in
fact, constructs another Open Question Argument in Chapter IV of Principia E/hica
aimed at undermining the claim that necessarily coextensive predicates must be
identical in meaning. Here he distinguishes the universal truths that are used in his
§13 Open Question Arguments from the necessary truths he uses in his §74 Open
Question Argument:
These two classes of philosophers do, indeed, differ with regard to the
nature of scientific laws. The former class tend to suppose that when
they say ‘This always accompanies that’ they mean only ‘This has
accompanied, does now, and will accompany that in these particular
instances’: they reduce the scientific law quite simply and directly to
the familiar type of proposition which I have pointed out. But this does
not satisfy the metaphysicians. They see that when you say ‘This
would accompany that, if that existed,’ you don’t mean only that this
and that have existed and will exist together so many times. (1993,
175)
I believe, just as Moore probably did, that Open Question Arguments exert a certain
philosophical force regardless of whether they’re motivated by certain universal truths
or certain necessary truths. For those curious about Moore’s §74 Open Question
Argument passage, here it is:
For whatever we may have proved to exist, and whatever two existents
we may have proved to be necessarily connected with one another, it
still remains a distinct and different question whether what thus exists is
good; whether either or both of the two existents is so; and whether it is
good that they should exist together. To assert the one is plainly and
obviously not the same thing as to assert the other. We understand
what we mean by asking: Is this, which exists, or necessarily exists,
after all, good? and we perceive that we are asking a question which
has not been answered. In face of this direct perception that the two
questions are distinct, no proof that they must be identical can have the
slightest value. That the proposition ‘This is good’ is thus distinct from
every other proposition was proved in Chapter I (1993, 176-7)
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metaethical naturalism. It is in response to this possible inference that Moore presents
his anti-hedonistic Open Question Argument.
Moore asks us to consider a couple of apparently different questions:
Q1 : Is pleasure pleasant?
Q2: Is pleasure good?
Q1 and Q2 as they stand, however, seem to be formulated in a somewhat confusing
way, owing to Moore’s inconsistent usage of the term ‘pleasure’. Sometimes Moore
uses pleasure to refer to a notion, a type of feeling of which all particular experienced
pleasures are instances.
38 He uses ‘pleasure’ in this way in the formulation of his
“identical proposition” P=G above. But other times he uses it as the nominative
counterpart of the predicate ‘x is pleasant’, and is thus using the term to “refer” to all
the pleasant things.
39
38 Moore held what might be called “the distinctive feeling” view of pleasure: the view
that pleasures are certain feelings that may differ in intensity and duration but that are
phenomenologically uniform. To experience a pleasure, on this view, is to experience
the so-called distinctive feeling of pleasure to some intensity, for some duration. The
distinctive feeling view of pleasure is carefully described and seemingly justifiably
rejected by Fred Feldman in his (1988).
39
I don’t, at present, have an analysis for the half-empty schema: Term, /, is the
nominative counterpart of predicate, P, iff. . . . But I do have an intuitive idea about





I believe the terms ‘water’, ‘chocolate’, and ‘sugar’ to be the nominative counterparts
of the predicates ‘x is water’, ‘x is chocolate’, and ‘x is sugar’, respectively.
Nominative counterparts of predicates “refer” to the items that fall under the extension
of the relevant predicate. Thus, the “water” question above asks whether the extension
29
Clarification of Moore’s intentions is required to generate a charitable
interpretation of his questions. If we interpret Moore as referring to the notion of
pleasure with his use of ‘pleasure’ in the questions, as he does in the construction of
his “identical propositions,” then the questions turn out to be very unusual, and,
moreover, unsuited to do the work that Moore has in mind. 40 What theoretical purpose
could be served by questioning whether the notion of pleasure is pleasant, or good? It
is simply inappropriate to question whether or not predicates such as ‘x is good’ or ‘x
is pleasant’ are applicable to names of notions. Notions are simply not of the kind of
thing that can be good or pleasant in any straightforward way. Therefore, I suggest we
interpret the term ‘pleasure’ in Moore’s questions as the nominative counterpart of the
predicate ‘x is pleasant’ This interpretation can be made explicit by substituting the
following questions for Moore’s originals: 41
Ql’: Are all pleasant things pleasant?
Q2’: Are all pleasant things good?
of ‘x is water’ is a subset of the extension of ‘x is wet’. Similar interpretations are
available for the other two questions.
40
This interpretation of the question suffers from a sort of linguistic error analogous to
the one charged against Regan above. Just as propositions expressed by statements of
analysis aren’t bearers of intrinsic goodness, neither are properties or concepts.
41
That these questions are the ones Moore intended to discuss is evidenced in his




what I really mean to assert is that G is not identical with any
predicate of this particular class, or that propositions which assert of
predicates of this class, that what has them has G, are non-tautologous.
They suggest, in fact, that G is not identical with any predicates, which
are, in a certain respect
,
like ‘is a state of pleasure’ and ‘is desired’
—




With these questions in hand, we might reconstruct what I call Moore’s Ami-
Hedonistic Open Question Argument.
But whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually
before his mind when he asks the question ‘Is pleasure (or whatever it
may be) after all good9 ’ can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely
wondering whether pleasure is pleasant.
Moore’s argument is terse, and unfortunately, not perfectly transparent But a
clear explanation of how it is supposed to work is readily available. 42 Let us introduce
the notion of an open question 43 We can say a question is open just in case either (i) it
is possible for a person to have a complete understanding of its meaning without
knowing the correct answer to it or (ii) it makes sense as something to say as a
expression of genuine doubt 44
42
With the exception of some minor alterations, the following interpretation is
presented in Feldman (1978), pp. 202f. A similar interpretation is provided in Horgan
and Timmons (1992b), pp. 154ff.
43
Interestingly, the phrase ‘open question’ doesn’t occur in what is considered
Moore’s most famous “open question” passages: §13 of Principia Ethica Rather, the
phrase is introduced in the last sentence of §14:
For we shall start with the conviction that good must mean so and so,
and shall therefore be inclined either to misunderstand our opponent’s
arguments or to cut them short with the reply, ‘This is not an open
question: the very meaning of the word decides it; no one can think
otherwise except through confusion.’ (1993, p. 72)
This conception of an open question is seemingly the same as Moore’s notion
of a “significant question” utilized in the opening passages of § 1 3
:
The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is
disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may
be most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that,
whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, with
significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good.
(1993, p. 67).
44 The concept of an open question has been described in a number of very similar
ways. A question is an open question iff: “it is possible for a person to understand its
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Next, the object of Moore s attack—a hedonistic version of metaethical
natural—must be identified
BH: x is good =df. x is pleasant,
which should be read: “The predicate ‘x is good’ is definitionally equivalent to the
predicate ‘x is pleasant’.”
Now for the argument:
1. Q 1 ’ is not open.
2. Q2’ is open.
3
. If ( 1 ) and (2), then Q 1 ’ differs in meaning from Q2’
.
4. If Q1 ’ differs in meaning from Q2\ then BH is false
5. Therefore, BH is false.
Premise ( 1 ) is clearly true. Due to the tautologous nature ofQ 1’, mere grasp of its
meaning forces an affirmative response.
meaning fully without knowing the correct answer “(Feldman 1978, p. 202); “it is
possible for someone to completely understand the question, yet not know its answer”
(Horgan and Timmons 1992b, p. 155); “it is not answerable merely by reference to a
priori, analytic truths based on the meanings of the words involved” (Gampel 1997, p.
148); it is possible to doubt an affirmative answer to the question (Brink 1989, 152-
153);“it makes sense as something to say in a serious discussion, as an expression of
genuine doubt” (Lewis 1989, p. 130). And Stephen Ball captures the notion of an
open question in this way: “The insight of Moore’s argument is that no matter what a
naturalist takes P to be, one can recognize that a given x has P and yet still reasonably
ask whether x is good or morally right—that is, this remains an ‘open question’” (Ball
1988, p. 197).
Other commentators on Moore’s Open Question Arguments—including Moore
himself in his (1993b)—have eschewed discussion of open questions altogether,
preferring to work with the similar, if not identical, concept of a “significant” question
(or statement) instead. Most interpretations of Moore’s “significance” involve the
concept of a contradiction or a tautology. For example, the question “Are all pleasant
things good?” comes out as significant according to many interpreters just in case a
negative answer to the question doesn’t imply a contradiction This sort of
employment of the notion of a significant question (or statement) in the construction of
Moore’s arguments can be found in Prior (1949), p 2; Ewing (1953), p. 91; White
(1958a), p. 126; and Putnam (1981), p 206. Hancock (1960) distinguishes three
notions of significance (the second being very similar to the notion employed by the
other “significance” interpreters), suggesting that none of them will serve to establish
Moore’s anti-naturalist conclusions.
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Premise (2) is much trickier, and subsequently, much more controversial
Reflection upon Q2\ Moore assures us, should somehow indicate the openness of the
question. An understanding of its meaning doesn’t force us to provide an affirmative
response to it in the same way that the trivial Q1 ’ does. In fact, philosophers have
provided negative responses to Q2’. 45
Premise (3), though not immune from attack, is fairly plausible. It rests upon
the principle that two questions differing with respect to which meaning-related
properties they instantiate, differ in meaning. If Q2’ has the property of being open,
something that Ql’ obviously lacks, then the two questions must have different
meanings.
Premise (4) is justified by a substitution principle. The only difference
between the two questions is that the second instance of the term ’pleasant’ in Ql’ is
substituted with the term ‘good’ in Q2’. Thus, assuming a straightforward principle of
45
Not surprisingly, Moore himself offers a negative response to Q2’ in Chapter VI of
Principia Elhica. Here’s how Moore characterizes the first class of the three “greatest
positive evils”:
The first class consists of those evils, which seem always to include an
enjoyment or admiring contemplation of things which are themselves
either evil or ugly. That is to say these evils are characterised by the
fact that they include precisely the same emotion, which is also
essential to the greatest unmixed goods, from which they are
differentiated by the fact that this emotion is directed towards an
inappropriate object. ... It is, however, important to observe that the
very same emotions, which are often loosely talked of as the greatest or
the only goods, may be essential constituents of the very worst wholes:
that, according to the nature of the cognition which accompanies them,
they may be conditions either of the greatest good, or of the greatest
evil. (1993, p. 257)
Moore’s view seems to be that pleasant things are capable of being as intrinsically
good as things can get—but are also capable of being, perhaps, as intrinsically bad as
things can get.
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compositionality, if there’s any difference in meaning between the two questions, it
must be due to a difference in meaning between the terms ‘pleasant’ and ‘good’ And
any difference here obviously entails the falsity ofBH
The argument, as stated, is valid. Furthermore, it can easily be seen how
Moore utilizes Open Question Arguments in his genera! attack upon metaethical
naturalism. Moore’s “refutation” of metaethical naturalism rests upon the claim that a
successful Open Question Argument can be constructed against each and every
naturalist interpretation of the fundamental ethical predicate Call this claim the Open
Question Thesis'.
Open Question Thesis (OQT): A sound Open Question Argument can
be constructed against any naturalist interpretation of the fundamental
ethical predicate(s).
Coupling OQT with the absurdity of ethical noncognitivism (something Moore
believed throughout his philosophical career save for a short time span in the 50’
s
where he struggled with its appeal 46 ) and the belief that “metaphysical” interpretations
suffer the same fate as their naturalistic counterparts
47
led to the inference of Moore’s
famous doctrine that the predicate ‘x is good’, under the relevant interpretation, is
indefinable, expressing an unanalysable, non-natural concept Now onto some serious
objections.
46
See Moore (1968), pp. 535-554.
47
See Chapter IV of Principia Ethica.
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CHAPTER 2
DEFENDING OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENTS
Moore’s Open Question Arguments have been targeted by unsympathetic
philosophers for just about a century. Two charges in particular have proved to be
the most influential in leading philosophers to reject Moore’s entire Open Question
project. The first of these charges is that the Open Question Arguments are invalid.
This invalidity charge rests upon the claim that Moore’s arguments rely upon
assumptions in the philosophy of language that are incompatible with the popular
Kripke-Putnam causal theory of reference The second—and equally popular
—
charge is that Moore’s arguments are question-begging.
I attend to the invalidity charge first, arguing that the Open Question
Arguments as I interpret them are indeed valid. I then present the objections behind
these charges of invalidity before giving reasons designed to establish that these
objections are insufficient to undermine Moore’s Open Question maneuvering.
Finally, I set the stage for a discussion of the Open Question phenomenon by
attending to the objection that Moore begs the question against the metaethical
naturalist.
2.1 Charges of Invalidity
A host of influential contemporary commentators has argued that Moore’s
Open Question Arguments are invalid Gilbert Harman, for example, writes:
More important, perhaps, is the fact that as it stands the open question
argument is invalid. An analogous argument could be used on
someone who was ignorant of the chemical composition of water to
“prove” to him that water is not H20 This person will agree that it is
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not an open question whether water is water but it is an open
question, at least for him, whether water is H 2O. Since this argument
would not show that water is not H2O, the open question argument in
ethics cannot be used as it stands to show that for an act to be an act
that ought to be done is not for it to have some natural characteristic
C 1
Hilary Putnam appears to share Harman’s sentiments:
These ideas of Kripke’s have had widespread impact on philosophy
of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mathematics; applied to
Moore’s argument they are devastating. Moore argued from the fact
that (1) [‘this action is not good even though it is conducive to
maximizing total utility’] can only befalse contingently
,
that being P
(for some suitable natural property P) could not be an essential
property of goodness; this is just what the new theory of necessity
blocks. All that one can validly infer from the fact that (1) is not self-
contradictory is that ‘good’ is not synonymous with ‘conducive to
maximizing utility’ (not synonymous with P
,
for any term P in the
physicalistic version of the world). From this nonsynonymy of words
nothing follows about the non-identity ofproperties. Nothing follows
about the essence of goodness 2
Nicholas Sturgeon has embraced Putnam’s criticisms in his own assault on Moore’s
Open Question Arguments:
Moore thought it [the Open Question Argument] showed that all
naturalistic definitions of “good” are mistaken and consequently that
“good” does not refer to a natural property, and Gibbard thinks it
shows something similar about “rational.” The problem, though, as
Hilary Putnam for one has noted, is that if Moore’s argument
succeeds then a precisely parallel argument will show that
1 Harman (1977), p. 19. Note also that Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton appear to be
sympathetic to Harman’s diagnosis of Moore’s Open Question Argument: they quote
Harman in a sympathetic light in the opening paragraphs of their (1997b)
2
Putnam (1981), p. 208. Some might find it interesting that Putnam’s interpretation
and evaluation of Moore’s Open Question Argument, while influential, is somewhat
unclear and, perhaps more importantly, shouldn’t be viewed as a charitable
interpretation of Moore’s thoughts as expressed in §13 of Principia Ethica. Here’s
one reason why: Moore believed that certain sentences similar to Putnam’s (1) are
necessarily, though not analytically, true. Moore took them to be synthetic a priori
truths.
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“temperature” does not refer to a natural property, either. It cannot,
for example, refer to mean molecular kinetic energy, as you might
have thought, since the definition “temperature is mean molecular
kinetic energy” is one we can imagine someone denying, and so fails
the open question test. But this means that there is something wrong
with Moore’s argument and, hence, with Gibbard’s, for temperature is
mean molecular kinetic energy, and so the term does refer to that
property. (More cautiously: if temperature is not mean kinetic
energy, this is something we will have to learn from physics, not from
an application of turn-of-the-century semantics.)
3
And William Lycan appears to be the most emphatic of these critics:
Reacting against the apriorism of both the positivists and the
ordinary-language philosophers, U. T. Place (1956) and J. J. C. Smart
(1959) offered myriad instances of the a posteriori identification of
properties: clouds, with masses of tiny water droplets; water itself,
with H20; lightning, with electrical discharge; temperature, with
mean molecular kinetic energy; genes, with segments of DNA
molecules; and so forth. Each of these identities was discovered
empirically; none has anything to do with the synonymy of terms;
each leaves “open questions” with a vengeance. An argument
precisely parallel to Moore’s would show that clouds, water,
lightning, temperature, and genes were nonnatural phenomena also.
. .
.
I suppose that this is what comes of thinking of properties as
predicate meanings, pure and simple In any case, the Open Question
Argument simply fails; it is bankrupt 3
These critics (whom I will refer to as “invalidity critics” 5 from now on) all appear to
have the same idea in mind. They believe that certain arguments analogous to
Moore’s Open Question Arguments are undoubtedly unsound From this, they argue
3
Sturgeon (1985), pp. 25-26.
4
Lycan (1988), pp. 200-1.
5 Some might object that my label here is a bit of a misnomer. While all of the
critics under consideration have the same idea in mind, Sturgeon and Lycan refrain
from explicitly stating that Moore’s Open Question Arguments are invalid But I
will stick with the label nonetheless. Harman and Putnam—the most influential
advocates of the objection—seem to believe that Moore makes an invalid inference
in his Open Question Arguments. Harman explicitly states that Moore’s arguments
are invalid, and Putnam implies just as much in the quotation presented above
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that Moore’s Open Question conclusions should be rejected on the grounds that he
makes an unjustifiable inference in his Open Question Arguments.
The best way, as I see it, to evaluate this objection is to examine closely the
similarities (and dissimilarities) between an Open Question Argument and a
purportedly analogous argument that has been used to motivate the “charge of
invalidity.”
6
A version of Moore’s Anti-Hedonistic Open Question Argument and a
Water-H20 argument should do the job just fine.
First, a version of Moore’s Anti-Hedonistic Open Question Argument is
needed. Consider the following two questions:
Q1 Is anything that is pleasant something that is pleasant9
Q2: Is anything that is pleasant something that is good9
Now for the argument:
1
.
Q 1 is not open
2. Q2 is open.
3. If ( 1 ) and (2), then Q1 differs in meaning from Q2.
4. IfQ 1 differs in meaning from Q2, then the meaning of the predicate ‘x is
pleasant’ is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
5. Therefore, the meaning of the predicate ‘x is pleasant’ is not identical to
the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
6
I have been referring to the objection under consideration as ‘the charge of
invalidity’. This label, however, might also be deemed to be a bit of a misnomer.
The Moorean passages from which the invalidity critics have extracted Moore’s
Open Question Arguments are fairly obscure, and it’s unclear what logical forms
Moore had in mind in his presentation of these arguments. Moreover, as I will
attempt to show shortly, perfectly valid arguments, with perhaps some questionable
premises, can be extracted from Moore’s murky passages. But, again, I will stick
with the label. Harman and Putnam—our influential objectors—make use of it, and
the charges brought forth by these philosophers have made their way into the Open
Question literature. See, for example, Stephen Ball’s very interesting commentary
on the charges of invalidity in his ( 1 988).
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Recall that a question is open just in case either (i) it is possible for a person to have
a complete understanding of its meaning without knowing the correct answer to it or
(ii) it makes sense as something to say as an expression of genuine doubt. I argued
at length in the previous chapter that this argument accurately captures Moore’s
Open Question intentions as they are presented in §13 ofPrincipia Ethica.
An argument utilized by our invalidity critics that is in some respects
analogous to an Open Question Argument might be constructed in this way. As in
Moore’s arguments, we need to consider a couple of questions.
Q3: Is anything that is water something that is water'7
Q4: Is anything that is water something that is H 209
The structure of our “analogous” argument is predictable
6. Q3 is not open.
7. Q4 is open.
8. If ( 1 ) and (2), then Q1 differs in meaning from Q2.
9. IfQ 1 differs in meaning from Q2, then the meaning of the predicate ‘x is
water’ is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is H20’.
10. Therefore, the meaning of the predicate ‘x is water’ is not identical to the
meaning of the predicate ‘x is H20’.
Both of these arguments are attractive. Clearly, each is valid, and, from my
perspective, each appears to be sound. Premise (7) in the Water-H20 Argument is
justified by the fact that someone who knows the meanings of ‘water’ and ‘H2 0’ yet
doesn’t know the chemical composition of water won’t know the correct answer to
Q4, thus establishing the openness of Q4. Some might object that without a
rationale sufficient to support premise (2) in the Anti-Hedonistic Argument, that
argument is incomplete at best, and question-begging at worst. But debate
concerning the rationale for this premise will have to wait And holding off on such
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a discussion in no way vitiates our evaluation of the charge of invalidity, for our
invalidity critics appear sympathetic to the conclusions of these arguments (and
perhaps even to the arguments themselves). Putnam even goes so far as to claim that
the only thing that “one can validly infer” from something like Moore’s questions is
that the predicate x is good’ is not synonymous with the predicate ‘x is pleasant’
(or, for that matter, with any naturalistic predicate).
7
Great' That’s exactly how
Moore’s arguments should be interpreted, and a brief look at some of Moore’s Open
Question passages should establish the plausibility of such a interpretation.
And thus it is very easy to conclude that what seems to be a universal
ethical principle is in fact an identical proposition; that, if for
example, whatever is called ‘good’ seems to be pleasant, the
proposition ‘Pleasure is the good’ does not assert a connection
between two different notions, but involves only one, that of pleasure,
which is easily recognised as a distinct entity. But whoever will
attentively consider with himself what is actually before his mind
when he asks the question ‘Is pleasure (or whatever it may be) after
all good?’ can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering
whether pleasure is pleasant. And if he will try this experiment with
each suggested definition in succession, he may become expert
enough to recognise that in every case he has before his mind a
unique object, with regard to the connection of which with any other
object, a distinct question may be asked. Every one does in fact
understand the question ‘Is this good9 ’ When he thinks of it, his state
of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked ‘Is this
pleasant, or desired, or approved 9 ’ It has a distinct meaning for him,
even though he may not recognise in what respect it is distinct. s
Moore intended to establish the thesis that moral predicates differ in meaning from
various other predicates by way of Open Question Arguments—arguments that are
capable of being extracted from the Moorean texts in perfectly valid forms. Thus, I
7
Putnam (1981), p. 208. Putnam’s claim is included in the quotation presented
above.
8 Moore (1993), p. 68.
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find this very influential charge of invalidity against Moore’s arguments to be, in
many respects, unmotivated. 9 Moreover, the popularity of this criticism seems to
have led many to the belief that Moore s Open Question Arguments aren’t of much
philosophical interest. I hope to show that such a belief is unfounded.
My defense of Moore’s Open Question Arguments as valid, however, doesn’t
undermine the substance of the objection that our invalidity critics have leveled. The
logical structures of Moore’s arguments aren’t really what the invalidity critics find
objectionable. Rather, they are troubled by some of the conclusions that Moore
attempted to draw from his Open Question Arguments. To illustrate their objection
clearly, an explanation of exactly how Moore utilized Open Question Arguments in
developing his own metaethical position is called for.
Moore believed the following views to exhaust the metaethical possibilities. 10
Melaelhical Naturalism Fundamental moral predicates can be
defined exclusively by way of some combination of purely
naturalistic expressions. Moral properties are natural properties.
Metaethical Transcendentalism. Fundamental moral predicates can be
defined exclusively by way of some combination of purely
9
Stephen Ball shares these sentiments. Much of his (1988) is dedicated to
evaluating the invalidity charge against Moore’s Open Question Arguments.
10
This is certainly true of the Moore oiPrincipia Ethica ; see §13 and Chapter IV of
Principia Ethica. Moore’s “A Reply to his Critics” in Schilpp (1968) serves as
evidence that Moore held this belief throughout his philosophical career
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metaphysical (or “transcendental”) expressions. Moral properties are
metaphysical (or “transcendental”) properties."
Metaethical Noncogtiitivism. Moral predicates have no (semantic)
meanings. Moral predicates do not designate properties in the same
way that other predicates do.
Metaethical Nonnaturalism: Fundamental moral predicates cannot be
defined exclusively by way of some combination of purely
naturalistic or metaphysical expressions. Moral properties are
nonnatural properties.
12
Moore thought that any plausibility associated with metaethical naturalism or
metaethical transcendentalism could be extinguished by way of a certain “open
question” strategy. Recall Moore’s Open Question Thesis:
11 What Moore intended the phrases ’metaphysical property’ and ‘transcendental
property’ to mean in Chapter IV of Principici Ethica isn’t perfectly clear. Moore
tries to clear things up in his “Preface to the 2
nd
Edition”:
In the first of these passages I insist that G is not identical with any
‘natural object’; and in the second I add that it is not identical either
(1) with any ‘natural property’, nor (2) with any property of a class,
which I obviously think of as properties which have the same relation
to ‘supersensible objects’ as ‘natural properties’ have to ‘natural
objects’. It seems, then, as if what I was wishing to say was that G is
not either (1) a ‘natural object’ or (2) a ‘natural property’ or (3) what I
will now call a ‘metaphysical property,’ meaning by that a property
which has the same relation to a ‘supersensible object’ as a ‘natural
property’ has to a ‘natural object.’ (1997b, p. 12)
12 Moore was unsuccessful in attempts to articulate this view and to distinguish
natural properties from nonnatural properties. Moore admits as much on p. 13 of his
“Preface to the 2
nd
Edition” of Principici Ethica. “But my attempts to define ‘natural
property’ are hopelessly confused,” implying that his attempts to distinguish natural
from nonnatural properties are equally confused.
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Open Question Thesis (OQT): A sound Open Question Argument
can be constructed against any naturalist interpretation of the
fundamental ethical predicate(s).
Moore argues for the plausibility ofOQT in §13 of Principia Ethica. In Chapter IV
of Principia Ethica
,




nd Open Question Thesis (OQT2): A sound Open Question
Argument can be constructed against any metaphysical interpretation
of the fundamental ethical predicate(s).
OQT and OQT2, if true, entail that the predicate ‘x is good’ resists both a naturalistic
and a metaphysical interpretation. Since Moore associated properties with the
meanings of predicates, 13 he inferred from his Open Question Theses that the
property of goodness can be neither a natural nor a metaphysical property. And
metaethical noncognitivism was a non-starter for Moore—an absurd position. 14
13
See Moore (1899) and Moore (1993b).
14
Since Moore doesn’t present any arguments against metaethical noncognitivism in
Principia Ethica
,
it might be objected that Moore begs the question against the
metaethical noncognitivist. But any blame that might be attributed to Moore on the
basis of this maneuvering should be mitigated—at least in part—by the fact that, at
the dawn of the 20th Century, noncognitivist metaethical programs had yet to arrive
on the philosophical scene. In fact, 20
lh
Century noncognitivists have fueled their
metaethical programs with Moore’s Open Question strategy against metaethical
naturalism—something to be addressed shortly.
For those interested in Moore’s “refutation” of metaethical noncognitivism in
§13 of Principia Ethica , here it is:
There are, in fact, only two serious alternatives to be considered, in
order to establish the conclusion that ‘good’ does denote a simple and
indefinable notion. It might possibly denote a complex, as ‘horse’
does; or it might have no meaning at all Neither of these possibilities
has, however, been clearly conceived and seriously maintained, as
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With three of the four metaethical possibilities knocked out of consideration, Moore
concluded metaethical nonnaturalism to be the only viable option—the property of
goodness must be a nonnatural property. It is to this series of inferences, and not to
the Open Question Arguments themselves, that the invalidity critics object. 15
Invalidity critics reject the classical Moorean thesis that non-synonymous
predicates cannot “pick out” or designate the same property. 16 Their examples are
familiar. The predicates ‘x is water’ and ‘x is H20’ are not synonymous, yet there
seems to be an interesting sense of the term ‘property’ such that these predicates pick
out the same property.
17
It is widely accepted that the two predicates are necessarily
such, by those who presume to define good; and both may be
dismissed by a simple appeal to facts.
Moore never gets to the task of displaying the facts that would render metaethical
noncognitivism untenable.
15 Note that even this series of inferences can be captured in a perfectly valid
argument. Perhaps a premise or two would be considered questionable by many, but
the validity—or lack thereof—of Moore’s argumentation does not seem to be the
important issue at hand
16
It’s important to point out that it isn’t exactly clear what the invalidity critics mean
by the ambiguous term ‘property’ in these passages. Perhaps Putnam’s distinction
between “classical” and “physical” properties as presented in his (1975a) could be
helpful in ironing out which conception of a property is being utilized in the charge
of invalidity. See Bricker (1996), and §1.5 ofLewis (1986a), for a taxonomy of
various conceptions of properties and the theoretical roles that these different
conceptions are suited to play.
17
Putnam’s preferred example involves the predicates ‘x is temperature n’
(according to some standard of measurement of temperature) and ‘x has mean
molecular kinetic energy m’ (according to some standard of measurement of
energy). See his (1981), especially pp. 84-5, for details
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coextensive, which, according to one conception of properties, is sufficient to
establish that the two predicates designate the same property. 18
That the predicates x is water and x is H20’ differ in meaning but
designate the same property serves as ammunition sufficient to undermine Moore’s
Open Question strategies according to the invalidity critics. If ‘x is H 20’ picks out a
natural property and ‘x is water’ picks out the same property that ‘x is H 20’ does,
then, despite the differences between the meanings of the two predicates, no one
should be led to believe that ‘x is water’ designates a nonnatural property
Analogously, the invalidity critics argue that while we might have yet to
discover the natural property that the predicate ‘x is good’ designates—and
subsequently, a naturalistic predicate that might also be used to pick out that
property—we have no reason to believe that ‘x is good’ picks out anything but a
natural property.
19
Here, the invalidity critics rest their case, concluding that Moore
is unjustified in making his metaphysical “leap” from differences in meaning
between ethical and apparently nonethical predicates to differences in the properties
that those predicates designate.
2.2 The Invalidity Charge Answered: A Moorean Defense
There appear to be a couple of holes in the case put forth by the invalidity
critics against Moore’s metaethical inferences. The first problem concerns an
18
Kripke famously argued that ‘Water is H20’ is an a posteriori necessary truth in
his (1980).
19
This also seems to be the received view of a new breed of metaethical naturalists.
See Sturgeon (1985), Boyd (1988), Brink (1989), Railton (1989), and Copp (1991)
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important respect in which Moore’s Open Question Arguments are not analogous to
the Water-H20 type arguments. The second problem is that the invalidity critics—in
granting the success of Moore’s Open Question Theses—stack the deck in favor of
an inference either to Moorean nonnaturalism or metaethical noncognitivism, an
inference their objection is intended to expose as unjustifiable.
The invalidity critics utilize what they refer to as “rigidly designating natural
kind terms” in their assault on Moorean metaethics. ‘Water’, in the example under
discussion, is taken to be a term that picks out the natural kind specified by the
chemical composition H20 throughout the possible worlds. 20 The central
assumption employed by the invalidity critics is that the predicate ‘x is water’ is
suitably analogous to the predicate ‘x is good’. So, for example, if it could be shown
that the predicate ‘x is good’ is not a natural kind predicate, then much of the force
of the invalidity charge would be sapped. 21
Here’s a reason to believe that ‘x is good’ is not a natural kind predicate:
there is practically no agreement among competent language users about which of
the items with which we are acquainted are included in the extension of ‘x is good’.
Philosophers, among others, engage in heated disputes over which criterion
20
Kripke coined the term ‘rigid designator’. The view that natural kind terms
designate rigidly won popular appeal through Kripke (1980), Putnam (1975), and a
subsequent cottage industry on rigid designation
21
Stephen Ball makes this point in his (1988):
[T]he objection is otiose if there is a more fundamental disanalogy
between ethics and science: namely, if there is, in ethics, no further
basis, beyond conceptual or linguistic considerations, for so
identifying moral properties with, or “reducing” them synthetically to,
natural or physicalistic ones. (202)
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identifies the extension of x is good’. The same cannot be said about natural kind
predicates. It’s doubtful that scientists argue over whether a sample of liquid is H 20
or whether a sample rock is gold. We’re all familiar with their superficial qualities,
and we have reliable tests to adjudicate problematic samples. Molecular structure
and atomic weight, respectively, serve as adequate extension identifying criteria for
these predicates. To even suggest that a group of scientists can discover the
“underlying essence” of goodness through a series of experiments—and thereby
settle some of our moral disputes—appears misguided.
Furthermore, the referential intentions revealed through our use of natural
kind terms are significantly different from those involved with our usage of ethical
terminology. Eric Gampel, a contemporary critic of the invalidity charge, claims
that causal specification is an essential characteristic of the referential intentions
associated with our use of natural kind terminology:
[W]e intend to refer to an individual or kind which competent users
understand primarily in terms of its causal role: as the thing I see over
there, the thing whose name has been passed on to me, or the kind
which is causally responsible for certain observable features (certain
sensations of heat, or clearness and drinkability).
Contemplating the invalidity critics’ claim that ethical terms are causally regulated
by certain natural properties, Gampel writes:
22 Gampel (1997), pp. 156-7.
23 To say that ethical (or moral) terms are causally regulated by natural properties
just means that “for moral terms, just as for names and natural kind terms, reference
is a matter of there being certain causal connections between the use of moral terms
and the relevant natural properties.” Horgan and Timmons (1992b)
See Boyd (1988), Horgan and Timmons (1992b), and Gampel (1997) for
details.
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[W]e are not normally intending to pick out such a causally regulative
kind in our references to goodness and other moral kinds—if we
were, then the discovery of the causal kind would answer our moral
questions, and refute the moral skeptic. So while the primary purpose
of our talk of water, temperature, and other natural kinds is to identify
things that play certain causal roles in our lives, the same cannot be
said about our use of ethical terms 24
I stand in complete agreement with Gampel here. 25 These differences in referential
intentions provide an adequate explanation for why the extension of ‘x is good’ is
disputable in a way that the extensions of natural kind predicates are not. We intend
to be meaning something different with our ethical terminology from what we intend
to be meaning with our natural kind terminology. 26 The predicate ‘x is good’ is not
used to pick out a so-called natural kind Thus, no non-analytic (or synthetic
)
reduction of the fundamental moral predicate(s) appears possible.
27
24 Gampel (1997), p. 159.
25
' Thomas Baldwin makes a claim very similar to Gampel’s in his (1990), pp 93-96.
Eric Gampel reiterates this point in the conclusion of his interesting (1997):
We use ethical terms in non-rigid ways, taking the ordinary methods
for assessing the evaluative status of acts and things, with their appeal
to ordinary normative criteria, to be decisive, not intending to defer to
what some other method (science) might discover about the actual
samples we have found (if any). Given these prior referential
intentions, the open question argument can stand as a serious
challenge to ethical naturalism, despite the success of the naturalist
strategy of synthetic a posteriori reduction in other areas. (161)
27
Other contemporary critics of the invalidity charge agree that moral predicates are
not, in many respects, analogous to rigidly designating natural kind predicates.
Horgan and Timmons, in their (1992a) and (1992b), use “Moral Twin Earth” thought
experiments to pump certain semantic intuitions that cast doubt upon the claim that
moral terms are analogous to natural kind terms.
Horgan and Timmons also make the following interesting observation
Also, even if one grants causal regulation of moral terms by natural
properties, it is still quite contentious whether any single natural
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Given the fact that the objections leveled by the invalidity critics rest upon a
purported analogy between ethical terms and natural kind terms and the fact that
predicates like x is good and ‘x is water’ aren’t suitably analogous, it appears that
this threat to Moore’s Open Question strategies motivated by the invalidity critics is
extinguishable 28 Moreover, by granting the plausibility of Moore’s Open Question
Theses, the invalidity critics seem to be providing a justifying rationale for Moore’s
rejection of metaethical naturalism.
The invalidity critics grant that ethical terms resist naturalistic interpretations.
Recall Putnam’s influential words:
All that one can validly infer from the fact that (1) is not self-
contradictory is that ‘good’ is not synonymous with ‘conducive to
maximizing utility’ (not synonymous with P, for any term P in the
physicalistic version of the world).
29
Given that ethical terms resist a “natural kind” semantic treatment, Moore’s
metaethical inferences appear fairly reasonable. Putnam admits that ethical terms
are incapable of being analyzed in terms of purely naturalistic terminology. With no
property causally regulates the use of ‘good’ for humankind in
general; likewise for other moral terms. (1992b), p. 1 75.
Given the heated disputes over which criteria identify the extensions of our moral
predicates, Horgan and Timmons appear to be right on the mark here
28
Interestingly, Horgan and Timmons—contemporary critics of metaethical
naturalism—argue that the invalidity critics have shown something of interest. In
their (1992b), Horgan and Timmons split the thesis of metaethical naturalism into
two: a semantic thesis and a metaphysical thesis. They argue that Moore’s Open
Question Arguments are effective in undermining only the semantic thesis but claim
that a novel Open Question Argument can be constructed against recent attempts to
substantiate the metaphysical thesis.
29 Putnam (1981), p. 208.
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other naturalist semantic options at hand, a rejection of metaethical naturalism seems
to be the only move available.
Metaethical noncognitivists have latched onto Moore’s maneuvers in their
own rejection of metaethical naturalism, though they are hesitant to follow Moore
down the path of metaethical nonnaturalism 30 Instead, they infer from their
rejection of metaethical naturalism that moral terms do not have any semantic
meanings at all; rather, moral terms are used primarily to express various emotions
or attitudes, or perhaps even imperatives, of some sort or other.
In granting the success of Moore’s Open Question Theses and failing to
establish sufficient similarities between natural kind terms and ethical terms, the
invalidity critics—while hugely influential—have failed to show anything
problematic with either Moore’s Open Question Arguments or the deployment of
Open Question Arguments in Moore’s rejection of metaethical naturalism The
30
Using Moorean Open Question Arguments to cast doubt upon the plausibility of
Metaethical Naturalism has been hugely popular in noncognitivist circles.
Considering the use which we have made of the principle that a
synthetic proposition is significant only if it is empirically verifiable,
it is clear that the acceptance of an “absolutist” theory of ethics would
undermine the whole of our main argument And as we have already
rejected the “naturalistic” theories which are commonly supposed to
provide the only alternative to “absolutism” is ethics, we seem to
have reached a difficult position. We shall meet the difficulty by
showing that the correct treatment of ethical statements is afforded by
a third theory, which is wholly compatible with our radical
empiricism. Ayer (1952), pp. 106-7.
Also see Hare (1952), pp. 8 Iff.; Blackburn (1984), pp. 168ff; Blackburn (1998), pp.
1 4f.
;
Gibbard (1984), pp. 200-6; Gibbard (1985), p. 6; and Gibbard (1990), pp. 11,
16-17, 19-22, 118, and 186. Note also that Gibbard is criticized for employing Open
Question strategies by one of the invalidity critics in Sturgeon (1985), the
companion piece to Gibbard (1985).
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recent ridiculing of Moore’s metaethical strategies by those under the influence of
the invalidity critics appears completely unwarranted
The best way—as I see it—to save metaethical naturalism from Moore’s
assaults is to cast doubt upon the plausibility of Moore’s Open Question Thesis and
thereby clear a path for naturalistic analyses of fundamental moral terminology. But
before turning to such a task, an equally popular but significantly more serious
objection to Moore’s Open Question Arguments must first be dealt with.
2 3 Are Open Question Arguments Question Beggars?
The most serious objection to Moore’s Open Question Arguments is that they
beg questions against various metaethical naturalists. Recall Moore’s Anti-
Hedonistic Open Question Argument.
Q1 : Is anything that is pleasant something that is pleasant 9
Q2: Is anything that is pleasant something that is good9
1. Q 1 is not open
2. Q2 is open.
3. If (1) and (2), then Q1 differs in meaning from Q2
4. IfQ 1 differs in meaning from Q2, then the meaning of the predicate ‘x is
pleasant’ is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
5. Therefore, the meaning of the predicate ‘x is pleasant’ is not identical to
the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
Philosophers such as W. K. Frankena and Gilbert Harman object that, without some
justifying rationale, premises like premise (2) beg the question against the
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metaethical naturalist. 31 Roger Hancock makes the point crystal clear in his “The
Refutation of Naturalism in Moore and Hare”:
How does Moore know that it is never self-contradictory to deny
sentences of the form ‘Whatever is F [for some allegedly non-ethical
expression F ] is good ? To say this is, after all, only another way of
saying that ‘F’s are good’ is not analytic. And this is precisely what
the naturalist affirms. The hedonist, for example, will surely have no
trouble with Moore’s argument, having defined ‘good’ as ‘pleasant’
and holding that ‘Whatever is pleasant is good’ is analytic, he will
simply reply that in point of fact it is self-contradictory to say that
something is pleasant and yet not good. Moore would have no
answer; at the very most his argument only pushes the dispute back a
step, without doing anything to settle it. 32
Hancock’s point is that anyone attracted to a definitional equivalence between the
predicates ‘x is good’ and ‘x is pleasant’ is going to find Q2 just as “closed” as Q1
.
And unless Moore—or some sympathetic Open Question theorist—provides some
argument to establish the plausibility of premise (2), there appears to be no reason
motivating the metaethical naturalist to believe premise (2) to be true.
33
Moore was aware of this problem. There are various passages in which he
tries valiantly to establish the plausibility of premise (2), knowing full well that he
31*i • ...The view that Moore’s Open Question Arguments are question-begging gained
popularity with Frankena’s influential (1969); see especially pp. 34-5. Harman
presents the objection in his (1977), p. 35. Ball appears sympathetic to one
interpretation of the question-begging objection; see his (1988), p.207.
32 Hancock (1960), pp. 328-9.
33
Fred Feldman discusses this problem in his (1978):
This is a valid argument, but primitive hedonists may refuse to be
moved by it. They may claim that (2) is false If their view is
correct, the statement that pleasure is good is analytic—that is, it is
true in virtue of its meaning alone. Hence, Q[2] is not an open
question. Anyone fully understanding its meaning would know the
answer to be yes. Moore, and others following him, would not accept
this response. (203)
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doesn’t have any arguments to support it. Here is a quotation from the Open
Question passages located in §13 ofPrincipia Ethica.
Every one does in fact understand the question ‘Is this good9 ’ When
he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be,
were he asked ‘Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved9 ’ It has a
distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what
respect it is distinct.
34
Moore’s defense of premise (2) is autobiographical. Moore can’t help but believe
that the meanings of the two questions are, in important respects, very different
And this revelation—Moore assures us—can be experienced by us all But without
some sort of interesting justification for premise (2), it’s unlikely that the targeted
metaethical naturalist will be moved by Moore’s test of faith
Despite this problem, Moore’s arguments remain interesting. I’m attracted to
hedonism yet still feel the force of the Open Question phenomenon in premise (2).
Other contemporary commentators evaluate Moore’s arguments in a similar way.
Moore’s student, Casimir Lewy, admits that Moore’s arguments are question-
begging but believes them to be successful nonetheless: “I think therefore that for all
34 Moore (1993), p. 68. In an earlier passage Moore writes:
But whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually
before his mind when he asks the question ‘Is pleasure (or whatever it
may be) after all good9 ’ can easily satisfy himself that he is not
merely wondering whether pleasure is pleasant. (68)
In providing a justifying rationale for the “open question’’ premise in his “desire to
desire” Open Question Argument, Moore writes:
Moreover any one can easily convince himself by inspection that the
predicate of this proposition
—
‘good’—is positively different from
the notion of ‘desiring to desire’. (1993), p. 67.
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his mistakes, Moore can fairly be said to have found a means of refuting any such
theory.”
35
Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons endorse Moore’s Open Question
strategy as an effective method in establishing the Open Question Thesis:
Analytic ethical naturalism does seem to be a sitting duck for
Moore’s open question argument. 36
Granted, the connection between the natural fact and the supervenient
moral fact cannot be any sort of logical or semantic entailment; old-
fashioned ‘ethical naturalism’, which attempted to analyze moral
terms or statements as equivalent in meaning to naturalistic terms or
statements, foundered upon G. E. Moore’s “open question” argument.
And Eric Gampel believes that “the open question argument can stand as a
serious challenge to ethical naturalism.” 38,39
Thus, while Moore’s Open Question Arguments—as they stand—are in fact
question beggars, rather than toss them aside as dialectically impotent, I propose that
they be treated as incomplete arguments, awaiting their final stage of construction.
This last stage must include, of course, an explanation of, or perhaps justification
for, what I call the ‘Open Question phenomenon’: the reason(s) that have influenced
35 Lewy (1970), p. 303.
36
Horgan and Timmons (1992b), p 156
37 Horgan and Timmons (1992a), pp. 223f.
38 Gampel (1997), p. 161
39
Frank Snare also believes that despite the lack ofjustification for the important
“open question” premise, Moore’s arguments are effective in undermining analytic
reductions of fundamental moral terms; see his (1975).
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Moore and his sympathizers to deem questions like Q2 to be open. So, let’s now
turn our attention to the Open Question phenomenon.
55
CHAPTER 3
THE OPEN QUESTION PHENOMENON
Success in Moore s attempts to undermine various forms of Metaethical
Naturalism requires his famous Open Question premises to be true. In the Anti-
Hedonistic Open Question Argument below, premise (2) is the Open Question
premise.
Q1 : Is anything that is pleasant something that is pleasant?
Q2: Is anything that is pleasant something that is good?
1
.
Q 1 is not open.
2. Q2 is open.
3. If ( 1 ) and (2), then Q1 differs in meaning from Q2.
4. IfQ 1 differs in meaning from Q2, then the meaning of the predicate ‘x is
pleasant’ is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
5. Therefore, the meaning of the predicate ‘x is pleasant’ is not identical to
the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
The plausibility of the claim that Q2 is open—that it is possible for a person to have
a complete understanding of its meaning without knowing the correct answer to it, or
that it makes sense as something to say as an expression of genuine doubt 1—is used
by Moore and his sympathizers to cast doubt upon any purported equivalence in
meaning between the predicates ‘x is pleasant’ and ‘x is good’. That an analogous




There is considerable controversy over how the concept of an open question should
be explicated. The former way is most popular in the Open Question literature, but I
find the latter way to be the more attractive. I will argue for the latter explication in
the final section of the next chapter. See the first chapter of this dissertation for a list
of the competing conceptions of an open question
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is good serves to complete Moore’s “refutation” of metaethical naturalism. 2 But an
interesting and seemingly important question remains: Why should anyone believe
Moore’s Open Question premises to be true? Moore and several philosophers
sympathetic to his metaethical program believe these premises to be true even
though they can’t quite explain why.
3
In fact, metaethical nonnaturalists in general
have been satisfied with these premises knowing full well that they lack any
substantial justification for believing them to be true. This, however, points to what
may be a serious problem with Moore’s Open Question Arguments: Without some
2
This claim might be best identified with what is probably the most general
Moorean Open Question Argument.
Consider the following question schemas:
Qsl : Is anything that is C something that is C 9
Qs2. Is anything that is C something that is good?
Instances of Qsl and Qs2 are successfully generated by plugging some combination
of purely naturalistic predicates into the “C” slots.
Here’s the argument:
1’. Instances of Qsl are closed
2’. Instances of Qs2 are open
3’. If (1) and (2), then any instance of Qsl differs in meaning from any
instance of Qs2.
4’. If any instance of Qsl differs in meaning from any instance of Qs2, then
the meaning of any naturalistic predicate (or any combination of naturalistic
predicates) is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’
5’. Thus, the meaning of any naturalistic predicate (or any combination of
naturalistic predicates) is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is
good’
3
See §13 ofPrincipia Ethica\ Russell (1903) and (1904); Ross (1930), pp. 8, 92-94,
and his (1939), p. 27; the concluding chapter of Broad’s (1930), Broad (1985), pp.
26 5 f; Ewing (1953), pp. 90f; Lewy (1970); Kolnai (1980); Horgan, T. and Timmons,
M. (1992a) and (1992b); Gampel (1997); and, possibly, Prior (1949).
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kind ofjustifying support for the Open Question premises, these arguments beg the
question against the targeted naturalists.
I, for one, am attracted to Moore’s Open Question strategies. The Open
Question Arguments do seem to bring to light certain differences in meaning
between ethical predicates and various naturalistic predicates. But this inclination to
be moved by Moore’s Open Question premises—the Open Question phenomenon
—
must be justified by some philosophical argumentation if it is to have any interesting
impact on the metaethical scene. In these next two chapters, I attempt to provide
such a justification.
First, I survey some of the more popular noncognitivist explanations of the
Open Question phenomenon and indicate how Open Question Arguments have been
utilized to promote noncognitivist, as well as various hybrid, metaethical programs.
Next, I argue that while there are indeed interesting noncognitive meaning
components associated with ethical terminology that aren’t captured by the type of
naturalistic analyses that Moore found objectionable, they fail to account fully for
the Open Question phenomenon There are certain contexts in which ethical terms
appear to be stripped of any usually accompanying noncognitivist meaning
components yet still retain “open question” features, or so I will argue. Finally, I
introduce a couple of semantic concepts—character and role—that I believe can be
used (i) to provide an adequate justification for Moore’s Open Question premises
and (ii) to set a standard for future naturalistic analyses of ethical terminology.
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U Ayer’s Open Question Maneuvers
A. J. Ayer—an early representative of the logical positivist movement-
employs some of Moore’s strategies in attempts to provide justification for the
position that ethical predicates do not contribute to the semantic meanings of the
sentences that contain them. And while Ayer struggled for years to establish a
plausible verifiability criterion,’ he nevertheless argued from the beginning that
simple sentences in which ethical predicates are applied to names or descriptions are
unverifiable and thus meaningless. 4
Setting aside Ayer’s positivistic interests, I aim to examine how Ayer used
Moore’s metaethical strategies to motivate his own emotivist account of ethical
terminology. Interestingly, in Ayer we find the first philosopher to provide an
explanation for the Open Question phenomenon, one who casts aside Moore’s
preferred metaethical nonnaturalism in an embrace of what Moore took to be a non-
starter. metaethical noncognitivism. As we shall soon see, Ayer agreed with Moore
that ethical predicates resist naturalist interpretations, but—in contrast to Moore
—
inferred from this that ethical predicates possess no semantic meanings at all.
Ayer’s most influential metaethical theorizing takes place in Chapter VI of
Language, Truth and Logic. You will notice that Ayer eschews the notion of an
open question in favor of that of a non-self-contradictory statement. Here, I quote
Ayer at length, emphasizing what may be the most relevant passage to understanding
Ayer’s “open question” argument
4
See Ayer (1952), pp. 102-113.
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Nevertheless we shall not adopt either a subjectivist or a utilitarian
analysis of ethical terms. We reject the subjectivist view that to call
an action right, or a thing good, is to say that it is generally approved
of, because it is not self-contradictory to assert that some actions
which are generally approved of are not right, or that some things
which are generally approved of are not good And we reject the
alternative subjectivist view that a man who asserts that a certain
action is right, or that a certain thing is good, is saying that he himself
approves of it, on the ground that a man who confessed that he
sometimes approved of what was bad or wrong would not be
contradicting himself And a similar argument is fatal to
utilitarianism. We cannot agree that to call an action right is to say
that of all the actions possible in the circumstances it would cause, or
be likely to cause, the greatest happiness, or the greatest balance of
pleasure over pain, or the greatest balance of satisfied over unsatisfied
desire, because we find that it is not self-contradictory to say that it is
sometimes wrong to perform the action which would actually or
probably cause the greatest happiness, or the greatest balance of
pleasure over pain, or of satisfied over unsatisfied desire. And since it
is not self-contradictory to say that some pleasant things are not
good, or that some had things are desired, it cannot be the case that
the sentence “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasant, ” or to “x is
desired. ” And to every other variant of utilitarianism with which I
am acquainted the same objection can be made. And therefore we
should, I think, conclude that the validity of ethical judgements is not
determined by the felicific tendencies of actions, any more than by
the nature of people’s feelings; but that it must be regarded as
“absolute” or “intrinsic,” and not empirically calculable 5
Ayer’s central contention here is that for whatever naturalistic predicate, N, we pick,
someone who asserts that a given thing is N but isn’t good (or right) isn’t
contradicting herself. One of Ayer’s examples is the predicate “x is pleasant.” In
step with Moore, Ayer suggests that the predicate “x is pleasant” cannot be
equivalent in meaning with the predicate “x is good” in virtue of the fact that if I
were to claim that something is pleasant but not good, I wouldn’t be contradicting
myself. We could make Ayer’s Moorean moves more explicit by showing which
premises he might utilize in his own Moorean argumentation
5
Ibid., pp. 104f. The emphasis is my own
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SI : Some things are pleasant but are not pleasant.
S2: Some things are pleasant but are not good.
Substituting these statements in for Moore’s questions in the Anti-Hedonistic Open
Question Argument above (in addition to some other slight changes) produces an
argument extremely similar to Moore’s original.
6. SI is self-contradictory.
7. S2 is not self-contradictory.
8. If (1) and (2), then SI differs in meaning from S2.
9. If SI differs in meaning from S2, then the meaning of the predicate ‘x is
pleasant’ is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
10. Therefore, the meaning of the predicate ‘x is pleasant’ is not identical to
the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
Ayer followed Moore in believing that a sound argument formally similar to the one
above can be constructed against any naturalist interpretation of an ethical
predicate.
6
The premise that requires substantial justification in Ayer’s argument
—
the “open question” premise—is premise (7). Without some interesting
argumentation to establish the claim that S2 isn’t self-contradictory, Ayer—like
6
This claim, too, can be characterized with a more general Ayer-inspired “open
question” argument.
Ssl : Some things are C but are not C.
Ss2: Some things are C but are not good.
Instances of the sentence schemas above are successfully generated by plugging
some combination of purely naturalistic (or descriptive) predicates into the “C” slots.
6’. Instances of Ssl are self-contradictory.
7’. Instances of Ss2 are not self-contradictory.
8’. If ( 1 ) and (2), then any instance of Ssl differs in meaning from any
instance of Ss2.
9’. If any instance of SSI differs in meaning from any instance of Ss2, then
the meaning of any naturalistic predicate (or any combination of naturalistic
predicates) is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’
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Moore—would be begging the question against our hedonistically inclined
metaethical naturalist. But Ayer does provide some explanation for why he believes
premise (7) to be true. Again, I quote Ayer at length.
We shall meet the difficulty by showing that the correct treatment of
ethical statements is afforded by a third theory, which is wholly
compatible with our radical empiricism.
We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts
are unanalysable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can
test the validity of the judgements in which they occur So far we are
in agreement with the absolutists. But, unlike the absolutists, we are
able to give an explanation of this fact about ethical concepts. We
say that the reason why they are unanalysable is that they are mere
pseudo-concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition
adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, “You
acted wrongly in stealing that money,” I am not stating anything
more that if I had simply said, “You stole that money.” In adding
that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about
it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had
said, “You stole that money, ” in a peculiar tone of horror, or written
it with the addition ofsome special exclamation marks. The tone, or
the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the
sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended
by certainfeelings in the speaker
If now I generalise my previous statement and say, “Stealing money
is wrong,” I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning—that
is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as
if I had written “Stealing money!!”—where the shape and thickness
of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a
special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being
expressed. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true
or false. Another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of
stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about
stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my
moral sentiments. But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me.
For in saying that a certain type ofaction is right or wrong, 1 am not
making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own
state ofmind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. And
10.’ Therefore, the meaning of any naturalistic predicate (or any combination
of naturalistic predicates) is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is
good’
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the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his
moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of
us is in the right. For neither ofus is asserting a genuine proposition.
What we have just been saying about the symbol “wrong”
applies to all normative ethical symbols. Sometimes they occur in
sentences which record ordinary empirical facts besides expressing
ethical feeling about those facts: sometimes they occur in sentences
which simply express ethical feeling about a certain type of action, or
situation, without making any statement of fact. But in every case in
which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical
judgement, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely
“emotive.” It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not
to make any assertion about them
7
Ayer defends premise (7) by appealing to his fledgling, yet groundbreaking,
emotivist account of ethical terminology. On Ayer’s view, the reason why I don’t
contradict myself when I say that some things are pleasant but aren’t good is that the
phrase ‘but aren’t good’ fails to contribute any propositional content to the meaning
of the sentence under consideration. Since, on this emotivist account, the term
‘good’ lacks any semantic meaning and is used usually to express a feeling of some
sort, the proposition expressed by the statement ‘Some things are pleasant but aren’t
good’ is considered to be identical to the proposition expressed by the statement
‘Some things are pleasant’. Ethical predicates, when applied to singular terms, fail
to “assert” anything about the objects picked out by such terms on Ayer’s view, for,
again.
in every case in which one would commonly be said to be making an
ethical judgement, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely
“emotive.” It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not
8
to make any assertion about them
7




Ayer’s reason for believing that S2 isn’t self-contradictory is the same for
believing that the following sentence isn’t self-contradictory.
S3: Some things are pleasant.
Furthermore, Ayer presents an interesting explanation for why the sentences S2 and
S3 might be considered to be equivalent in semantic meaning even though S2
contains a predicate that S3 lacks. The only kind of meaning that ethical terms
possess, on a view like Ayer’s, is pragmatic meaning 9 Their meanings are thought
to be exhausted by non-semantic features associated with their use: the various
emotions they are used to express and the results that one may aim to achieve by
utilizing such emotive terminology.
It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express
feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so to
stimulate action. Indeed some of them are used in such a way as to
give the sentences in which they occur the effect of commands 10
Ayer has latched onto a very interesting and seemingly salient aspect of our
moral language. It is undoubtedly true that ethical terms can be, and actually are,
used to express various things, be they emotions, attitudes, intentions to act, or
imperatives. And I concur with Ayer that pragmatic elements associated with moral
terminology can serve to establish certain differences between what might be
9
The semantic meanings of terms and sentences can be divided into extensions and
the functions or properties that, along with contextual features, determine extensions.
Any meaning a term or sentence might possess that isn’t semantic meaning is
pragmatic meaning.
10
Ibid. Notice that in this quotation Ayer seems to be wavering a bit between a
purely emotivist account of ethical terminology and the suggestion that some ethical
sentences contain hidden commands, anticipating Hare’s prescripti vist account of
certain ethical terminology.
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expressed by utterances of the sentences 'That experience was pleasant’ and ‘That
experience was good But I am hesitant to conclude from this fact that:
sentences which simply express moral judgements do not say
anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not
come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are
unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of
command is unverifiable—because they do not express genuine
propositions.
11
My (very closely related) reasons for rejecting an account like Ayer’s—an account
that is capable of explaining something like the Open Question phenomenon—are
twofold. First, I believe, as do the prescriptivist R M. Hare and the emotivist-
naturalist Charles L. Stevenson, that ethical terms are capable of transmitting
information via semantic meanings that they possess. But a defense of this claim
will have to wait until a discussion of Hare’s and Stevenson’s views and the
presentation of my own positive program.
My second reason for rejecting Ayer’s explanation of the Open Question
phenomenon has to do with important differences between the sample statements he
utilizes in his “open question” arguments and the questions Moore utilizes in his.
Ayer’s statements closely resemble conjunctions whereas the logical form of
Moore’s questions appear to resemble that of conditionals to a considerable extent.
These differences in logical form may have serious repercussions for Ayer’s
explanation if—as Frege has suggested—the meanings of terms remain constant
throughout (at least) extensional contexts,
12







This Fregean point can be found in much of Frege’s work on the philosophy of
language, even in his early Begriffsschrift.
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appear to be stripped of certain of their usual pragmatic meaning components in
various contexts without losing their meaning altogether, the most prominent
example of which appears to be the context of conditional constructions 1314
To cast doubt upon Ayer s explanation of the Open Question phenomenon, I
will try to locate the phenomenon in contexts where emotive features aren’t, or at
least don’t appear to be, operating. If there are any such locations, Ayer’s
explanation will be found to be wanting.
Purely pragmatic accounts of moral language—Ayer’s radical emotivism,
Blackburn’s expressivistic quasi-realism, and perhaps others—seem to explain
interesting aspects of moral language in what we might call assertive constructions.
Let an assertive construction be one that entails, or that appears to entail, that one of
its predicates (given its interpretation) somehow applies. We might then say that a
predicate is in an assertive location within a construction just in case the construction
entails, or at least seems to entail, that the predicate somehow applies. Here are
some examples of assertive constructions:
Samantha is cute.
My bike is blue.




1 owe a special debt of gratitude to Ty Barnes for teaching me about what has
come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivist
metaethical theories. Much of the upcoming objections against noncognitivist
explanations of the Open Question phenomenon will closely parallel the much
discussed Frege-Geach, or “embedding”, problems for noncognitivist analyses of
ethical terminology. See Sinnott-Armstrong (2000) for an interesting discussion of
these problems.
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Each of these constructions entails, or at least superficially appears to entail, that one
of its predicates—‘x is cute’, ‘x is blue’, ‘x is good’—somehow applies. The
sentence:
Samantha is cute.
entails that the predicate ‘x is cute’ applies to the name ‘Samantha’. When I utter it,
I am asserting that Samantha is cute.
Now consider the ethical, or at least evaluative, sample above: ‘My enjoyable
experience in last week’s soccer game was a good one.’. To make things simpler, let
‘E’ pick out my enjoyable experience in last week’s soccer game. Now consider the
following assertive constructions:
S4: E was good.
S5: E was pleasant.
Recall Ayer’s explanation of how the predicates in S4 and S5—‘x is good’ and ‘x is
pleasant’—differ. The predicate ‘x is pleasant’ is a descriptive, purely naturalistic
predicate. S5 is true just in case E meets the conditions required for an experience to
be a pleasant one. S5 entails that the predicate ‘x is pleasant’ applies to the name
‘E\ S4, on the other hand, purportedly isn’t capable of being true or false On
Ayer’s view, the predicate ‘x is good’ doesn’t make a semantic contribution to
sentences in which it is contained. Appearances are deceiving in this case, so says
Ayer. Rather, S4, when sincerely uttered, expresses a feeling and is incapable of
being either true or false, just as “a cry of pain” can be neither true or false. Recall
that ethical predicates such as ‘x is good’ are, on a view like Ayer’s, merely vehicles
for the expressions of feelings and emotions; their meanings are purely emotive.
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When limiting our consideration to assertive constructions—like those
utilized by Ayer in his “open question” sentences above—Ayer’s emotive metaethics
might appear plausible. Some might be attracted to the view that my utterance of S4
was, in fact, just an emotive outburst, a non-factual expression of some sort of
positive emotion or feeling concerning E. Others, however, find such an analysis
implausible, for it would render emotionless assertions containing ethical predicates
completely meaningless (semantically and emotively), an unattractive implication to
be sure. 15 But let’s set aside this objection for now, and focus instead upon what
Ayer’s view implies about the meanings of ethical terms in unassertive
constructions.
Conditionals, for example, are usually unassertive constructions. Many
conditionals of the form rIf P, then Q 1 do not entail that any of their predicates
applies. Consider a simple conditional constructed from our sentences S4 an S5.
Cl: IfE was pleasant, then E was good
Cl doesn’t entail, nor does it even appear to entail, that either of the predicates—‘x
is pleasant’ or ‘x is good’—applies. Utterances of Cl aren’t used to assert that E is
pleasant nor are they used to assert that E is good Yet C 1 appears meaningful, at
least in some sense. The question is whether its meaning can be adequately
accounted for by a view like Ayer’s. Ayer claims that the meaning of the ethical
predicate ‘x is good’ is purely emotive; it is a vehicle for the expression of feelings,
emotions, or perhaps even imperatives. But how would Ayer interpret Cl 9 Asa
conditional feeling? A conditional emotion? A conditional imperative? It’s
15
See, for example. Hare (1952), pp. 143f. and Feldman (1978), pp. 220ft
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difficult even to conceive of ways in which the former two possibilities could be
worked out. And while the latter might look promising, I’ll set it aside for now;
Hare s prescriptivist account of the Open Question phenomenon is on the horizon
Exactly how the predicate x is good can be considered to possess emotive
meaning in this unassertive context is tricky indeed Yet Cl appears to be an
instance of the universally quantified conditional that Moore utilized in his own
“open question” premise.
C2: For all x, if x is pleasant, then x is good.
16
C2, like Cl, seems to express some kind of conceptual (or perhaps accidental) link
between the predicates ‘x is pleasant’ and ‘x is good’. But as the latter predicate, on
Ayer’s view, lacks any conceptual content, it’s meaning must be purely emotive.
Perhaps I lack the sensitivities required to identify emotive outbursts. It
simply isn’t clear to me how emotive meaning could be generated in the consequents
of these two conditionals. But I can imagine a way in which someone might suggest
that it can. Perhaps some might be attracted to treating conditionals containing
ethical predicates in their consequents in the following way.
An emotivist might suggest that the utterance of an indicative conditional
like Cl amounts to something like two distinct speech acts. The first act—the
utterance of the antecedent—introduces the antecedent into the conversational
context as a live hypothesis. The utterance of the consequent, then, might serve as
16
Recall Moore’s hedonistic open question:
HOQ: Is anything that is pleasant something that is good 1?
HOQ seems to ask whether C2 is true.
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an outburst of feeling or emotion directed at the live possibility of E being as it is
described in the antecedent. In this way, perhaps, some sense might be made of how
the emotive meanings of ethical terms could be retained in the consequents of
conditionals.
So perhaps there is a way of preserving the emotive meaning of an ethical
term in the consequent of a conditional. But despite this possibility, it still appears
to me that the emotive contribution of the predicate x is good’ in an utterance of Cl
is considerably less substantial than its contribution in an utterance of an assertive
construction such as S4. Its placement in an unassertive construction has prevented
it from exhibiting at least some of its potential emotive meaning.
This fact, if it is indeed one, might not worry theorists like Ayer 17 Ayer and
his sympathizers could still explain differences in meaning between Cl and the
following conditional by appeal to the emotive meaning components of ethical
terms.
C3 : If E was pleasant, then E was pleasant
However, the Ayer-inspired explanation of the Open Question phenomenon isn’t in
the clear yet While the consequent of a conditional serves as a fairly unassertive
location, there are locations that are still less assertive—ones that might be capable
of completely stripping ethical terms of the pragmatic meaning components with
which they are normally associated. So let’s search for an even more unassertive
17
But then again it might. Ayer and others who defend the view that the meanings
of ethical predicates are exhausted by their pragmatic features must give up the hope
of an emotivist or expressivist principle of conipositionality, if the pragmatic
features associated with the utterances of ethical terms shift within extensional
contexts. Blackburn discusses this problem for purely pragmatic metaethical views
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place into which we can tuck an ethical predicate. The antecedents of conditionals
seem to be just that kind of place.
By switching the antecedents with the consequents in our conditionals above
we can generate two conditionals that should serve our purposes well
C4: If E was good, then E was pleasant
C5. For all x, if x is good, then x is pleasant.
These conditionals, too, seem to be expressing certain conceptual (or, again, perhaps
accidental) links. But if Ayer is right, these appearances must be deceiving I
suggested earlier that we could strip ethical predicates of certain emotive meaning
components they are normally associated with by inserting them into the
consequents of conditional constructions. I am suggesting now that these
components appear to be completely stripped when ethical predicates are tucked into
the antecedents of these constructions. Consider C4. An utterance of C4 isn’t used
to assert that E was good. And unlike our other conditionals, utterances of C4 and
C5 resist being treated as expressions of conditional feelings or conditional
emotions, even on the assumption that accounts of such alleged concepts can be
adequately worked out. It simply isn’t the case that emotive outbursts imply the
truth of the propositions we have been considering in the consequents of our sample
conditionals. Thus, it’s not possible—on a purely emotivist account—to provide an
adequate treatment of the meanings of ethical terms in the antecedents of
conditionals in a way parallel to the proposed treatment of ethical terms in the
consequents of the conditionals described above. An emotional outburst is not the
in Chapter 6 of his (1984). Thanks again to Ty Barnes for teaching me about these
matters.
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kind of thing that can be introduced into a conversational context as a live
hypothesis. There seems to be no plausible way in which Ayer and his followers can
stick to their emotivist guns and provide an account of what ethical terms mean in
the antecedents of conditionals.
Now we can pose a little problem for those sympathetic to Ayer’s
explanation of the Open Question phenomenon Compare conditional C4 with C3
C3: If E was pleasant, then E was pleasant.
Many, including myself, are inclined to believe that the meaning of C4 differs from
that of C3—the Open Question phenomenon appears to be present. But this time, an
appeal to the emotive features associated with ethical language doesn’t seem capable
of providing an adequate explanation for this difference in meaning Here’s why.
On purely emotivist accounts, the only meaning ethical terms possess is
emotive meaning. I have suggested that in the confines of the antecedents of
conditionals ethical terms possess no emotive meaning. If this is so, then, on an
account like Ayer’s, ethical terms tucked into antecedents of conditionals must be
completely meaningless—semantically and emotively. This presents dire
consequences for Ayer’s explanation of the Open Question phenomenon The
differences in meaning between utterances of C3 and C4 would be reduced to a
difference in meaning between the utterance of a tautology and the utterance of
complete jibberish, like that which would be involved in an utterance of the
conditional below.
C6: IfE was nisterock, then E was pleasant
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If the term ‘good’ in C4 lacks emotive meaning, then the emotivist’s reason
explaining the difference in meaning between utterances of C3 and C4 is the very
same reason that explains the difference in meaning between utterances of C3 and
C6, as well as countless other gibberish-injected conditionals. This just simply
doesn’t seem to be the case. And we can make things still more difficult for Ayer’s
explanation of the Open Question phenomenon.
Consider questions about the conditionals we have been considering After
all, Moore’s Open Question Arguments rest upon alleged differences in meaning
between questions. And questions, especially questions about the kinds of
conditionals under consideration, appear to be constructions less assertive than any
we have previously considered. Here are some questions to ponder:
Q3: Is it the case that if E was good, then E was pleasant?
Q4: Is it the case that if E was pleasant, then E was pleasant9
Differences in meaning between the terms ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ appear to be
responsible for any differences in meaning between the two questions. The term
‘good’, however, is tucked away in perhaps the least assertive of locations: within
the antecedent of a conditional in a question. My contention is that in this location
the term fails to express any emotivistic force yet remains meaningful This, of
course, is impossible according to a view like Ayer’s. And for this reason, Ayer’s
explanation of the Open Question phenomenon should be rejected, along with any
other attempt to explain the phenomenon by appeal to a purely pragmatic account of
moral terminology. There are locations in which the Open Question phenomenon is
present but the pragmatic meaning components usually associated with moral
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terminology are not. Variants of this objection will plague any attempt to explain
the Open Question phenomenon in a purely noncognitivist fashion
It’s interesting to note that Ayer uses his explanation of the Open Question
phenomenon to promote his own emotivist metaethical program. But after testing
his explanation through a variety of constructions, the apparent failure of Ayer’s
explanation seems to cast serious doubt upon the plausibility of his metaethics. It
seems that something more than just pragmatic features must be responsible for
differences in meaning between ethical and non-ethical terms, if the Open Question
phenomenon is to be taken seriously, as Ayer and his descendants believe it should
But this remains a contentious claim Metaethicists influenced by Ayer, but
reluctant to adopt a purely emotivist account of moral terminology, developed hybrid
accounts of moral language designed to deflect some of the objections leveled
against Ayer yet still explain the Open Question phenomenon by appeal to non-
semantic (or non-descriptive) features of moral language. 1S To the views of these
theorists, we now turn.
3.2 Hare’s Moorean Moves
R. M Hare is the great pioneering metaethical prescriptivist Hare was
among the first to promote in a serious way the idea that certain ethical statements
either contain (in some sense) or “entail” imperatives that are intended to prescribe
18 One contemporary influential metaethicist—Simon Blackburn—has taken up
Ayer’s torch in defending a purely pragmatic account of ethical terminology. But
Blackburn is prepared to give up plausible principles of compositionality when it
comes to providing the meanings of sentences containing ethical terms, something I
am wholly reluctant to do. Furthermore, Blackburn never explicitly takes up the task
of providing an explanation or analysis of Moore’s Open Question phenomenon
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courses of action. 19 But he was also a prominent philosopher moved by Moore’s
Open Question phenomenon.
Moore thought that he could prove that there were no such defining
characteristics for the word ‘good’ as used in morals. His argument
has been assailed since he propounded it; and it is certainly true that
the formulation of it was at fault. But it seems to me that Moore’s
argument was not merely plausible; it rests, albeit insecurely, upon a
secure foundation; there is indeed something about the way in which,
and the purposes for which, we use the word ‘good’ which makes it
impossible to hold the sort of position which Moore was attacking,
although Moore did not see clearly what this something was. Let us,
therefore, try to restate Moore’s argument in a way which makes it
clear why ‘naturalism’ is untenable, not only for the moral use of
‘good’ as he thought, but also for many other uses. 211
Clearly, Hare believed Moore’s “open question” strategies to be effective in
undermining various forms of metaethical naturalism. He felt, however, that there
was something problematic about the way in which Moore formulated his Open
Question Arguments.
While Hare never provided an explicit interpretation of Moore’s arguments,
it seems that his central objection against these arguments is that though there is a
kind of persuasive justification for Moore’s tricky Open Question premises, “Moore
did not see clearly what this something was.”
21
This interpretation of Hare’s
criticism of Moore’s arguments appears to be justified by Hare’s “open question”
passages:
19
See Hare (1952). Recall that Ayer suggested this possibility, though never
developed the idea, in his (1952), p. 108 Note also that Hare interprets Kant as the
pioneering metaethical prescriptivist.
20 Hare (1952), pp. 83f.
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Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there are some ‘defining
characteristics’ of a good picture. It does not matter of what sort they
are; they can be a single characteristic, or a conjunction of
characteristics, or a disjunction of alternative characteristics. Let us
call the group of these characteristics C. ‘P is a good picture’ will
then mean the same as ‘P is a picture and P is C’. 22
If ‘P is a good picture’ is held to mean the same as ‘P is a picture and
P is C’ then it will become impossible to commend pictures for being
C; it will be possible only to say that they are C. It is important to
realize that this difficulty has nothing to do with the particular
example that I have chosen. It is not because we have chosen the
wrong defining characteristics; it is because, whatever defining
characteristics we choose, this objection arises, that we can no longer
commend an object for possessing those characteristics. 23
It might come to mind that there are important differences between the sense
of the term ‘good’ that Hare is discussing and that which is the focus of Moore’s
Open Question Arguments. Moore’s predicate, when applied properly, says of an
object that it is good in itself‘ intrinsically valuable in the way Moore describes in
Chapter VI ofPrincipia Ethica. It’s clear that the meaning of Moore’s predicate is
not the same as the meaning of the predicate used to say of a picture that it is good
I’m not well versed in the ways of aesthetic evaluation, but I’m inclined to believe
that when those who are seriously interested in evaluating works of art suggest that a
certain work is particularly good, they are meaning to say something different from
that which Moore is attempting to say with his predicate. Hare tells a story about
how the evaluative predicate he employs is intended to work,"
4





24 One of Hare’s accounts of the meaning of ‘good’ is provided in the latter chapters
of his The Language ofMorals (1958). Hare seems to believe that the fundamental
form of attributions of value to items is rx is a better P than y
1
( 1 86) The form rx is
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delve into these complex matters quite yet, for while I think it is unfortunate that
Hare uses what appears to be a semantically different predicate from Moore’s in his
discussion of an argument that he attributes to Moore, Hare’s believes that the point
Moore makes in his Open Question Arguments can be made with any type of
evaluative terminology. Thus, differences between these predicates might safely be
ignored in an evaluation of Hare’s explanation of the Open Question phenomenon.
Hare asks us to consider the form of a prospective “naturalistic” analysis for
what it might mean to say that something is a good picture. 25
GPict: x is a good picture =df. x is picture and x is C.
GPict is merely the form (or a schema) of a prospective analysis because there isn’t a
clear specification of which characteristics the schematic predicate ‘x is C’ is
a good P1 might be considered to be a rougher version of the fundamental form.
Any attribution of value to an item, on Hare’s view, amounts to commending that
item to some extent with respect to a certain comparison class. (Ch 8) In the
example presently under consideration, any of the following might serve to identify
a relevant comparison class: picture for me to purchase, picture for me to study,
picture for you to purchase, picture in competition for a particular prize, etc. Hare
also introduces two constraints on correct applications of the term ‘good’: (i) that the
item being commended with the term ‘good’ is being commended for having certain
characteristics and (ii) that if a certain item in a comparison class is considered to be
good by someone for having certain characteristics, then that person is committed to
the position that any other item within that comparison class with those
characteristics is also good. What it might mean for something to be commended by
someone on a view like Hare’s will be addressed shortly. For a clear explication of a
Hare-inspired version of metaethical prescriptivism, see the chapter on
prescriptivism in Feldman (1978).
25
There appear to be, at least, two ways of interpreting the meaning of Hare’s
predicate ‘x is C\ It could be interpreted as an standard predicate used to pick out
some definite characteristics or it could be interpreted as a schematic predicate. I opt
for the latter interpretation because it gels well with some of the generalization
moves Hare makes near the end of his Open Question passages. I recognize,
however, that Hare’s point could be interpreted just as clearly using the former
interpretation.
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intended to pick out. But this is just how Hare means his schematic predicate to
work. Let an instance of ‘x is C’ pick out whichever characteristics you like Hare
assures us that whichever characteristics are picked out, differences in meaning can
be established between the predicate x is good’ and any instance of ‘x is C\
Like Moore’s Open Question passages. Hare’s thoughts on these matters are
difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, interpretations are available Here is how Hare
seems to be setting up his argument. Consider the following constructions.
Ss6: P is a C picture.
S7: P is a good picture.
The term ‘P’ in these constructions is presumably intended to be a name that picks
out some work of art
If some specific instance of the form of GPict is correct, then there are
instances of Ss6 that are, obviously, equivalent in meaning to S7. Hare suggests,
however, that sentences like S7 can be used to serve—and are intended primarily to
serve—a general purpose that cannot be served by sentences formally similar to Ss6.
If true, this would seem to establish a difference in meaning between the predicate ‘x
is good’ and any naturalistic predicate (or any combination of naturalistic
predicates), undermining the prospects of the complete meaning of ‘x is good’ from
being displayed by any instance of GPict.
This primary purpose served by sentences like S7 is, according to Hare, that
of commending. And this feature of the predicate lx is good’ in S7 can, perhaps, be
made more salient in what some might take to be Hare’s “open question sentence
forms.
78
Ss8: P is a C picture because P is a C picture.
Ss9: P is a good picture because P is a C picture. 26
If an instance of GPict were capable of being successful, then instances of the forms
Ss8 and Ss9 would be identical in meaning. Hare assures us, however, that they
can’t be and, moreover, that these forms can be used to illustrate that “what is wrong
with naturalist theories is that they leave out the prescriptive or commendatory
element in value-judgements, by seeking to make them derivable from statements of
fact.”
27
Ss8 and Ss9 are similar to standard conjunctions in that someone who asserts
an instance of one of these forms asserts each conjunct in the sentence. The
connective ‘because’, however, serves a different purpose from the standard
conjunction constructing connective ‘and’. The term ‘because’ might be considered
to be an explanatory connective By way of various possible semantic or pragmatic
features, the connective ‘because’, when used in sentences formally similar to Ss8
and Ss9, is intended to express the claim that the latter conjunct in some way
explains the former conjunct. For example, someone might be inclined to accept the
I have taken some interpretive liberties in suggesting that Ss8 and Ss9 might
adequately serve as Hare’s “open question” sentence forms. Hare doesn’t utilize
these forms in any explicit way in the quoted passages above. Instead, he writes:
If ‘P is a good picture’ is held to mean the same as ‘P is a picture and
P is C’ then it will become impossible to commend pictures for being
C; it will be possible only to say that they are C. Hare (1952), p. 85.
I’m suggesting that instances of Ss9 are constructions capable of serving the purpose
of commending a picture for having certain natural characteristics. I’m certain that
Hare would believe instances of Ss8 incapable of serving such a purpose
27
Hare (1952), p. 82
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following truth conditions for the connective ‘because’: A sentence of the form rP
because Q1 is true iff each of the conjuncts is true and the latter conjunct explains
why the former conjunct is true. 28
While I find something like these truth conditions very plausible, employing
them—or some close variant of them—in an interpretation of our argument would
beg the question against metaethical noncognitivists like Ayer and, possibly, our
prescriptivist Hare. Recall that Ayer believes that the first conjunct of any instance
of Ss9 is incapable of being either true or false in virtue of the fact that on his
emotivist account, the predicate ‘x is good’ doesn’t make any semantic contributions
to sentences in which it is contained. Setting aside truth conditions, the role of
‘because’ in these kinds of sentences can be made explicit with the introduction of a
plausible assertibility restriction: Unless the latter conjunct explains why the former
conjunct is true, or accepted, or assertible, or endorsed (or whatever noncognitivists
want to say about these types of sentences) in a context, then a sentence of the form
rP because Q1 is not assertible in that context.
Something akin to our assertibility restriction appears capable of establishing
why instances of the forms Ss8 and Ss9 differ in meaning. Sentences of the form
Ss8 violate the condition
Ss8: P is a C picture because P is a C picture
The latter conjunct of any instance of Ss8 seems incapable of explaining the former
conjunct (in some relevant sense) in any context. It’s a mere repetition of the former
28
1 acknowledge that providing adequate truth conditions for a sentence of the form
HP explains why Q is true -1 is a very tricky matter.
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conjunct. And aside from this repetition, it’s unclear to what extent an instance of
Ss8 is capable of being informative in any way other than serving to assert one of its
conjuncts, something that can be done without introducing a sentence with the
‘because’ connective.
In violating our assertibility condition, instances of Ss8 violate certain
conversational maxims. Since ‘because’ is an explanatory connective, one’s
conversational partner(s) will most likely expect some kind of explanation on the
way when they hear an instance of the following fragment uttered: rP is a C picture
because.
. A But no such explanation will be forthcoming. A maxim of
conversation will have thus been violated
Notice that no such violation need occur with the utterance of an instance of
Ss9.
Ss9: Pisa good picture because P is a C picture.
The primary purpose of the term ‘good’ on an account like Hare’s is to serve as a
vehicle for commending things 29 Unfortunately, Hare isn’t perfectly clear about
what commending something amounts to. Clearly, Hare believes there to be a
necessary link between commending things and guiding choices.
When we commend or condemn anything, it is always in order, at




See p. 126 of Hare (1952) where Hare writes that “the primary function of the




[W]e only use value-words about them, when occasions are known to
exist, or are conceivable, in which we, or someone else, would have
to choose between specimens. 31
We should not speak of good sunsets, unless sometimes the decision
had to be made, whether to go to the window to look at the sunset; we
should not speak of good billiard-cues, unless sometimes we had to
choose one billiard-cue in preference to another; we should not speak
of good men unless we had the choice, what sort of men to try to
become. Leibniz, when he spoke of the ‘best of all possible worlds’,
had in mind a creator choosing between possibilities. The choice that
is envisaged need not ever occur, nor even be expected ever to occur,
it is enough for it to be envisaged as occurring, in order that we
should be able to make a value-judgement with reference to it 32
Hare might be interpreted here as suggesting that commending an object with the
term ‘good’ indicates that the object, or perhaps an object relevantly similar to it,
should play a salient role in some relevant decision-making context More clearly.
Hare appears sympathetic to the idea that labeling something as good commits one
to the position that in some relevant decision-making context, someone ought to
make a choice involving that object. Hare analyzes the prescriptive element of
“ought” statements, and subsequently the prescriptive element of all other evaluative







In the final chapter of Hare (1952), Hare discusses how to bolster an artificial
language lacking evaluative terminology in a way that satisfies all the uses for which
we employ evaluative terminology in our own languages. He introduces a
stipulative account of the term ‘ought’ that ends up doing all of the evaluative work.
The later Hare refines and, to some extent, changes features of the view he
outlines in The Language ofMorals. My presentation of Hare’s view here is faithful
to Hare’s early views, the one’s that accompany his commentary on Moore’s Open
Question Arguments. Some of Hare’s later modifications will be considered in my
criticism of his explanation of the Open Question phenomenon
82
For all the words discussed in Parts II and III [‘good’, ‘right’, and
‘ought’] have it as their distinctive function either to commend or in
some other way to guide choices or actions; and it is this essential
feature which defies any analysis in purely factual terms. But to
guide choices or actions, a moral judgement has to be such that if a
person assents to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence
derivable from it; in other words, if a person does not assent to some
such imperative sentence, that is knock-down evidence that he does
not assent to the moral judgement.
. .
34
Perhaps the role of commending in Hare’s account of the evaluative term
‘good’ might be characterized in the following way. Any use of the term ‘good’ is
about, in some sense, some relevant decision-making context or contexts.
Concerning some particular object. A, an utterance of an instance of the form rA is a
good Pn in a context, c
,
might express—on a view like Hare’s—an imperative of a
form substantially similar to the following: ‘In some decision-making context, c\
relevant to c, let the option involving A in a salient way be selected!’. What makes
one context relevant to another in the required sense might be gleaned from a fleshed
out version of Hare’s “picture” example
Suppose that a couple of friends are out viewing a few pieces of artwork.
One of the friends is interested in purchasing a picture for a certain area in her home.
The other is there to assist in the selection process. Imagine that they have spent a
bit of time studying three pictures before them. The potential purchaser is
befuddled. She likes each one in certain respects, but isn’t sure which one would be
best. Finally, her friend pipes up. Singling out one of the items before them, he
claims: “This is a good picture.” Assuming that our evaluator is indeed trying to be




p. 1 7 1 f.
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expressing the imperative: “In those contexts in which you are deciding which of
these three pictures to purchase for that area in your home, let this one be selected!”
Now, in this case, the context of the evaluative comment might be identical to one of
the decision-making contexts that the comment implicitly refers to, thus establishing
a sense in which the decision-making contexts are relevant to the context of the
evaluative utterance. But in different situations, just as Hare indicates, the relevant
contexts may be considerably more “distant.”
Imagine that our two friends have become quite poor and, spending time at a
prestigious auction house, again begin discussing which among a series of painting
would look best in a certain part of one of their homes. When the “assisting” friend
mentions that one of the pieces under consideration is a particularly good one, he
may be expressing an imperative identical to the one considered above. In this case,
however, the context of the evaluative utterance is not identical to any of the relevant
decision-making contexts implicitly referred to in the evaluative utterance Financial
considerations prevent any purchase-related decision-making contexts from
materializing for our friends in the auction house that day.
This is, of course, just a very rough sketch of how Hare’s insights might be
characterized. But the details aren’t important here. What’s important here is that
there is a groundwork for a substantive account of what it is to commend something
that doesn’t appear to be reducible to a listing of that thing’s natural characteristics
and relations. On Hare’s view, a sentence containing a commending term such as
‘good’ possesses an irreducible imperatival meaning component, one that can’t be
captured by any sort of description of the object being commended, the subject doing
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the commending, or any relations that hold between them. In this way. Hare
provides an interesting motivation for endorsing the claim that the commendatory
contribution of the term good to a sentence like P is a good picture’ can ’t be
reduced to some listing of P’s characteristics.
Note also that a prescriptivist account of commending isn’t required to get
Hare’s “open question” argument off the ground. Perhaps some emotivist account of
what is expressed when someone commends something with the term ‘good’ for
having various features would work as well 35
Returning to our discussion of:
Ss9: P is a good picture because P is a C picture,
we can now see how instances of Ss9 are significantly different from those of Ss8.
The first conjunct of an instance of Ss9 might be used to commend the picture P.
The second conjunct of an instance of Ss9 might then be used to explain why one is
commending P. An instance of Ss9 according to an explanation like this—one
perfectly compatible with a purely noncognitivist account like Ayer’s—is capable of
being informative in a way that instances of Ss8 can’t be. An instance of Ss9 can be
35
While this might be true. Hare explicitly rejects any purely emotivist account of
what is expressed when something is commended, and for good reasons too:
We may add that the ‘emotivity’ of much moral utterance, which
some have thought to be of the essence of evaluative language, is
only a symptom—and a most unreliable one—of an evaluative use of
words. Moral language is frequently emotive, simply because the
situations in which it is typically used are situations about which we
often feel deeply. One of the chief uses of the comparison which I
have been drawing between moral and non-moral value-language is
to make it clear that the essential logical features of value-words can
be present where the emotions are not markedly involved. (1952), p.
143f.
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used to commend a picture for having certain characteristics. Instances of Ss8
aren’t suited to achieve such a purpose. Asserting that a picture has certain
characteristics—Hare assures us—doesn’t amount to commending that picture, and
the asserting of an instance of Ss8 appears to be little more than misleading.
With these differences between Ss8 and Ss9 brought to the forefront, an
explicit presentation of Hare’s “open question” argument can be provided
1 1. Instances of Ss9 are capable of being informative in a way that instances
of Ss8 cannot be.
12. If ( 1 ), then any instance of Ss9 differs in meaning from any instance of
Ss8.
13. If any instance of Ss9 differs in meaning from any instance of Ss8, then
the meaning of any naturalistic term (or any combination of naturalistic
terms) is not identical to the meaning of the term ‘good’.
14. Therefore, the meaning of any naturalistic term (or any combination of
naturalistic terms) is not identical to the meaning of the term ‘good’.
A defense for Hare’s “open question” premise
—
premise (1 1)—has been provided
above. Premises (12) and (13) are plausible, almost identical in form to the premises
that Moore himself probably utilized. 36 And it can easily be seen how Hare’s
rejection of metaethical naturalism via this sort of argument rests upon his central
claim that:
Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending;
and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which
themselves do not perform this function.
37
Notice that Hare’s explanation of the Open Question phenomenon in his
defense of premise (1) does not commit him to a purely noncognitivist account of
ethical terminology like Ayer’s. Nowhere does Hare claim that ethical terms are
36
I defend this claim in the Chapter 1 of this dissertation
37
Hare (1952), p. 91.
86
completely devoid of semantic meaning. In fact. Hare believes that the term ‘good’
“has this peculiar combination of evaluative and descriptive meaning.”38 Thus, it
might be the case that, at least in certain contexts, the term ‘good’ is capable of
making a semantic contribution to a sentence in which it is contained Recall Hare’s
sample sentence S7.
S7: P is a good picture.
On Hare’s account, it appears possible that, in addition to serving the role of
commending P, the term ‘good’ might pick out certain natural characteristics of the
picture P as well Thus, it should probably be concluded that Hare’s “open question”
moral is that while the meanings of naturalistic, or descriptive, terms might
contribute to the meanings of ethical terms, the meanings of naturalistic terms are
incapable of exhausting the meanings of ethical terms
Hare’s point appears to be a good one. When we commend something, we
seem to be doing something more than just describing that thing. And if Hare is
right—if the primary purpose of the term ‘good’ is to commend, and if commending
can somehow be analyzed in terms of irreducible imperatives—then it seems that the
complete meanings of ethical terms cannot be identified with the meanings of some
combination of naturalistic or descriptive terms.
But now the question is whether Hare’s explanation of these alleged
differences in meaning between ethical and non-ethical terms is sufficient to explain
the Open Question phenomenon. My view is that it is not. As in my criticism of




locations—specifically, the antecedents of conditionals—in which the Open
Question phenomenon is present but escapes identification by Hare-style
explanations.
The distinction between assertive and unassertive constructions, again, plays
the vital role. Hare’s “open question” sentences, as I have construed them, are
similar to conjunctions in an important respect: uttering one of these sentences
amounts to asserting each of its conjuncts. On Hare’s view, the distinguishing
feature between the term ‘good’ and non-evaluative terms is that utterances of the
term ‘good’ are capable of commending things in ways that utterances of non-
evaluative terms cannot. In assertive constructions, like the ones surveyed above.
Hare’s “distinguishing feature” is detectable. When someone utters the sentence ‘P
is a good picture’, P is being commended as well as, possibly, being described to
some extent. This fact appears to explain—though certain subjective naturalists
might disagree—a difference between the meaning of ‘good’ and the meanings of
non-evaluative terms in assertive constructions. But how does Hare’s explanation
fare in unassertive constructions?
When the term ‘good’ finds its way into unassertive constructions, it
becomes questionable as to whether it is being used to commend anything. Consider
how it operates in the consequent of instances of the following schema.
Csl : If P is a C picture, then P is a good picture
In this unassertive location, the term ‘good’ isn’t, strictly speaking, being used to
commend P. An utterance of an instance of Csl in a context, c, doesn’t express an
imperative substantially similar to: ‘In some decision-making context, c , relevant to
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c, let the option involving P in a salient way be selected!’. But this shouldn’t bother
those attracted to Hare’s explanation too much. An irreducible imperatival meaning
component that Hare claims to be a part of the meaning of the term ‘good’ might still
be found in instances of Csl, for such instances might plausibly be treated as
conditional imperatives. An instance of Csl uttered in a context, c, could be
interpreted as expressing something like: ‘If the predicate in the antecedent of the
instance of Csl applies to P, then in some decision-making context, c\ relevant to c,
let the option involving P in a salient way be selected! ’. Such a treatment would
preserve differences in meaning between instances of Csl and instances of the
following schema, just as Hare would hope
Cs2: If P is a C picture, then P is a C picture
Problems arise for Hare’s explanation of the Open Question phenomenon,
however, in the consideration of how the meanings of ethical terms might differ
from those of non-ethical terms when tucked into the antecedents of conditionals.
Consider the schema that would result from switching the antecedent with the
consequent of Csl
.
Cs3: If P is a good picture, then P is a C picture
In instances of Cs3, the term ‘good’ is located within a very unassertive location: the
antecedent of a conditional. And, unfortunately for those attracted to Hare’s view,
instances of Cs3, and other similar conditionals, are not amenable to the “conditional
imperative” treatment provided for instances of Csl above Imperatives simply do
not imply the truth of propositions that are expressed by instances of the consequent
of Cs3. It would be implausible to suggest that an utterance of an instance of Cs3 in
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a context, c, could be interpreted as expressing something like: ‘If in some decision-
making context, c\ relevant to c, let the option involving P in a salient way be
selected!, then the predicate in the consequent of the instance of Cs3 applies to P
Imperatives just aren’t suited to be antecedents of these types of conditionals.
This presents substantial problems for how anyone attracted to Hare’s view
might characterize the differences in meaning between instances of Cs2 and Cs3, or
how the meanings of instances of Cs3 might be characterized at all.
Advocates of Hare’s view, however, have some options here. They can, of
course, deny the Open Question phenomenon is present. Unlike Ayer and others
attracted to purely pragmatic accounts of moral language, Hare grants that ethical
terms are capable of possessing some naturalistic or descriptive meaning. With
these meanings at one’s disposal, someone attracted to Hare’s view might suggest
that in extremely unassertive locations such as the antecedents in conditionals,
ethical terms are not used to commend (even conditionally) and thus their meanings
are exhausted by whatever naturalistic or descriptive meaning they possess.
It’s possible, perhaps, that Hare, and those attracted to his views on these
matters, might find this reply appealing. Remember: Hare found fault with
naturalistic interpretations of evaluative language that made it impossible for
someone to commend something with evaluative language because of that thing’s
having certain characteristics or standing in certain relations. Hare’s view does not
have this feature. Furthermore, Hare suggests in later works—particularly his
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“Meaning and Speech Acts”—that “commendations do get transformed into
something else when they get inserted into conditional clauses.”39
In this later work. Hare claims that assertive constructions containing
evaluative terminology, when uttered, constitute commending speech acts. But Hare
suggests that utterances of unassertive constructions containing evaluative
terminology, however, are not speech acts of commendation, yet retain their
meanings in a way that preserves the validity of certain arguments.
So we can easily perform the standard maneuver for letting the
consequent of the hypothetical out of its cage. Thus, if I am prepared
to say that it is a good movie, and that if it is a good movie it will
make a lot of money, I can go on to say “It will make a lot of money.”
The only difference between this and the preceding case is that to
affirm the minor premise “It is a good movie” is here to commend the
movie. But this does not make the meaning of “It is a good movie” in
the categorical premise different from that of the same words in the
conditional clause of the hypothetical premise in any sense that is
damaging to the inference. . . 40
What Hare seems to be implying here is just the view that was attributed to him
earlier: that the meaning of the evaluative term ‘good’ is best characterized as a
combination of semantic meaning similar to that of a descriptive or naturalistic term
and the capacity to express commendatory force in assertive constructions through a
pragmatic (or more specifically, prescriptive) meaning component.
This view, however, simply fails to account for any differences in meaning
between ethical and certain nonethical terms in unassertive contexts. Better would
39




be a view that does. Furthermore, this way of interpreting Hare isn’t consonant with
the idea that ethical terms contain irreducible imperatival meaning components.
Hare and his followers could, though they haven’t, interpret instances of Cs3
as having certain commendatory meaning components. They could suggest that the
schema Cs3 be interpreted as:
Cs4: If P is a commendable picture, then P is a C picture
And whether an utterance of the sentence ‘P is a commendable picture’ in a context
is true or not might depend on whether the speaker, or perhaps all rational beings, 41
would assent to certain imperatives.
While such a view, if worked out, could save the irreducible imperatival
meaning component that Hare found in evaluative terminology, more would still be
required to explain the Open Question phenomenon in unassertive constructions
Specifically, a view along these lines would have to distinguish the semantic
meanings of ‘commendable’ and other evaluative terms from those of various
seemingly non-evaluative terms. In the next chapter, I attempt to work out a
somewhat Hare-inspired distinction capable of doing the required work. Without
such a distinction, the meaning of the term ‘commendable’ could, perhaps, be
identified with some combination of the meanings of terms used to describe the
counterfactual and/or actual properties of speakers and rational beings as well as,
perhaps, the meanings of terms used to describe objects of interest and the relations
41 The later Hare ofMoral Thinking appears to be sympathetic to a view along these
lines.
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that hold between speakers or rational beings and those objects of interest. 42 This
combination of terms could then be inserted into the “C-slots” in the construction of
instances of Cs2 and Cs3, which, in turn, could be used to construct an Open
Question Argument. And this Open Question Argument, unlike the one that Hare
presents, would, like Moore’s originals, contain an unsupported and unexplained
“open question” premise.
Hare’s explanation of the Open Question phenomenon is an improvement
over Ayer’s. Evaluative terms aren’t completely meaningless in unassertive
constructions on Hare’s view. Their descriptive or naturalistic meanings appear to
step up and play the prominent role when sentences (or questions) containing
evaluative terminology fail to be speech acts of commendation or condemnation.
The problem with Hare’s view, though, is that evaluative terms don’t appear to be
particularly evaluative in unassertive contexts. In the least. Hare fails to provide any
explanation of how their meanings could differ from those of certain non-evaluative
terms in unassertive contexts.
While it’s unclear how Hare might have felt about this feature of his
explanation of the Open Question phenomenon, a distinction, however slight,
explaining a difference in meaning between evaluative and non-evaluative
terminology in unassertive constructions is what is required to ease “open question”
tensions.
42 One might be prepared to say an irreducible evaluative element would survive this
kind of treatment in virtue of the fact, pace Gibbard ( 1 984), (1985), and ( 1 990), that
the term ‘rational’ is a evaluative term incapable of being analyzed in terms of
purely descriptive or naturalistic terminology. While this might be so, Hare was
sympathetic to naturalistic analyses of rationality. The view expounded in Brandt
(1979), in particular, caught Hare’s fancy. See Hare (1981), pp 101-105, 214-216
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Our final Open Question theorist—Charles L. Stevenson—thought that such
a distinction could be made along some of the lines that Hare pursued While
Stevenson, as we shall soon see, is an emotivist-naturalist, he, like Hare, believed
that the meaning of the moral term ‘good’ could be identified with the meaning of a
naturalistic predicate conjoined with a pragmatic meaning component And, also
like Hare, Stevenson used Moorean reasons to motivate his view. So, to Stevenson’s
Moorean sympathies we now briefly turn.
3.3 Stevenson’s Open Question Theorizing
Charles L. Stevenson’s most explicit “open question” theorizing occurs in the
second and seventh essays of his Facts and Values. Stevenson embraces Moore’s
arguments against certain forms of metaethical naturalism in his essay “The Emotive
Meaning of Ethical Terms.”
The omnipotence of the empirical method, as implied by interest
theories and others, may be shown unacceptable in a somewhat
different way. G. E. Moore’s familiar objection about the open
question is chiefly pertinent in this regard. No matter what set of
scientifically knowable properties a thing may have (says Moore, in
effect), you will find, on careful introspection, that it is an open
question to ask whether anything having these properties is good. It
is difficult to believe that this recurrent question is a totally confused
one, or that it seems open only because of the ambiguity of “good
”
Rather, we must be using some sense of “good” which is not
definable, relevantly, in terms of anything scientifically knowable.
That is, the scientific method is not sufficient for ethics.
43
An explicit presentation of Stevenson’s interpretation of Moore’s Open Question
Argument is readily available. Consider the following schemas
Qsl Is anything that has the property P something that has the property P 9
43
Stevenson (1963), p. 15.
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Qs2: Is anything that has the property P something that is good?
Instances of these question schemas are successfully generated by plugging some
combination of names of purely natural properties into the “P” slots. 44
Here’s Stevenson’s Open Question Argument:
15. Instances of Qsl are not open.
16. Instances of Qs2 are open.
17. If ( 1 ) and (2), then the meaning of any instance of Qsl is different from
the meaning of any instance of Qs2.
18. If any instance of Qsl differs in meaning from any instance of Qs2, then
the meaning of any naturalistic predicate (or combination of naturalistic
predicates) is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
19. Therefore, the meaning of any naturalistic predicate (or combination of
naturalistic predicates) is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x
is good’.
While slightly different from Moore’s original, Moore would have certainly
approved of Stevenson’s argument here. However—like others who have proffered
noncognitivist explanations of the Open Question phenomenon—Stevenson is
reluctant to embrace Moore’s mysterious metaethical nonnaturalism:
But this does not imply that “good” must be explained in terms of a
Platonic Idea, or of a categorical imperative, or of a unique,
unanalyzable property.
45
Instead, Stevenson defends his Open Question premise—premise (16) above—by
appealing to the view that moral terms such as Moore’s predicate ‘x is good’ exhibit
44 By ‘natural properties’, I just mean the class of properties that aren’t either
transcendental or nonnatural, in Moorean terms. This sense of the phrase should not
be confused with the sense expressed with the very same phrase by contemporary
metaphysicians. For those curious to investigate Moore’s attempts to characterize
these alleged classes of properties, see Chapters I and IV ofPrincipia Ethica as well






a combination of descriptive (or naturalistic) and emotivist meaning that purely
naturalistic predicates lack.
Stevenson’s emotivist-naturalist metaethics are complicated 46 He provides
two incompatible analyses of both the descriptive and the emotive aspects of moral
terminology in the two “patterns of analysis” presented in his Ethics and Language
Thus, rather than delving into all of the complexities of Stevenson’s metaethical
thought, I will merely attempt to indicate some of the ways in which he believes the
meanings of ethical terms to differ from those of purely naturalistic ones, thereby
establishing what appears to be Stevenson’s justification for his Open Question
premise.
Stevenson suggests that the meaning of an utterance of the sentence “That is
good” by me differs from those of certain naturalistic candidates that have been
introduced to exhibit its meaning—sentences such as “I like that,” “We like that,” “I
approve of that,” etc.—in that my utterance contains a predicate capable of
transmitting certain emotive elements that aren’t transmitted by the competing
predicates.
The word “good” has a laudatory emotive meaning that fits it for the
dynamic use of suggesting favorable interest. But the sentence “we
like it” has no such emotive meaning.
47
46
For a lucid account of Stevenson’s emotivist-naturalist view, see Feldman (1978),
pp. 223-231
47
Stevenson (1963), p. 24.
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How to characterize the emotive meanings of terms, particularly moral terms, on a
view like Stevenson’s is, again, a very complicated matter. Thankfully, Stevenson
provides us with a synoptic account of these meanings:
The emotive meaning of a word or phrase is a strong and persistent
tendency, built up in the course of linguistic history, to give direct
expression (quasi-interjectionally) to certain of the speaker’s feelings
or emotions or attitudes; and it is also a tendency to evoke (quasi-
imperatively) corresponding feelings, emotions, or attitudes in those
to whom the speaker’s remarks are addressed. It is the emotive
meaning of a word, accordingly, that leads us to characterize it as
laudatory or derogatory—that rather generic characterization being
of particular importance when we are dealing with terms like “good”
and “bad” or “right and wrong.” 48,49
Stevenson’s account of the emotive meaning of moral terminology is a sophisticated
development of Ayer’s early view. 50 Emotive terms appear to be capable of
expressing some combination of two distinct phenomena. On one hand, they are
—
like interjections—capable of serving as vehicles for the expression of a speaker’s
feelings, emotions, or attitudes. Stevenson, in fact, appeals to this aspect of moral
language in his preferred analysis of moral disagreement among people who don’t
disagree about any of the relevant empirical facts
51 On the other hand, moral terms
are capable of evoking various feelings, emotions, or attitudes in those who are being
addressed with moral language. This feature of moral language, Stevenson suggests,
is very subtle. It is much less “blunt” than, say, issuing commands to others to feel
48
Ibid., pp. 2 If.
49
See Chapters III and IX of his (1944) for the full story.
50
Cf. Ayer (1952), p. 108.
51
See the first of essay of Stevenson (1963).
97
various ways. 52 Rather, it is suggestive in a seemingly more subliminal, perhaps
even insidious, way.
Note that Stevenson’s development of emotivism in his metaethical program
makes a clean break with Ayer’s original view in one important respect. Failing to
be attracted to Ayer’s view that the emotive meanings of ethical terms completely
exhaust their meanings, Stevenson proposes the view that ethical terms are capable
of possessing complex descriptive, as well as emotive, meaning. 53 Such a view,
Stevenson argues,
tempers the paradoxical contention that ethical judgments are “neither
true nor false.” This latter remark is wholly misleading. It is more
accurate and illuminating to say that an ethical judgment can be true
or false, but to point out that its descriptive truth may be insufficient
to support its emotive repercussions. 5
I will gloss over Stevenson’s account of the descriptive meanings of moral terms, for
it isn’t particularly relevant to his explanation of the Open Question phenomenon,
opting instead for our, by now, traditional hedonic example. So let’s consider some
“hedonic” instances of Stevenson’s question schemas.
Q5: Is anything that has the property pleasantness something that has the
property pleasantness?
Q6: Is anything that has the property pleasantness something that is good9
52







Stevenson suggests in his “second pattern of analysis” that the meaning of a
descriptive, purely naturalistic predicate like ‘x is pleasant’ is capable of providing
the complete semantic meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’ in various contexts. 55
Without clearly explicating what he intends to mean by the phrase ‘open
question’, Stevenson follows Moore in claiming that Q6 is open while Q5 is not
Due to its tautological nature, Q5 isn’t very interesting, and any competent language
user can provide the correct answer to it just by grasping the meanings of its words.
Q6, however, appears to be different, despite Stevenson’s contention that the
semantic meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’ might very well be identical to that of
‘x is pleasant’ in the context under consideration.
Doubtless there is always some element of description in ethical
judgments, but this is by no means all. Their major use is not to
indicate facts but to create an influence. Instead of merely describing
people’s interests they change or intensify them They recommend an
interest in an object, rather than state that the interest already exists. 56
Like Ayer before him, Stevenson suggests that the emotive elements of meaning that
naturalistic predicates tend to lack, but that are readily evident in ethical predicates,
are responsible for the Open Question phenomenon
I may add that my analysis answers Moore’s objection about the open
question. Whatever scientifically knowable properties a thing may
have, it is always open to question whether a thing having these
(enumerated) qualities is good For to ask whether it is good is to ask
for influence. And whatever I may know about an object, I can still
55
See Chapter IX of his (1944). In his “first pattern of analysis,” Stevenson suggests
that moral predicates are indexical and equivalent in semantic meaning to certain




ask, quite pertinently, to be influenced with regard to my interest in
Armed with this emotivist-naturalist explanation of the Open Question phenomenon,
Stevenson suggests that Moore’s “open question” inferences to metaethical
nonnaturalism are ill-motivated in that they lack explanatory justification and ignore
a plausible naturalistic account of the very phenomenon that led Moore to reject
metaethical naturalism in the first place.
If Moore wishes to maintain this, and if he actually is confident that
he encounters this quality in his experience or “intuition,” and if he is
sure that the quality is nonnatural, then I cannot pretend to have said
anything here which is likely to convince him to the contrary—even
though I should privately suspect him of building up elaborately
sophisticated fictions in the name of common sense. I do contend,
however, that if Moore is to support such a view, he must argue for it
in a more positive way. He cannot hold it up as the only alternative to
manifest weaknesses of naturalism. The kind of naturalism which he
was combating, which ignores disagreement in attitude and emotive
meaning, does indeed require an alternative; but unless new
arguments can be found to the contrary, such an alternative can be
developed along the lines I have here suggested
?s
I think it’s obvious from the passages cited above that Stevenson, like Ayer and
Hare, believed certain pragmatic aspects of moral language to be completely
responsible for the Open Question phenomenon. But as I argued earlier, while I
admit that these pragmatic features play a salient role in our moral discourse, it is
unlikely that they are capable of providing a complete, and thus adequate,
justification for the Open Question phenomenon.
57




My objection to Stevenson’s account of the Open Question phenomenon
should, by this time, be quite predictable: it doesn’t provide an explanation of the
Open Question phenomenon in unassertive constructions. If, as I argued against
Ayer, the emotivist meaning components usually associated with moral terminology
aren’t present in unassertive locations such as the antecedents of conditionals, then
Stevenson, it seems, would be hard pressed to provide an explanation for any
differences in meaning between certain conditionals. His view, then, would suffer a
fate similar to that of Hare’s. Conditionals containing evaluative terms wouldn’t
come out meaningless, but there would be no way to distinguish their meanings from
those of certain conditionals absent of evaluative terminology.
Stevenson, like Hare, seemed to be aware of this difficulty. In his essay
“Moore’s Arguments against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism,” Stevenson
discusses, albeit briefly, the implications of his view concerning the meanings of
certain conditionals.
It seems quite likely, judging from parallel remarks in Principia
Ethica (p. 7) that Moore would deny that
“If I now approve of X, X is right”
is an analytic statement, in any usual sense of words. By D3 [‘x is
right’ =df. ‘I now approve of x, which is occurring’] this is analytic,
and I am prepared to accept that consequence, and at the same time to
insist that D3 is as conventional as any precise definition of a vague
common term can be, ifD3 is qualified with reference to emotive
meaning. What I do not admit, however, is that the statement is
trivial
,
in the way most analytic statements are. The emotive
meaning of “right,” in the above statement, might serve to induce the
hearer to approve of X, provided the speaker does. Any hearer who
does not want to be so influenced may accordingly object to the
statement, even though it is analytic. Although trivial in regard to its
cognitive aspects, the statement is not trivial in regard to its
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repercussions on attitudes; and one may refuse to make it, as I should,
very often, for that reason.
59
Stevenson’s commentary here isn’t easy to decipher. He seems to be suggesting a
way in which the conditional he considers differs in meaning from the following
conditional:
Cl: If I now approve of X, I now approve of X.
Admitting that his view entails that the two conditionals are identical in cognitive (or
semantic) meaning, 60 the differences in meaning between the two conditionals are
purportedly accounted for by the emotive meaning component associated with the
predicate ‘x is right’ in the former conditional. Stevenson’s reasoning behind the
claim, however, doesn’t appear to be very persuasive. He suggests that the “emotive
meaning of ‘right’” in the conditional he considers “might serve to induce the hearer
to approve of X, provided the speaker does.” But what might Stevenson mean by
this? What if the antecedent isn’t satisfied7 If the speaker does not approve of X, is
the emotive force usually associated with the term ‘good’ present in an utterance of
the conditional under consideration7 And if it is present, then how does it differ
from the emotive meaning the predicate ‘x is good’ allegedly carries in utterances of
assertive constructions? Stevenson doesn’t provide any answers to these questions.
I suggested in my criticism of Ayer a way in which the emotive meanings of
evaluative predicates in consequents of conditionals might be described. But this
still leaves those attracted to emotivist explanations of the Open Question




predicates that make their way into the antecedents of conditionals, and how the
conditional C7 above might differ in meaning from the following construction
C8: IfX is right, I now approve of X.
If what I have suggested throughout these criticisms of noncognitivist explanations
of the Open Question phenomenon is accurate—that evaluative terms packed into
the antecedents of conditionals do not carry the emotivist or prescriptivist meaning
components that they do (or might) in assertive constructions—then Stevenson, like
Hare, has yet to provide any explanation for how C7 and C8 might differ in
meaning. “Open question” tensions remain
Ayer, Hare, and Stevenson have elucidated a number of ways in which moral
terms differ in certain respects from purely naturalistic, or descriptive, ones. These
non-semantic differences in meaning, they suggest, are responsible for Moore’s
Open Question phenomenon. And they, as well as subsequent philosophers attracted
to noncognitivist explanations of the Open Question phenomenon, like Blackburn
and Gibbard, have used similar techniques to motivate their own metaethical
programs. But I think Moore’s Open Question Arguments run a bit deeper than
these theorists have suggested. It just doesn’t seem to be the case that they have
provided a complete account of the phenomenon with which Moore was so
concerned. At least part of the story remains to be told. In fact, distinctions appear
to be available that might be able to lend some help in explaining the Open Question
phenomenon in all of its guises, distinctions capable, perhaps, of marking semantic
differences between ethical and nonethical terminology without appealing to
60
I’m setting aside any indexical related worries that might prove troublesome, for
now.
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mysterious nonnatural properties. To these distinction, and their application in
possibly resolving Open Question tensions, we now turn.
104
CHAPTER 4
OPEN QUESTION ELUCIDATION: SEMANTIC-STYLE
The most popular noncognitivist accounts of the Open Question phenomenon
seem to falter in cases where ethical terms are located within unassertive




provides a “quasi-realist” account of moral terminology that
might be a strong competitor in our “open question” contest, but Blackburn’s
account entails the rejection of a compositional semantics for sentences containing
ethical terms, a cost to be sure. Recognizing that there might be several interesting
ways to develop non-cognitivist (and perhaps, non-compositional) semantics for
ethical terms, I am going to pursue a cognitivist, semantic account of the Open
Question phenomenon.
Semantics is a complicated business, and moral semantics perhaps even more
so. In these final sections I will discuss two semantic concepts—character and
role—that might prove useful in elucidating the Open Question phenomenon.
4,1 Character
Frege suggested that the meaning of an expression could be adequately
characterized by its sense and its referent, the sense, in some way, determining the
referent of an expression But the notion of a sense was mysterious.
Then came Carnap who, utilizing the modal notions of necessity and
possibility, thought that the concepts of an intension and an extension could
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sufficiently characterize the semantic meanings of terms and sentences. 1 David
Kaplan, however, convincingly argued that that the two semantic concepts were not
suited to characterize the meanings of a specific range of terms—namely, indexicals
and demonstratives—nor the sentences that contain them 2 Consider the following
sentences.
SI : lam pounding away at a keyboard right now.
S2: Jean-Paul Vessel is pounding away at a keyboard at 3:15pm on 7/20/02.
SI and S2 differ in meaning. It’s possible that utterances of SI and S2 say the same
thing—express the same proposition—but obviously this isn’t necessarily so. An
utterance of SI by my brother Sam, or by me at a later time, will not express the
same thing that an utterance of S2 will.
To deal with the semantics of sentences containing indexical or
demonstrative elements, Kaplan suggests that in addition to the concepts of an
intension (or “content” as he calls it) and extension, the concept of a character
should be utilized. The intension (or content) of an utterance of a sentence is, in
very rough terms, what is said through the utterance of the sentence, which
proposition (however you wish to characterize propositions) is expressed through the
utterance. The character of a sentence type, on the other hand, is the meaning
component that determines how the intension of an utterance of a sentence type is
picked out .
3
Since the intensions of utterances of sentences containing indexical or
1




Ibid., p. 84. I’ve made a slight departure from Kaplan’s notion of character here.
Kaplan distinguishes an utterance of a sentence from a sentence in a context. The
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demonstrative terms are determined, in large part, by contextual features—the set of
parameters including but perhaps not limited to: the world, location within the world,
time, and agent of the utterance—Kaplan describes the character of a sentence type
as a function from contexts to intensions. The characters of any sentence-
constituting expression types can likewise be described as functions from contexts to
intensions.
4
Kaplan’s concept of a character can be used to explain how the intension of
my utterance of SI right now is identical to the intension of S2 uttered by anyone at
any time: the characters of the expressions T and ‘right now’ pick out the same
intensions from my context of utterance that the characters of ‘Jean-Paul Vessel’ and
‘at 3:15pm on 7/20/02’ pick out from any context of utterance. 5 In different
contexts, of course, the characters of the expressions ‘I’ and ‘right now’ are capable
of picking out different intensions. When my brother Sam and I both utter SI, we
latter doesn’t require a token, so that sentences like ‘I am not uttering anything right
now’ can be true in a context without any utterances taking place. I will gloss over
this feature of Kaplan’s view as well as several other interesting features that
distinguish Kaplan’s concept of a character from various competing concepts. For
those interested in such features, see Chalmers (2002).
4 Salmon characterizes Kaplan’s notion of the character of an expression in this way:
The character of an expression is a function or rule that determines,
for any possible context of utterance, c, the information value the
expression takes on with respect to c. For example, the character of a
sentence is a function or rule that assigns to any possible context of
utterance c the piece of information that the sentence encodes with
respect to c, that is, the information content of the sentence with
respect to c. Salmon (1991), p. 14f.
5
1 realize that those attracted to a causal theory of reference for proper names might
reject the view that proper names have anything like intensions. But even they
shouldn’t be worried by what’s coming: proper names will shortly give way to
ethical predicates.
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say something with the same character but express different intensions. Indexicals
and demonstratives, in particular, have unstable characters: characters that are
capable of picking out different intensions from different contexts.
Kaplan notes that it’s not surprising that character-related meaning puzzles
didn’t arise until careful semantic studies of indexicals and demonstratives got
underway. Most expressions seem to have stable characters, so it’s understandable
that features of meaning associated most with terms that have unstable characters
went undetected, or at least failed to be characterized in a satisfactory manner, for so
long. But since Kaplan’s groundbreaking “The Logic of Demonstratives,” the
concept of a character has been utilized to provide semantic accounts of expressions
besides the indexicals and demonstratives it was originally introduced to explain.
Kaplan’s success gave birth to intensive philosophical studies on what are
now referred to as “two-dimensional meaning apparatuses”, which have been
utilized to provide semantic accounts of all sorts of expressions that have some kind
of indexical feature.
6
Let us consider an expression to have an indexical feature just
in case its intension is determined, at least in part, by some contextual feature, be it
the speaker, the time, the world, the location within the world, or what have you.
6
See, for example, Stalnaker’s diagonal proposition and proposition expressed in his
(1978), Evans’s deep necessity and superficial necessity in his (1979), Davies and
Humberstone’s fixedly actual truth and necessary truth in their (1981), Chalmers’s
primary intension and secondary intension in his (1996), and Jackson’s A-intension
and C-intension in his (1998). Note also that the distinction between wide and
narrow content in the philosophy of mind appears to be a descendant of Kaplan’s
distinction between character and content See, for example, Fodor (1987), p. 30 and
White (1982). Again, see Chalmers (2002) for a detailed study of two-dimensional
semantic apparatuses.
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What if ethical predicates are indexical in some sense 1? 7 Since perhaps the
beginning of rational discourse various forms of relativism—individualistic, social-
contract oriented, etc.—have enjoyed spirited defenses. If any sort of relativism is
acceptable, then it wouldn’t be surprising that ethical predicates might be amenable
to a semantic analysis similar to that which is commonly provided for standard
indexical expressions insofar as their intensions are determined, in part, by
contextual factors. But before pursuing such a possibility, something must first be
said about the intensions of predicates in general.
Philosophers disagree about the nature of the intensions of one-place
predicates. Some describe these intensions as functions from possible worlds to
extensions, where the extensions might be taken to be either classes of individuals8
or perhaps even properties of some variety or other.
9 Some even describe these
intensions as properties themselves
10
Since I have no ax to grind here, I want to
In what follows, I will be implementing many of the ideas Dreier utilizes in his
(1999). In his (1999), Dreier shows how one can take Gibbard’s noncognitivist,
expressivistic semantics and, by way of Kaplan’s character function, transform them
into a cognitive sort of relativism
8 Assuming bivalence, Kaplan in his (1978) and Salmon in his (1991), p. 14 endorse
this view about the extensions of predicates. If bivalence isn’t acceptable, Salmon
suggests that the extensions of predicates be understood in the following way:
The extension of an //-place predicate (with respect to w) is the
predicate’s semantic characteristic function (with respect to w), i.e.,
the function that assigns either truth or falsehood to an //-tuple of
individuals, according as the predicate or its negation applies (with
respect to w) to the //-tuple. (1991), p 14.
9 Chalmers remains neutral between the two possibilities in his (1996).
10
This appears to be Carnap’s view even though most of his interpreters want to
attribute to him the view that intensions should be regarded as functions from
possibilities to classes of individuals; see his (1947).
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remain as neutral as possible with respect to the natures of these intensions. I will
tentatively adopt the view that intensions of one-place predicates are functions from
worlds to classes of individuals and that such functions are capable of representing
properties.
11
Returning to ethical predicates, we can see how semantic differences
between ethical and various naturalistic predicates might be elucidated on the
assumption that some form of relativism is plausible. Consider the possibility that
the intension of a particular use of a certain ethical predicate is determined, in part,
by contextual factors. Imagine that some sort of individualistic relativism is
acceptable, one in which the intension of an uttered ethical term is partially
determined by the system of norms 12 that a speaker accepts, or the system of norms
that a speaker would (or perhaps might) accept under various conditions, or perhaps
even by an event-description that a speaker can universalize (according some
conception of universalizability). In short, suppose that the intensions of ethical
utterances are partially determined by psychological features of the speaker or
psychological features of the speaker’s “subjunctive” counterparts, however they
may be specified. Given the plausibility of this kind of view, which is sometimes
referred to as “subjective naturalism”, a way in which the meanings of ethical
11
Cf. Lewis (1983b). More generally, I wouldn’t mind treating intensions of n-
place predicates as functions from worlds to classes of //-tuples. Intensions of 1-
placed predicates could then be used to represent properties and intensions of more-
than-one-placed predicates could be used to represent relations.
12 A system of norms might be characterized as a subset of possible actions. Acting
in accordance with a particular system of norms might then be understood as
performing one of the members of the norm-characterizing set.
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predicates can be distinguished from an assortment of non-ethical ones (in any
context) might be capable of being displayed
Imagine two people with slightly different axiological views. Jeremy is an
old-fashioned, Bentham-style, primitive hedonist—one who associates the intrinsic
values of outcomes with their hedonic values, intrinsic goodness with positive
hedonic value. The other, Fred, is hedonistically inclined but sensitive to a certain
matter of desert; in particular, that in addition to its hedonic value, facts concerning
the past receipt of pleasure and pain can play a role in determining how intrinsically
valuable an outcome is. Fred believes there to be something more to the intrinsic
values of outcomes than merely their hedonic values. Let’s further suppose that both
Jeremy and Fred are very “settled” in their views, they would continue to hold them
regardless of any new arguments or information to which they may be introduced.
According to the version of relativism on the table, differences in meaning
between ethical and various non-ethical predicates can be established First,
consider what Moore would take to be a paradigm naturalistic predicate: ‘x has
positive hedonic value’. Assume that according to our version of relativism, when
Jeremy utters the sentence ‘Outcome O is intrinsically good’ the intension selected
by Jeremy’s utterance of the predicate ‘x is intrinsically good' is identical to the
intension that the predicate ‘x has positive hedonic value’ picks out on any occasion
of use. But meaning differences between the two predicates should be apparent.
The intension of Jeremy’s use of ‘x is intrinsically good' is selected by a function
from features of Jeremy’s context—namely, his psychological properties (his actual
ones or perhaps those he has in nearby worlds). This function (which 1 will continue
to call ‘character’, despite Kaplan’s strictures 13 ) is significantly different from any
character that might be associated with the predicate ‘x has positive hedonic value’.
The intension of a use of ‘x has positive hedonic value’ is not determined by the
same sort of features of context that our relativistic theory suggests determines the
intensions of ethical predicates. Differences in character make for differences in
meaning. So, perhaps it might be argued that Moore’s Open Question phenomenon
can be adequately accounted for by pointing out differences in character between
ethical predicates and those particular non-ethical predicates that some have claimed
to be synonymous with them.
Furthermore, the character of ethical terms proposed by this sort of relativism
can help explain how Jeremy and Fred might be able to understand what each other
means when uttering evaluative statements despite the fact that they express
different intensions through their uses of the predicate ‘x is intrinsically good’.
Their expressions are identical with respect to character; it’s just that this character is
capable of selecting different intensions from different contexts.
How these semantic differences between ethical and non-ethical predicates
can be displayed by different sorts of relativism is fairly clear. Versions of
relativism might be distinguished by the character functions that are proposed to be
the best candidates for the characters of ethical predicates. For example, social-
contract theorists might argue that the character of an ethical predicate like ‘x is
right’ is a function from a set of social agreements relevant to a context of utterance
13
See his (1978). Kaplan wants to reserve the character function for a limited class
of indexical and demonstrative expressions. I will use the term to refer to the
relevant function that selects intensions from contexts of utterance.
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to an intension. Different social-contract theories will explicate what the relevant set
of social agreements is in different ways, resulting in a plethora of characters that
might be touted in the social-contractivist’s cause
Even those seduced by the view that ethical terms are amenable to a semantic
analysis akin to that which Kripke and Putnam have proposed for natural kind
terms
14
might find the character function to be capable of displaying differences in
meaning between ethical and nonethical terminology. After all, natural kind terms
seem to have indexical features. Water is the stuff to which we stand in certain
causal relations. It’s the stuff we see here on earth, the stuff that we are able to pick
out in virtue of its stereotypical, superficial qualities. 15
Recent developments in two-dimensional semantics indicate that differences
in meaning between the predicates ‘x is water’ and ‘x is H 20’ can be attributed to
differences in character (or some similar competing function). 1 '’ The characters of
the predicates pick out the same intension from any utterance in our world But
perhaps an utterance of the predicate ‘x is water’ in a different world expresses a
different intension from that expressed by an utterance of ‘x is H 20’ in that world.
Imagine a Twin Earth type world where most everything is the same as it is
in our world except that the stuff Twin Earthlings are able to pick out in virtue of the
very same stereotypical, superficial qualities with which we are able to pick out
water can’t be characterized as H 20 From utterances of l x is water in that world, it
14
See Boyd (1988).
15 See Putnam (1975b).
16
See Block and Stalnaker (1999), Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1998), and perhaps
Davies and Humberstone (1981).
might be the case that the character of the predicate selects an intension different
from that which is selected by the character of ‘x is H 20’ in that world In this way
perhaps, differences in meaning between the two predicates can be established as
well as semantic differences between ethical and various nonethical terms //ethical
terms are suitably analogous to the natural kind terms that are popularly believed to
be amenable to a semantic analysis along the lines of a Kripke-Putnam causal theory
of reference.
Even noncognitivists 17 might be persuaded to jump boat and embrace the
character of ethical terms as the meaning feature distinguishing them from
nonethical terms. James Dreier has shown how, with the help of the character
function, the semantics of Alan Gibbard’s noncognitivist expressivism can be
transformed into a cognitivist, individualistic relativism of the type discussed
above. Mix in a non-cognitive meaning component capable of being expressed in
assertive constructions containing ethical terminology and we might have a
semantics capable of luring the non-cognitivist holdouts into the camp founded by
Hare and Stevenson.
So have we finally found a solution to Moore’s “open question” puzzles?
Can the Open Question phenomenon be explained by appeal to indexical features of
ethical terms and the peculiar functions that serve as the characters of such terms9
Unfortunately, I don’t think so. While I think that the characters of ethical terms
17
Recall that noncognitivists don’t believe that ethical terms have semantic




might play an interesting role in explaining the phenomenon, various reasons suggest
there is more to be explained
First of all, no matter how plausible I find certain versions of relativism to be,
the suggestion that any sort of relativistic theory best captures the natures of certain
meaning-related features of ethical terms is a controversial thesis. Moral absolutists
abound. They believe the character of any ethical term to be perfectly stable,
picking out the same intension from any context of utterance I certainly wouldn’t
want to suggest that their views are obviously wrong-minded by appealing to a
question-begging account of ethical terminology. And as I argued elsewhere, ethical
terms seem to resist the kind of indexical treatment that a modified Kripke-Putnam
causal theory of reference provides for natural kind terms 19
Second, Moore was well aware of indexical accounts of ethical terminology.
In fact, one of his Open Question Arguments is aimed at distinguishing the meanings
of the predicates ‘x is good’ and ‘x is that which we desire to desire’. And it
wasn’t the indexical feature of the latter predicate that captured Moore’s attention; it
was something else. The Open Question phenomenon seems to require more of an
explanation than merely that ethical terms are indexical and require some kind of
indexical semantic treatment. Even if ethical terms are indexical, then they share
this feature with a great many seemingly nonethical terms. How could differences in
meaning between ethical and various nonethical indexical terms then be captured9
Perhaps pointing to the particular natures of their character functions would lead to
19
See my “Defending Open Question Arguments,” Chapter 2 of this dissertation
20
§ 1 3 ofPrincipia Ethica.
the sought out explanation. 21 Better yet would be an explanation of how these
character functions are determined. Still better would be an account that explains
how all of these meaning functions—characters and intensions—of ethical terms are
determined.
4.2 Role
There is more to meaning than the set-theoretic devices used to assign
semantic values to utterances in contexts that have been discussed thus far Which
semantic value-selecting functions are associated with which words in our language
are determined, in part, by the role that these terms plays in our linguistic
community; meaning is determined in part by use. 22 To understand the meaning of a
term, one must be able to grasp which functions, among all of the available
candidates, the role of the term picks out. We might think of the role of a term, very
generally, as the set of semantic constraints placed upon the term by a linguistic
community, or perhaps in some cases by an individual, by way of the referential
intentions utilized in the use of the term. And we might think of a satisfier of a role.
21 James Dreier suggests this on p 567 of his (1999):
Furthermore, an indexical theorist and an expressivist will agree
about what it is that makes a sentence, and its assertion, normative. It
is the primary semantic value of a sentence, a function from norms (in




then, as a pair of functions (character and intension) that adequately meets the
semantic constraints established by the role. 23
On the assumption that some form of cognitivism is correct, an adequate
account of the meanings of ethical terms must accurately characterize both the roles
and the satisfiers of these terms. Ralph Wedgwood echoes these sentiments in his
recent work on the semantics of ethical terms:
If the term’s meaning is truth-conditional in this way, then the
account must also explain why the term makes the contribution that it
does to the truth conditions of sentences in which it appears (in more
technical terms, why the term has the “semantic value” that it has).
Since moral terms are predicates, we may also put this second point
as follows: the semantic account must explain whether the moral term
has the function of standing for a property or relation; and if the term
has that function, the account must also explain what determines
which property or relation (if any) the term stands for. 24
If some form of ethical absolutism is correct, then there will be just one unique
satisfier for the role of each ethical term. If some version of relativism is correct
(that is, if ethical terms turn out to have indexical features), then there will be an
abundance of satisfiers for the role of each ethical term, each satisfier of a particular
role sharing a common character. Thus, if ethical terms are indexical in some way,
features of the roles of ethical terms will be reflected in their characters.
How to characterize accurately the roles of ethical terms is a matter of huge
metaethical debate. J. L. Mackie suggested that the role of the predicate ‘x is
intrinsically good’ established by our linguistic practices requires anything in the
23
1 am appealing here to something like David Lewis’s “best candidate” theory ot
content. For descriptions of the theory, see Lewis (1983d) and Sider (2001), pp xxi-
xxiv.
24 Wedgwood (2001), p. 5.
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extension of the predicate to be such that it has mind-independent, objective, “to be
pursuedness” built into it. 25 After presenting arguments intended to establish that
there couldn t be, or at least that we have no reason to believe there could be, any
satisfier for this role-candidate of x is intrinsically good that picks out a non-empty
extension, Mackie concluded his famous error theory to be correct: If such features
are built into the role of the predicate, then its extension is empty. 26 But I think the
role of ‘x is intrinsically good’ must be such that it at least leaves open the
possibility that there are some intrinsically good things. Any feature of role that
would render it otherwise must be rejected.
Various theorists, hesitant to put forth a complete characterization of a role
for a particular ethical term, have suggested features that the roles of all ethical terms
might share in common. Robert Adams has suggested that relations to the roles of
other ethical terms are built into the role of each ethical term
27
Terence Horgan and
Mark Timmons have suggested that “action-guiding” features are built into the role
of each ethical term
28 And R M. Hare has famously argued that universalizability
constraints constitute a huge part of the roles of ethical terms, something I find
extremely attractive.
25
Mackie describes this satisfier-determining constraint in a number of different
ways throughout his (1977). At one point he describes it in this way: “objective,
intrinsic, prescriptivity” (p. 35).
26
See Chapter 1 of Mackie (1977).
27 Adams (1999), p. 20.
28 Horgan and Timmons (1992b), p. 170.
29
This theme weaves it way throughout much of Hare’s work on moral philosophy.
See especially his (1952) and (1981).
1 18
Recent theorists attracted to conceptual role semantics have proffered
specific ways in which the roles of ethical terms might be characterized Ralph
Wedgwood suggests that the role of each ethical term can be associated with a set of
basic rules governing a specific type of practical reasoning. 30
Frank Jackson suggests that the roles of these terms can be displayed by way
of a modified Ramsey sentence. Adopting the semantics that David Lewis provides
for theoretical terms,
31
Jackson suggests that we can construct a Ramsey sentence by
first articulating what he calls “our folk morality”: a huge conjunction of “ethical”
sentences that are commonly held to be true, sentences such as ‘Killing someone is
typically wrong’. The ethical predicates in the sentence are then replaced with
“property name” predicates; for example, the predicate ‘x is wrong’ is replaced with
‘x has the property of being wrong’. Finally, a Ramsey sentence results from
replacing each ethical property term with a unique variable that is bound by an
existential quantifier. The role of each ethical term—according to Jackson—is
characterized by this Ramsey sentence. If moral absolutism is true, then there is just
one unique realization of the Ramsey sentence, and these unique realizers (if there




See Chapter 6 of Jackson ( 1 998), especially pp. 1 40- 1 44. Note also that Jackson
takes properties rather than functions to be the relevant satisfiers. But this still gels
well with my characterization. If moral absolutism is correct, then, according to my
usage, intensions will be the relevant satisfiers. And, as I mentioned, I’m assuming
intensions to be functions that are capable of representing properties. If intensions
turn out to be best characterized as properties instead of functions, then the two
characterizations come together.
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The debate concerning which metaethical view most accurately characterizes
the roles of ethical terms is not something I want to pursue here Rather, I merely
hope to have established, on the assumption that some form of cognitivism is
correct, that the claim that ethical terms have both “role” and “satisfier” meaning
components is a plausible one. Now I hope show how these concepts might prove
useful in providing a semantic explanation of the Open Question phenomenon.
4 3 The Open Question Phenomenon Explained?
Recall Moore’s Anti-Hedonistic Open Question Argument:
Q1 : Is anything that is pleasant something that is pleasant9
Q2: Is anything that is pleasant something that is good?
1
.
Q 1 is not open.
2. Q2 is open.
3. If (1) and (2), then Q1 differs in meaning from Q2.
4. IfQ 1 differs in meaning from Q2, then the meaning of the predicate x is
pleasant’ is not identical to the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
5. Therefore, the meaning of the predicate ‘x is pleasant’ is not identical to
the meaning of the predicate ‘x is good’.
The “open question” premise is premise (2). What it takes for a question to be an
open one is a matter of some controversy. Two competing explanations have been
offered.
OQ1 : A question is open just in case it is possible for a person to
have a complete understanding of its meaning without knowing the
correct answer to it.
33
33
This appears to be the prevalent conception of an open question.
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0Q2: A question is open just in case it makes sense as something to
say as an expression of genuine doubt
.
34
Moore never provided any interesting justification for premise (2) Without some
interesting justification for the premise and other “open question” premises, Moore-
style Open Question Arguments beg the question against the targeted metaethical
naturalists. Yet many of these premises do seem to be true. This inclination to
endorse Moore’s “open question” premises 1 have called ‘the Open Question
phenomenon’. Now, perhaps, the phenomenon can be explained.
In the last section, I suggested that ethical terms have at least two semantic
meaning components: role and satisfier, where satisfiers are pairs of functions that
determine semantic values. To have a complete understanding of the meaning of an
ethical term is to have complete knowledge concerning its role, its satisfier(s), and
any non-cognitive meaning components it might have. I am not suggesting that all
competent language users have this kind of knowledge; we can get along quite well
without complete knowledge and usually do I’m merely describing what
requirements must be met in order to have a complete understanding of the meaning
of an ethical term.
If my account of what it is to understand completely the meaning of an
ethical term is correct, then an OQ1 account of an open question must be rejected. If
someone completely understands the meaning of
Q2: Is anything that is pleasant something that is good?
34
This is David Lewis’s version; see his (1989), p 130 David Brink’s version is
very similar; see his (1989), pp 152f
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then Q2 is closed according to my OQ1 interpretation To have a complete
understanding of the meaning of Q2, one must have complete knowledge of the
meanings of the quantification terms, the implicit logical terms, and complete
knowledge of the roles and satisfiers (characters and intensions) of the predicates ‘x
is pleasant’ and ‘x is good’. Let’s assume that the quantifier ranges over all possible
things.
35
If someone had all of this semantic knowledge, then she would know the
correct answer to this question in a context in virtue of her understanding of its
meaning alone. If in the context of the question, the satisfier of the role of ‘x is
good’ is constituted in part by the same intension that partially constitutes the
satisfier of the role of ‘x is pleasant’, then the answer is “yes.” If the roles of the
terms determine satisfiers with different intensions, then the answer is “no.”
Complete understanding of the meaning of the question is all that is required to give
the correct answer
An OQ2 interpretation, however, seems perfectly capable of capturing the
sense in which Q2 is open while Q1 is not. Q2 does seem to be something that
makes sense to say as an expression of genuine doubt, whereas Q1 obviously
doesn’t. It’s not at all obvious which among the available candidates is the satisfier
35
This feature can be made explicit by interpreting Q2 in the following way:
Q2’: Is it necessarily the case that anything that is pleasant is
something that is good.
Moore endorses this interpretation in Ch. IV of Principle/ Efhica To interpret the
quantifiers in an actualist way would preserve the openness of the question
according to OQ1, provided that the intensions selected for the two predicates
differed. But then its openness would be due solely to the fact that one might not
know whether the two predicates were accidentaly coextensive in the actual world
Moore didn’t believe this kind of lack of knowledge to be all that relevant to
metaethical concerns. Again, see Ch. IV of Principle/ Ethicez
122
(or, are the satisfiers) of the role of the predicate ‘x is good’. In fact, as I mentioned
in the last section, there is huge debate over what the role of the predicate even is.
And even if the role of the predicate were nailed down, we might be less than 100%
confident in our judgments concerning the nature(s) of the satisfier(s) of the role
Even if we were right about the relevant satisfier(s), we might, and most probably
would, still harbor doubts. And the fact that most of us do
—
philosophers are
constantly seeking out better possible candidates for the role—renders the question
open.
This explanation of the Open Question phenomenon is consonant with C. L.
Stevenson’s view that to ask an open question “is to ask for influence,” even though
no appeal to noncognitive meaning components is being made. 36 Given some
specification of the role of an ethical term, I might still ask for some influence
concerning what the satisfier(s) of the role might be. In fact, I think that those
engaged in normative ethics are busy arguing over whether some eligible candidate
or other is or isn’t a satisfier for the role of a specified ethical predicate.
The meanings of ethical terms can be distinguished from various nonethical
terms by their distinct roles. Even if it turns out to be the case that certain ethical
predicates are necessarily coextensive with various nonethical predicates, the fact
that the very same intensions are picked out via different routes constitutes
differences in meaning.
Moore shouldn’t have concluded from his Open Question Arguments that
ethical predicates pick out nonnatural properties, different in kind from the natural
properties picked out by standard, descriptive predicates. On the assumption that
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some form of cognitivism is correct, ethical predicates have the same kinds of
intensions—be they functions representing properties or properties themselves—that
standard, descriptive predicates have; it’s just that they’re selected in different ways
I believe this explanation, combined with an account describing any noncognitivist
meaning components that ethical terms might have, to be a very plausible
explanation of the Open Question phenomenon in all of its guises.
Notice also that this explanation of the Open Question phenomenon should
prove to be acceptable from a whole range of metaethical viewpoints. Relativists,
causal theory of reference folks, and moral absolutists of every stripe can safely
adopt the explanation. Their disputes concern the natures of the roles of ethical
terms. “Open question” tensions have finally been eased
Despite Moore’s protests, the prospects of metaethical naturalism don’t
appear to be dampened by “open question” maneuvering. Moore has shown that the
meanings of ethical predicates are not identical to the meanings of those like c x is
pleasant’. But if the proposed explanation of the Open Question phenomenon
proves correct, then the intensions associated with a subset of such predicates might
very well constitute a part of the meanings of various ethical predicates. Any
successful naturalistic, semantic account of an ethical predicate will have to describe
accurately the role and the satisfier(s) of the predicate in purely naturalistic terms.
Neither Moore nor any of those influenced by his “open question” strategies has
provided any serious reasons to suggest that this can’t be done.
36




Subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents are puzzling. On what 1 take
to be the most plausible and popular accounts of subjunctive conditionals—those of
David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker 1—subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents
and true consequents are themselves always true. But many are wary of endorsing
this implication.
Relevance theorists, for example, have objected to this feature of Stalnaker-
Lewis semantics for some time
2
They argue, roughly, for the somewhat
controversial thesis that subjunctive conditionals whose antecedents and consequents
aren’t sufficiently “connected” (the consequents don’t seem to follow in any way
from the antecedents) might be false even if both the antecedents and the
consequents turn out to be true But theorists sympathetic to the Stalnaker-Lewis
account have a ready response to this objection. Relevance is a matter ofpragmatic,
not semantic, concern. While it might not be appropriate to assert certain
subjunctive conditionals whose antecedents and consequents aren’t sufficiently
connected, nothing follows from such assertibility restrictions about the truth
conditions of these constructions. The reply is appealing.
1 With the advent of Kripke’s possible world semantics came what might be referred
to as Stalnaker-Lewis possible world semantics for subjunctive conditionals. For a
succinct history and bibliography of Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for subjunctive
conditionals, see Edgington (1995).
2
Objections from relevance against Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for subjunctive
conditionals have been leveled in Fine (1975), Bigelow (1979), McCall (1983), Rott
(1986), and Read (1995).
3 Lewis (1973a), pp. 28-31.
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My worries are very different. I am concerned primarily with the roles that
subjunctive conditionals play in certain types of consequentialist contexts. In fact, I
will argue that all presently endorsed accounts of subjunctive conditionals fail to
capture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contexts of consequentialist
reasoning. What I hope to show is that we must allow for the possibility that some
subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and true consequents are false, if we
are to believe that certain types of seemingly straightforward consequentialist
reasoning are coherent. If success is achieved here, then reasons totally unrelated to
relevance will be responsible for motivating an analysis that allows for the
possibility of false subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and true
consequents in contexts of certain types of consequentialist moral reasoning. 4
My strategy is fairly simple. First, I present an example that illustrates one of
the roles that subjunctive conditionals play in utilitarian, as well as other types of
consequentialist, reasoning. I then present David Lewis’s account of counterfactuals
to illustrate how his theory evaluates the most morally relevant subjunctive
conditionals in the case. Next, I turn to a slight modification of the case, arguing
that Stalnaker-Lewis semantics fails to generate the correct truth values of the
important subjunctive conditionals in the modified case. I then present a modified
version of the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics that generates the correct results in the
modified (as well as in the standard) cases. And interestingly enough, David Lewis
has already considered and seemingly rejected the modification, one that amounts to
4
Nozick might be the only other writer to argue for this possibility outside of
relevance circles. Fie utilizes something similar to the analysis that I will be arguing
for below to explicate his notion of “tracking” in his preferred analysis of
knowledge. For details, see his ( 1 98 1 ), pp 680-68 1
.
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the adoption of a “weakly-centered” (as opposed to a “strongly-centered”) analysis
for subjunctive conditionals. Finally, I defend the modified semantics against an
objection. 5
5 1 Case 1 : Sam and the Demon’s Coin
For simplicity’s sake, assume that determinism is true. 6 Now suppose that a
powerful demon, with hopes of livening up his day, approaches a young gentleman
named ‘Sam’ and makes him an interesting offer. Producing a fair coin, the demon
5 An anonymous referee from Philosophical Studies has characterized my project in
a slightly different way. The referee suggests that the upcoming cases and
arguments shouldn’t be used to cast doubt upon the plausibility of the Stalnaker-
Lewis semantics as an accurate account of subjunctive conditionals in English The
recommendation was to remain neutral about this. Instead, the referee suggests that
the paper should say: if the Stalnaker-Lewis account is correct, then
consequentialism should not be formulated in terms of the English subjunctive
conditional, but rather should be formulated in terms of a new, stipulated connective
that functions just like the English subjunctive conditional except that the strong
centering assumption is dropped I am sympathetic to the referee’s characterization
of the project at hand. I am interested in providing an accurate semantic account of
subjunctive conditionals that objective consequentialists utilize in certain moral
contexts, one that does not appear to be captured by the standard Stalnaker-Lewis
account. And in this paper, I offer a way of modifying the standard account so as to
capture the semantic nature of these consequentialist subjunctive conditionals along
with all of the rest. But I understand that some might prefer to interpret my project
in a different way—as a series of arguments intended to establish that certain
subjunctive conditionals utilized in consequentialist contexts require a stipulated
interpretation that differs slightly from that provided by the standard account. I have
no qualms with interpreting the project in either of these equally interesting ways.
6
This assumption shouldn’t play a controversial role in what follows. But some, I
fear, might find the mix of determinism and legitimate moral evaluation repugnant.
For them, we can make the additional assumption that a tiny “pocket” of
indeterminism opens up in an otherwise deterministic world, allowing Sam to
perform the alternative of his choice freely. But I don’t really find the assumption
necessary. Even if our world is in fact deterministic, providing a semantics for
subjunctive conditionals in consequentialist reasoning would still be an interesting
project.
127
asks whether Sam would like to flip it given the following conditions. If Sam flips
and the coin lands heads, then the demon will bring about the Good (Pleasure) But
if Sam flips and the coin lands tails, then the demon will bring about the Bad (Pain).
And finally, if Sam abstains from flipping the coin, then the demon will leave things
pretty much the way they are: neither wonderful nor abysmal, rather somewhere in
between.
Now let us also suppose that Sam is a good utilitarian, one who endorses an
objective (as opposed to a subjective) utilitarian theory 7 When considering whether
or not to flip the demon’s coin, Sam hopes to perform the alternative that has the
better outcome, the alternative that would produce the greater balance of pleasure
over pain in the world.
8
So, Sam must decide for himself which of the two
alternatives open to him in this situation,
al : flip the coin
a2: don’t flip the coin,
has the better outcome.
9
7
Objective utilitarian theories might be distinguished from subjective ones in this
way. According to subjective versions, an agent’s beliefs concerning the possible
consequences of an alternative (including perhaps: their likeliness to obtain should
the alternative be performed, their intrinsic value, etc.) play a prominent role in
determining that alternative’s moral status. According to objective versions, these
beliefs play no such role.
8
Or, a bit more carefully: an alternative than which none other would produce a
greater balance of pleasure over pain in the world than it would
9 Some might object that al and a2 are not the morally relevant alternatives in a
utilitarian evaluation of Case 1 . Perhaps they would suppose the “real” alternatives
to be considerably more “fine-grained”:
al’: flip a heads
a2: don’t flip
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Let’s suppose that Sam, after careful deliberation, decides to play it safe and
turns down the demon s offer to flip the coin. We might ask ourselves at this point
how Sam concluded that performing a2 was a morally right thing to do from a
utilitarian perspective. Furthermore, we might wonder whether Sam’s reasoning was
flawed in this case, that is, we might wonder whether Sam actually acted in
accordance with the utilitarian doctrine he so fervently endorses. The answers to
these latter concerns, however, seem to rest upon the truth values of the
counterfactual conditionals utilized by Sam in his moral reasoning about the case,
which appear to be the following:
Cfl : If Sam were to flip the coin, then it would come up heads.
Cf2: If Sam were to flip the coin, then it would come up tails.
If Cfl is true, then it can be concluded that Sam failed to achieve his utilitarian
goals—for the truth of Cfl implies that flipping the coin would have produced the
best results possible. But if, on the other hand, Cf2 is true, then Sam has succeeded
in performing his utilitarian duty—his opting not to flip the coin produces much
better results than flipping tails and unleashing the demon’s wrath upon our world.
So let’s now turn to a semantic account of subjunctive conditionals that will enable
us to evaluate these counterfactuals.
a3: flip a tails
But to do so would amount to putting the “alternatives” al ’ and a3 beyond Sam’s
control—a violation of the contrapositive of an “ought implies can" principle.
ALT: If S doesn’t have the ability to select and perform A, then A is
not a morally relevant alternative (i e , an alternative that is a bearer
of normative status).
al’ and a3 violate ALT and thus are ineligible as candidates for bearers of normative
status.
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5,2 Lewis’s Semantics for Subjunctive Conditionals: Evaluating Cfl and Cf2
David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker endorse similar accounts of the truth
conditions for subjunctive conditionals. So for simplicity’s sake, I will restrict my
discussion to Lewis’s theory, while indicating along the way where the theories
diverge in seemingly important respects.
Lewis’ view is that a uW<i-counterfactual of the form rIf it were that A, then
it would be that C1 is (non-vacuously) true at a world, i, just in case the consequent,
C, is true at all of the closest accessible antecedent worlds to /. (“Antecedent
worlds” are worlds where the antecedent is true.)
L(SC): A -> C is non-vacuously true at / iff C is true at all the
closest accessible /4-worlds to /
10
How close an antecedent world is to a world where a counterfactual is being
evaluated is cashed out in terms of comparative overall similarity 1
1
Roughly, when
evaluating counterfactuals we are interested in what occurs in the antecedent worlds
that, given a context, are “most similar” (in relevant respects) to the world where the
counterfactual is being evaluated Furthermore, Lewis’s view assumes strong
centering (thus the ‘SC’ in ‘L(SC)’), which can be captured in the following two
claims: (i) no world is more similar to a world / than / is to itself, and (ii) no other
10
Lewis (1973a) and (1979). Notice that L(SC) doesn’t quite capture Lewis’s
preferred view. L(SC) invokes the Limit Assumption—an assumption that Lewis
rejects since it amounts to ignoring the possibility of infinite chains of more and
more similar worlds. Invoking the Limit Assumption for simplicity’s sake is
harmless in this context, for it won’t be playing any role in the upcoming arguments.
For Lewis’s argument against the Limit Assumption, see his (1973a), pp. 19-21
11 Lewis (1979).
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world is even as similar to / as / is to itself. 12 It is the latter, and admittedly more
questionable, claim that will become the focus of my central arguments in this paper
With L(SC) in hand, it’s possible to evaluate the two important
counterfactuals in our case:
Cfl : If Sam were to flip the coin, then it would come up heads.
Cf2: If Sam were to flip the coin, then it would come up tails
Note immediately that Cfl and Cf2 are counterfactuals with identical (and possible)
antecedents and incompatible consequents—if one is true, then the other is false.
And since the two counterfactuals share a common antecedent, we can evaluate them
simultaneously. In order to find out the semantic values of these conditionals, we
must check the closest antecedent worlds to the world of evaluation to see whether
the proposition that the coin comes up heads (the consequent of Cfl) or whether the
proposition that the coin comes up tails (the consequent of Cf2) is true at each of
them. Recall that in order for either of the counterfactuals to be true, the relevant
consequent must be true in all of the closest antecedent worlds to the world of
evaluation. Now we have reached the crucial point in our evaluation of these
counterfactuals: Is there any reason at all that could justify the claim that one
particular consequent, rather than the other, is true at all of the closest antecedent
worlds? As I see it, the answer must be ‘No
’
Two intertwining reasons can be used to explain why neither Cfl nor Cf2 is
true. The fact that the antecedents of the two counterfactuals are extremely
underspecified constitutes the first reason. Note that all that is required for the
12 Lewis (1973a), pp. 13-15, 28-31.
antecedents to be satisfied is that Sam flip the coin But truth be told, Sam is capable
of flipping a coin in any number of ways. Imagine what could factor in the
differences between these ways: the direction in which the coin is tossed, the
velocity of the toss, the spin action provided by Sam’s thumb and fingers, and so on
Variations in these influencing factors can be used to generate a plethora of different
fully specified ways in which the antecedents of our two counterfactuals might be
satisfied. And this implies that there are a vast number of different possible
worlds—at least one for each fully specified way that Sam might flip a coin—in
which Sam flips the demon’s coin. In one possible world, Sam flips it in direction
dl, with velocity vl, spin action si, and so on In another, Sam flips it in direction
d2, with velocity v2, spin action s2, . . . . In another, ....
The concept of mf-proposition (f-prop ) can be used to articulate the fully
specified ways in which an underspecified antecedent might be satisfied In our
case, some of the relevant f-props include:
fl : Sam flips the coin in direction dl, with velocity vl, spin action si, ... .
f2. Sam flips the coin in direction d2, with velocity v2, spin action s2, . . . .
It seems obvious that the way a coin is tossed plays an important role in determining
whether it turns up heads or tails. Given constant environmental conditions, the
direction, velocity, spin (and so on) of the coin determine which side turns up Thus,
the performance of different f-props can produce different results This is noticeably
clear in consideration of the role that such f-props play as antecedents in
counterfactual constructions.
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Consider the following pair of counterfactuals:
Cf3: If Sam were to flip the coin in direction dl, with velocity vl, spin
action si, . . then it would come up heads.




then it would come up tails.
The antecedents of Cf3 and Cf4 are identical f-props. So, again, whether either CB
or Cf4 is true depends upon whether or not either the consequent of Cf3 is true in
each of the closest antecedent worlds or the consequent of Cf4 is true in each of the
closest antecedent worlds. In the case of this Cf3-Cf4 pair, however—unlike that of
the Cfl-Cf2 pair—it does seem to be the case that one of the counterfactuals is true.
Since fl, which serves as the antecedent for Cf3 and Cf4, is a fully specified way
that Sam might flip the coin, it seems that there is only one way that the coin will
turn up should fl be realized If we are correct in believing that the precise way
that a coin is tossed (given constant environmental conditions) determines which
side turns up, then it seems proper to conclude that either the coin turns up heads in
all of the antecedent worlds relevant to the evaluation of the Cf3-Cf4 pair or the coin
turns up tails in all such worlds. Thus, either Cf3 or Cf4 appears to be true
Note that while I have argued that it is the complete specificity of the
antecedents of the Cf3-Cf4 pair that ensures the truth of one of them, I am not
13
1 am not assuming that the set of closest possible worlds in this case is a singleton
set. There are, perhaps, a bunch of different ways that Sam can move his body in
order to achieve a toss in direction dl, with velocity vl, spin action si, etc. My
point is merely that the worlds in which the fully specified antecedent is satisfied are
either all heads-worlds or all tails-worlds. Clay Splawn brought this point to my
attention.
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suggesting that the only factor contributing to my denial of the truth of any of the
Cfl-Cf2 pair is that their antecedents are extremely underspecified There are plenty
of examples of pairs of counterfactuals with identical underspecified antecedents and
incompatible consequents such that one of the pair is, in fact, true. Consider the
following counterfactuals:
Cf5: If I were to carry my daughter Samantha towards her crib, I would drop
her along the way.
Cf6: If I were to carry my daughter Samantha towards her crib, I wouldn’t
drop her along the way.
Cf5 and Cf6 are underspecified in much the same ways that Cfl and Cf2 are: there
are a multitude of different fully specified ways in which I can carry Samantha to her
crib. But, intuitively, Cf6 seems true. Samantha is our third baby—and I’ve never
dropped a kid. I have the ability to guarantee that whatever fully specified ways
satisfy the antecedents in the closest antecedent worlds are ways that will ensure the
truth of the consequent of Cf6.
14
This ability, we shall shortly see, plays an
important role in how the similarity relation determines the set of closest antecedent
worlds relevant to the evaluation of many counterfactuals. And it is this kind of
agent ability—the ability to guarantee the truth of various consequents in light of the
fact that it might not be within the agent’s power to select and perform a particular
14
I am not suggesting that it isn’t possible that I drop Samantha on the way to her
cr it»—surely it is. All I’m asserting is that my abilities are such that I can guarantee
the truth of the Cf6 consequent in nearby antecedent worlds—and these are the only
ones relevant to the evaluation of the Cf5-Cf6 pair.
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fully specified way of satisfying the antecedent—that distinguishes the Cf5-Cf6 pair
from the Cfl-Cf2 pair. 15
Contrasting with the ability I have to ensure the truth of the consequent of
Cf6 in close antecedent worlds is the inability Sam has to ensure the truth of the
consequent of either Cfl or Cf2 in close antecedent worlds. Sam simply lacks the
requisite dexterity or control to ensure that if he flips the demon’s coin, it will turn
up on the side of his choosing. For not only does Sam lack the ability to select and
perform a particular fully specified way (f -prop) of satisfying the antecedents of Cfl
and Cf2, he also lacks the ability to guarantee that some one or other f-prop whose
performance leads to a result of heads (or tails, for that matter) would be realized if
he were to flip the demon’s coin. u '
The similarity relation—whose job it is to determine the closeness of
antecedent worlds in the evaluation of counterfactuals—certainly takes agents’
abilities seriously in this kind of case. And given Sam’s inability to ensure that his
coin tosses produce the results of his choice, there don’t appear to be any factors that
15
Fred Feldman has correctly pointed out that it isn’t ability alone that ensures the
truth of conditionals such as Cf6 in standard situations. The disposition to utilize my
abilities in various circumstances is also required. If I were to opt not to utilize my
abilities while in charge of my daughter, then Cf5 may very well be true, and Cf6
false. But like all doting dads, I do whatever I can to keep my youngsters safe from
harm. Cf6 is true.
16
Clay Splawn has suggested this claim can be best explained by consideration of
certain partitions of the set of closest possible worlds relevant to Case 1 Consider
partitioning the set into two: one comprised of head-worlds (the set of worlds in
which the relevant f-props lead to a result of heads); the other comprised oftails-
worlds (the set of worlds in which the relevant f-props lead to a result of tails). My
claim here is that Sam’s inabilities prevent him from even being able to guarantee
that a propositional element from one particular partition, rather than the other,
would be selected if he were to flip the demon’s coin
would influence the similarity relation to grant any special priority (or “closeness”)
to heads-worlds over tails-worlds. Upon contemplation of all the different fully
specified ways in which Sam flips the coin in nearby antecedent worlds, those ways
resulting in heads turning up won t have any special priority over ways resulting in
tails turning up, and vice versa. Thus, it should be concluded that in the evaluation
of the Cfl-Cf2 pair, some of the closest antecedent worlds are heads-worlds, and
others are tails-worlds.
How a Lewis-style semantics for subjunctive conditionals evaluates the Cfl-
Cf2 pair now becomes clear. In order for either counterfactual to be true, either all
of the closest antecedent worlds under consideration must be heads-worlds or all of
them must be tails-worlds. But the fact of the matter is that some such worlds are
heads-worlds; others are tails-worlds. Thus, Lewis’s account entails that neither of
the counterfactual s is true
17
This is just how it should be Humans are, by and large, clumsy animals
We simply don’t have the ability to ensure the outcomes of our choices in many
17 *
It is perhaps important to point out that my evaluation of Cfl and Cf2 doesn’t
necessarily depend on Lewis’s semantic account captured in L(SC). Any adequate
semantics for counterfactual s should recognize that certain vro/z/J-counterfactuals
with underspecified antecedents cannot be true, for (due to lack of ability or some
other reason) there is no particular way that their antecedents would be satisfied
(Phil Bricker and Russ Colton brought this point to my attention )
Friends of Stalnaker’s theory should notice that while Stalnaker’s semantics
for subjunctive conditionals are slightly simpler than Lewis’s, when conjoined with
Bas van Fraassen’s theory of supervaluations, Stalnaker’s theory also produces the
desirable result that neither Cfl nor Cf2 is true. Stalnaker’s theory differs from
Lewis’s in that Stalnaker takes the truth values of the conditionals to be
indeterminate rather than false. All I need is for them not to be true, so either
Lewis’s or Stalnaker’s account will do the job. For a complete account of
Stalnaker’s theory, see his (1984), esp. ch. 7. For Lewis’s discussion of Stalnaker’s
earlier theory, see his (1973a), pp. 77-83.
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cases. Casinos rely upon this at the craps tables. They wouldn’t allow us to place
bets on outcomes if we could guarantee a 7 every time And this fact—this
limitation of our abilities
—
plays an important role in establishing which antecedent
worlds are closest in the evaluation of subjunctive conditionals Since Sam doesn’t
have the ability to guarantee a heads, it is not true to say that a heads would turn up
were he to flip the coin; since he doesn’t have the ability to guarantee a tails, it is not
true to say that a tails would turn up were he to flip the coin. Neither Cfl nor Cf2 is
true. In light of Sam’s inabilities, there is no fact of the matter as to what would
occur were Sam to flip 19 20
1
8
But each of the following ‘might’ counterfactuals seems to be true:
Cf7: If Sam were to flip the coin, then it might come up heads.
CfB: If Sam were to flip the coin, then it might come up tails.
19
Other theorists on counterfactuals echo this conclusion, though they haven’t
expressed it in quite the same way:
This time someone ran off with the coin before it was tossed Having no
other coin, Tweedledee and Tweedledum argue about how it would have
landed if it had been flipped Tweedledee is convinced that it would have
landed heads. Tweedledum that it would have landed tails. Again, neither
has a reason—they agree that the coin was a normal one and that the toss
would have been fair. This time, there is little inclination to say that one of
them must be right. Unless there is a story to be told about a fact that
renders one or the other of the counterfactuals true, we will say that neither
is. (Stalnaker 1984, pp. 164-165)
I make a bet: ‘If I toss this penny it will come up heads’; and then I toss it
and am proved right or wrong. But now suppose that I find no takers, and so
do not toss the penny, I then say: ‘You were quite right not to bet with me,
for if I had tossed the penny it would have come up heads ' I have no
grounds for this assertion. .
.
(Ayer 1972, pp. 1 16)
20 An objector to this claim might still, for some unknown reason, demand that either
Cfl or Cf2 is true—that the coin would have come up heads had Sam flipped it, or
that it would have come up tails had he flipped it. To suggest this, however, is to
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We might be able to speculate now about why Sam rejected the demon’s
offer. Recognition of the fact that neither Cfl nor Cf2 is true might have led Sam to
view the flip as too risky. 2122 In any case, it seems clear that Lewis’s account of
make the seemingly insupportable ontological claim that there is something in the
u 01 Id that makes it the case that were Sam to flip the coin, it would turn up on one
side rather than the other (See Stalnaker’s 1984, p 163). This claim seems
implausible. Remember: (i) that Sam never flips the coin, (ii) that the antecedents of
these counterfactuals are underspecified in the sense that there is a multitude of
different fully specified ways that Sam could have tossed the coin in order to satisfy
the antecedent, and (iii) that Sam lacks the ability to ensure the outcome of the coin
toss: he doesn’t have the ability to select and perform some f-prop from a specific
group of f-props (such as the heads group) rather than another (the tails group).
Therefore, to assume that worlds in which the coin turns up on one particular side
rather than the other are the “closest” worlds to Sam’s world is wholly unjustified.
Neither of the relevant counterfactuals is true
Note also that the fact that neither Cfl nor Cf2 is true presents serious
problems for the moral evaluation of Sam’s alternatives by objective (as opposed to
subjective) utilitarian theories, especially since most of these theories are formulated
in terms of subjunctive conditionals—reason enough to spark my interest in these
tricky constructions. Some might believe that formulations of objective
consequentialism that don’t make use of subjunctive constructions—e g. the theory
presented in Feldman (1986)—evade this objection, but an equally serious analogue
of this objection applies to these theories as well. I pursue these matters in the next
chapter of this dissertation. Also see Mendola (1987) for problems that the falsity
(or indeterminacy) of certain subjunctive conditionals poses for the specification of
alternatives in consequentialist reasoning.
Those who endorse a subjective utilitarian theory might be able to get around
the problems posed by the fact that neither Cfl nor Cf2 is true Rather than thinking
about conditionals like Cfl and Cf2, they might opt instead to utilize probabilistic
subjunctive conditionals in their moral reasoning. But such treatment would, of
course, be anathema to utilitarians who believe that the moral status of a act is
determined solely by that act’s consequences and the consequences of its
alternatives, and not in any way by the subjective probabilities assigned by agents
utilizing probabilistic subjunctive conditionals.
^ 1
Recent objective consequentialists—notably Vallentyne (1987), p. 60 and Sosa
(1993), p. 109—have suggested that taking a dangerous risk might be considered to
be harmful in itself, and thus intrinsically bad in a way that could affect the values of
the consequences of ‘risk-taking’ alternatives. Perhaps Sam endorses a risk-aversive
version of objective consequentialism, justifying his refusal to flip the coin.
Whether or not subjective versions of utilitarianism deem Sam’s decision
morally permissible also seems to depend upon how risk-aversive they are For
those not so averse to risk, perhaps either alternative would be deemed permissible
138
counterfactuals adequately captures the nature of the subjunctive conditionals used
to reason about the moral status of Sam’s alternatives from a utilitarian (or otherwise
consequentialist) perspective. But the same cannot be said, I shall soon argue, about
what, in all interesting respects, amounts to the very same conditionals in a slight
modification of Case 1
.
5, 3 Case 2: The Problems Pam’s Flipping Poses for Lewis-stvle Semantics
Unsatisfied with Sam’s conservative rejection of his offer, the demon turns to
Sam’s adventurous twin sister Pam—also a die-hard utilitarian—asking whether she
would like to toss the coin Pam, who just moments earlier had been egging Sam on
to make the toss, eagerly accepts the demon’s offer and flips his coin into the air: her
decision being based, in part, upon utilitarian considerations similar to those her
brother Sam utilized in the earlier case. But as luck would have it, the coin comes
22 Someone might be inclined to object at this point that the subjunctive conditionals
relevant to Sam’s reasoning in this case are not Cfl and Cf2, but rather those with
fully specified antecedents such as
Cf3. If Sam were to flip the coin in direction dl, with velocity vl, spin
action si, . .
.,
then it would come up heads.
One might argue that the fully specified ways (f-props) of satisfying the antecedents
of Cfl and Cf2 constitute the relevant alternatives available to Sam in the case But
notice that these f-props don’t even qualify as candidates for alternatives available to
moral agents. Why? Because in virtue of their being beyond Sam’s control, positing
them as morally relevant alternatives would violate the contrapositive of an ‘ought
implies can’ principle
ALT: If S doesn’t have the ability to select and perform A, then A is
not a morally relevant alternative.
Since all of the f-props satisfy the antecedent of ALT, they remain ineligible as
candidates for bearers of normative status.
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up tails, and the demon prepares to unleash a tremendous amount of pain and
suffering upon our poor world
Notice that the new pair of subjunctive conditionals playing a central role in
Pam’s reasoning is practically identical to the pair discussed in Case 1
sCl : If Pam were to flip the coin, then it would come up heads
sC2: If Pam were to flip the coin, then it would come up tails.
But, somewhat surprisingly. Lewis-style semantics evaluates them differently from
the earlier Cfl-Cf2 pair. Since Pam indeed opts to flip the coin, one of the fully
specified ways (f-props) in which Pam can flip the coin is actualized—resulting in
the truth of the consequent of sC2 (that the coin comes up tails) in the actual world
Lewis’s L(SC) thus evaluates sCl as false and sC2 as true
L(SC): A -> C is non-vacuously true at / iffC is true at all the
closest accessible A -worlds to /
sC2 comes out true on an L(SC) evaluation in virtue of the fact that the consequent
of sC2—that the coin comes up tails—is true in the closest antecedent world to the
world in which the subjunctive conditional is being evaluated, namely, in the the
world of evaluation itself! That there is no world as close to the world of evaluation
as it is to itself is ensured by the strongly centered nature of Lewis’s semantics. It
thus follows that, according to L(SC), all subjunctive conditionals with true
antecedents and true consequents are themselves also true, and as we are aware, sC2
is one such conditional
Many will be pleased by this implication, but I find something suspicious
lurking about. Notice that the truth of sC2 seems to imply that Pam, prior to her
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flipping, failed to identify the correct truth value of one of the subjuctive
conditionals utilized in her utilitarian reasoning. Her denial of sC2—that the coin
would come up tails were she to flip it—led her astray, perhaps, from the most
important consideration in the case. Recall that utilitarians are most interested in
what would happen should some alternative or other be performed In light of Pam’s
alternatives in Case 2,
a3: flip the coin,
a4: don’t flip the coin,
it might be concluded that she failed to grasp that a proper evaluation of sC2
disqualfies a3 from moral consideration; the truth of sC2 entails that the performance
of a3 is bound to bring about the worst. Thus some might be led to believe that
despite the fact that Pam couldn’t have known the result of her coin toss, her option
to flip the coin was morally wrong. But certainly not I.




underspecified nature of the sCl-sC2 antecedents coupled with her inability to
ensure the outcomes of coin tosses led her to believe neither conditional to be true.
And she flipped the coin in light of such considerations. Her reasoning was sound
It is the semantics that require adjustment.
23 Some might be inclined to exclaim here: “How can it be that Pam and Sam
reasoned in much the same way given that they came to different conclusions91
One might respond to this sort of question by alluding to the fact that it isn’t exactly
clear what objective forms of utilitarianism prescribe in this kind of case
Furthermore, one might allude to the possibility that the version of utilitarianism that
Sam endorses is much more averse to risk than that which Pam prefers, allowing for
similar reasoning but different conclusions.
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To see precisely the way in which Lewis’s semantics evaluates the Cfl-Cf2
and sCl-sC2 pairs differently, an investigation of the roles played in the two cases
by the fully specified ways (f-props) that Sam and Pam can flip a coin is called for.
In Sam’s case, f-props that result in the coin coming up heads don’t have any special
priority over f-props that result in the coin coming up tails, and vice versa Thus, we
were led to believe that neither heads-worlds nor tails-worlds were deemed to be
closer antecedent worlds than the others.
Conversely, in Pam’s case, an f-prop resulting in the coin coming up tails has
maximal priority over all the others. The specific f-prop that Pam actually performs
in her satisfying of the sCl-sC2 antecedents results in the coin coming up tails in the
actual world And since on Lewis’s account no other world is even as similar to a
world as it is to itself, we can be assured that the closest antecedent world relevant to
the evaluations of the subjunctive conditionals in Pam’s case is a tails world—since
tails comes up in the actual world (the world in which the conditionals are being
evaluated). The fact that in Case 2 Pam actually ends up performing a specific f-
prop makes all the difference between the two cases so far as Lewis-style
evaluations are concerned. And it is this difference, I shall argue next, that should be
disregarded in evaluations of certain subjunctive conditionals in contexts of
utilitarian, or otherwise consequentialist, reasoning.
5.4 Semantics for Subjunctive Conditionals in Utilitarian Reasoning: A Weakly-
Centered Modification of Lewis’s Account
It is the fact that Pam actually ends up performing a specific f-prop in Case 2
that plays the crucial role in L(SC)’s evaluation of sC2 as true But it seems
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questionable to assume that the actual performance of an alternative by an agent
should have any impact whatsoever upon the evaluation of the type of conditionals
under consideration in contexts of utilitarian reasoning. In fact, it seems that
whether or not an alternative is deemed morally permissible by utilitarian standards
shouldn’t depend in any respect upon whether or not that alternative is actually
performed. Erik Carlson has made explicit this feature of normative thought in his
Principle ofNormative Invariance:
NI: An alternative’s moral status does not depend upon whether or
not it is performed 24
In virtue of this aspect of utilitarian thought, one might be led to believe that too
much weight was given by L(SC) to the fact that Pam actually performed an f-prop
that resulted in tails coming up in Case 2 25
24
Carlson (1995), pp. lOOf.
25 Some might prefer to drop NI from utilitarian reasoning altogether, especially
when they find out that NI is responsible for much of the tension that I use to
motivate a new semantics for subjunctive conditionals in objective consequentialist
reasoning. But I believe doing so would be a mistake. I take NI to be a fundamental
axiom of normative reasoning. It is intuitively attractive, and it might also be argued
for along some of the lines that Erik Carlson discusses:
Although I am here primarily interested in moral theories as accounts of
right-making characteristics, rather than as decision-making procedures, I
believe that a reasonable theory should nevertheless be ‘action guiding’ for
an agent with complete knowledge of all morally relevant facts in the
situation in question. That is, if T is a moral principle, P should be able to
use T as a decision-making procedure in S, provided that she knows
everything that is relevant, according to T, to what she ought to do in S.
(1995, p. 201)
If we dropped NI from our normative reasoning, then our moral theories would be
unsuitable as decision-making procedures for agents in ideal epistemic states—an
implication I find very unattractive.
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Recall the structure of Pam s reasoning. In considering the two alternatives
open to her at the time,
a3: flip the coin,
a4: don’t flip the coin,
she believed the one, if any, that would produce the best results if performed to be
the one sanctioned by utilitarian doctrine. So she turned to the investigation of the
subjunctive conditionals sCl and sC2 in hopes of shedding some light on the matter
It was in this context of moral reasoning that the evaluation of these conditionals
took place.
Notice that if we insist upon using an account like L(SC) to evaluate sCl and
sC2, then a very bizarre result is generated: Pam must perform a3 in order for a3 to
be morally wrong on a utilitarian evaluation! Pam realizes that if the coin would
turn up tails were she to flip it, then—being a good utilitarian—she shouldn’t flip it.
But the only situation in which there is a fact of the matter as to which side “would”
turn up were Pam to flip the coin is that situation in which Pam actually flips. And if
this is right, then the truth of a general account of subjunctive conditionals such as
L(SC) implies that whether or not an alternative is actually performed plays an
important role in whether or not that alternative should or shouldn’t be performed on
a utilitarian evaluation. But, as has been noted, surely a utilitarian conception of
rightness shouldn’t exhibit any bias—one way or the other—towards alternatives
that just happen to be performed. It can thus be concluded that L(SC) isn’t general
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enough to characterize the nature of subjunctive conditionals employed in certain
types of ethical reasoning 26
Only a slight emendation to L(SC) need be made to rectify this situation—
a
modification that David Lewis himself has considered and rejected in his
Counterfactuals
.
L(WC): A -> C is non-vacuously true at / iffC is true at all the
closest accessible A -worlds to i.
Keeping the superficial structure of L(SC) intact, a slight adjustment of the
interpretation of the term ‘closest’ will produce the desired results. Recall that on
L(SC)—Lewis’s strongly-centered account of subjunctive conditionals—the
following two claims are held to be true: (i) no world is more similar to a world /
than / is to itself, and (ii) no other world is even as similar to / as / is to itself.
Consider what would result from keeping the first claim but dropping the second
from our account of subjunctive conditionals. Lewis does just this in his seminal
work on counterfactuals:
26 Some might conclude from this type of argument that consequentialists shouldn’t
use subjunctive conditionals at all in their moral reasoning. But the fact of the
matter is that it is perfectly natural for consequentialists to utilize such constructions
in their reasoning (a point brought to my attention by Jonathan Schaffer and the fact
that virtually every formulation of utilitarianism makes use of them). Furthermore,
these cases can be used to motivate an equally serious objection against formulations
of consequentialism that don’t make use of subjunctive conditionals (e g., theories
like the view that Fred Feldman presents in his 1986). 1 argue for the seriousness of
this objection in the next chapter of this dissertation
In what follows, I present a semantics for subjunctive conditionals that makes
constructive use of the problems posed by these cases. I also believe that the revised
semantics will play an essential role in future formulations of objective
consequentialism that absorb the troubles brought about by these cases. I argue for
one way this might be done in the next chapter of this dissertation
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The first is a consequence of the assumption that no world is more
similar to a world / than / itself is; and that seems perfectly safe The
second is a consequence of the assumption that no other world is even
as similar to / as / itself is; and that is not quite such a safe
assumption Perhaps our discriminations of similarity are rather
coarse, and some worlds different from / are enough like / so that
such small differences as there are fail to register
27
The world / itself is one of these closest worlds to /; but there may be
others as well—worlds differing negligibly from /, so that they come
out just as close to / as / itself 28
Lewis is considering here whether our discriminations of similarity are somewhat
coarse in our evaluations of subjunctive conditionals. If they are fairly coarse
—
Lewis implies—then in some cases there may indeed be worlds differing negligibly
from a world in which a subjunctive conditional is being evaluated that are as close
to that world as it is to itself To allow for this possibility is to relax the stringent
requirements of similarity (and subsequently, closeness) imposed by Lewis’s
strongly-centered account in favor of a weakly-centered account, which discards the
requirement that no other world is even as similar to a world as it is to itself And
given this modified account—Lewis’s weakly-centered semantics (L(WC))—the
possibility offalse subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and true
consequents emerges in situations where the consequent is false at a sufficiently
close antecedent world
29
This, I submit, is an appropriate semantics for certain
subjunctive conditionals employed in consequentialist reasoning, but while my
27
Lewis (1973a), p. 29.
28
Ibid. Lewis also makes this point in his (1986b), p 18
29 Lewis (1973a), p. 29.
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reasons for endorsing L(WC) are in general agreement with those that Lewis
discusses, further clarification is in order.
Lewis suggests that L(WC) might be used to characterize the truth
conditions of our subjunctive conditionals just in case the discriminations of
similarity we employ in our use of subjunctive conditionals are sufficiently coarse 30
But this claim can be interpreted in a couple of different ways. One might interpret
Lewis’s claim as suggesting that a weakly-centered account implies that the
similarity relation we employ in evaluating subjunctive conditionals is coarse in
general. But such an interpretation would be too strong. There are plenty of
examples in which a fine-grained similarity relation is called for. Rather, Lewis’s
remark should be interpreted as implying that the point that an employed similarity
relation occupies on the spectrum from perfectly fine-grained to fairly coarse can
change from context to context. My suggestion is that certain consequentialist
contexts require the employment of a fairly coarse similarity relation, for certain
differences between worlds are ignored as irrelevant to the evaluation of subjunctive
conditionals in such contexts. The weakly-centered account allows us to demarcate
these irrelevant aspects of similarity from the relevant as is required by various
30
While Lewis cautiously prefers L(SC) to L(WC), the same cannot be said about
other writers who endorse the possibility of false subjunctive conditionals with true
antecedents and true consequents. Bigelow, for example, explicitly rejects accounts
like L(WC) in his (1976):
[Lewis] even went to the length of considering the possibility that
there may be a number of possible worlds which are distinct from the
actual world, yet which are just as similar to the actual world as the
actual world is to itself I hope to show that we need not go to such
lengths as that. (21)
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contexts. This can be illustrated through an L(WC) interpretation of the important
conditionals in Pam’s case.
sC 1 If Pam were to flip the coin, then it would come up heads.
sC2. If Pam were to flip the coin, then it would come up tails.
Remember that Pam is wondering what would happen were she to flip the
coin; and recall that for every fully specified way in which she can flip the coin,
there is at least one possible world in which she flips the coin in exactly that way. It
was stipulated that Pam flips the coin in the actual world in one of the fully specifed
ways that results in the coin turning up tails. Now notice that there is a plethora of
possible worlds, minimally different from the actual one, in which Pam flips the coin
in a slightly different fully specified way from the way she actually does. I submit
that these worlds, or perhaps a substantial subset of them, are worlds as similar to the
actual world as it is to itself in all respects relevant to Case 2. As we are all aware,
Pam lacks the ability to guarantee a result of heads should she flip a coin, she can’t
ensure that the fully specified way (f-prop) in which she actually ends up flipping the
coin is one that will produce heads. She seemingly “stumbles” into her performance
of the actualized f-prop. And since the f-prop she actually ends up performing is a
mere accidental byproduct of her seeing to it that the coin is tossed, 1 can find no
reason to believe that worlds minimally different from the actual one where Pam
flips the coin in an unactualized fully specified way are any less similar to the actual
world than it is to itself in the evaluation of these important subjunctive conditionals.
Since the truth values of these conditionals play an important role in
determining whether or not Pam should or shouldn’t flip the coin on a utilitarian
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evaluation, and since whether or not an alternative is actually performed has
absolutely no bearing on its moral status, it should be concluded that certain
accidental byproducts of an alternative’s actual performance (the f-prop actually
used to toss the coin in this case) should be considered irrelevant to the evaluation of
subjunctive conditionals in consequentialist reasoning. On the basis of these facts,
Lewis’s L(WC) generates the correct results in Pam’s case: Neither sCl nor sC2
turns out to be true, for some of the closest antecedent worlds are heads-worlds, even
though the actual world turns out to be a tails-world. 31
Lewis’s weakly-centered account captures perfectly the nature of certain
subjunctive conditionals in consequentialist reasoning L(WC) captures the stronger
modal force that utilitarians (as well as other consequentialists) mean to employ
when reasoning about what would happen were some alternative or other to be
performed. On an L(WC) interpretation of sCl and sC2, certain future facts about
the actual world (e.g., which f-prop Pam actually ends up performing in Case 2) are
excluded from similarity comparisons. This, in turn, produces the desired result that
31
Notice that temporal considerations also play a prominent role in evaluating
subjunctive conditionals in these contexts I have been concerned with “future”
subjunctives of the form rIf it were that A, then it would be that C 1
,
arguing that an
L(WC) analysis best captures their sense in consequentialist reasoning But notice
that similar subjunctive conditionals of the form rIf it had been that A, then it would
have been that C1 seem to be described best, perhaps, by the L(SC) analysis. But
this is just how it should be. The “had been, would have been” variety of
subjunctive conditionals are much more “counterfactual” than their “were, would”
counterparts. When people assert conditionals of the former form, they are
speculating about what it would have been like if some feature of the past didn’t
occur, or had occurred in a different way (while holding fast facts between the
“time” of the antecedent and the “time” of assertion). But certain “were, would”
constructions leave open the possibility that the antecedent may in fact be satisfied.
It is this feature of “were, would” conditionals that leads me to endorse a weakly-
centered analysis of them in certain consequentialist contexts.
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certain accidental features (features completely outside an agent’s control) obtaining
solely in virtue of an agent’s actual performance of an alternative are disregarded in
the evaluation of certain subjunctive conditionals in consequentialist reasoning This
is exactly how it should be. L(WC) succeeds where L(SC) fails. Now onto an
objection.
Obj ection : You and I bet on the subjunctive conditional sC2 in Case 2. You bet that
the coin would come up tails were Pam to flip it. I bet that it wouldn’t. On the
L(WC) interpretation just presented, it appears that I would win the bet in virtue of
the fact neither of the subjunctive conditionals in Case 2 were evaluated as true But
certainly you have won the bet!
32 You bet that if Pam were to flip the coin, then it
would come up tails. She flipped it. It came up tails. Case closed; L(WC) is
unacceptable
Reply : Our evaluation of sC2 occurred in a radically different context from the one
in which Pam evaluated it. In her context, certain facts about the future (which f-
prop she eventually performed) were disregarded from similarity considerations in
the evaluation of sC2, for they came into conflict with the Principle of Normative
Invariance governing certain types of moral evaluation But in our betting case, the
accidental byproducts of Pam’s seeing to it that the coin is tossed are just what we’re
interested in. You are betting that the fully specified way in which she actually flips
the coin will result in tails. I am betting that it won’t. Thus, the f-prop that Pam
32
Cf. Ayer (1972): ‘I make a bet: ‘If I toss this penny it will come up heads’; and
then I toss it and am proved right or wrong.’ (116)
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actually performs plays a crucial role in the evaluation of sC2 in our context. The
contextual changes make all the difference Respects of similarity are prioritized
differently in varying contexts. And L(WC) is certainly sensitive to these
differences. In our context, afme-grained similarity relation is employed, resulting
in sC2 coming out true; in Pam’s, a coarse similarity relation is employed, resulting
in sC2 coming out false. Betting situations thus pose no problems for L(WC).
5,5 Conclusion
A weakly-centered account of subjunctive conditionals, I have argued, is
required to capture the nature of certain subjunctive constructions utilized in
consequentialist reasoning. If I have succeeded (and if some objective form of
consequentialism is defensible), then reasons totally unrelated to relevance are
responsible for the possibility of false subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents
and true consequents in certain circumstances—a possibility that has received little
support outside of relevance circles,
33
until now, that is.
33
Again, Nozick (1981) might be the exception
CHAPTER 6
WORKING TOWARDS THE CLOSEST THING TO AN OBJECTIVE FORM OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM THAT YOU CAN GET
Consequentialist normative theories can be classified into two groups:
subjective and objective. Subjective consequentialist theories might be characterized
as those in which an agent s beliefs concerning the possible consequences of an
alternative (including perhaps: their likeliness to obtain should the alternative be
performed, their intrinsic value, etc.) play a prominent role in determining that
alternative’s normative status. According to objective versions of consequentialism,
these beliefs play no such role.
Objective versions can, in turn, be naturally classified into two groups:
“subjunctive” and “possibilist”. Subjunctive versions are formulated in terms of
would-subjunctive conditionals. Possibilists forgo such conditionals, opting instead
to use a modal accessibility relation and a world-ranking system in the construction
of their theories.
In this chapter, I argue that all extant objective formulations of
consequentialism—subjunctive and possibilist alike—fail to deliver the normative
implications that the spirit of objective consequentialism requires My argument
rests upon an objection based upon the claim that certain pairs of subjunctive
conditionals with identical antecedents and incompatible consequents are such that
neither of the pair is true, a claim argued for extensively in the previous chapter.
In Section 6. 1 of this chapter, I introduce a deterministic case to motivate my
objection. In Section 6.2, 1 level the objection against subjunctive versions of
consequentialism. In Section 6.3, 1 show that possibilist versions are vulnerable to
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an analogue of the very objection directed against the subjunctivists. In Section 6.4,
I argue that making the problem case indeterministic doesn’t provide any assistance
in rectifying matters. In Section 6.5, I introduce the concept of an “objective”
subjunctive probability. And finally, in Section 6.6, 1 utilize the concept in the
transformation of a subjective version of expected act utility consequentialism into
an objective version, one that is capable of dealing with the difficulties posed by our
problematic case. I end by indicating some ways in which the closest thing to a
plausible, objective form of consequentialism might be developed.
6, 1 The Case of Sam and the Demon’s Die
This case is almost identical to “The Case of Sam and the Demon’s Coin”
presented in §5.1 of the previous chapter. Once again, determinism is being
assumed (though consideration of what would result from dropping the deterministic
assumption is pursued in §6.4). And, once again, our bored but powerful demon
makes Sam an offer. But this time, rather than using a coin toss, the demon hopes to
tempt Sam with the possibility of die toss. Producing a fair, six-sided die, the demon
asks whether Sam would like to toss it given the following conditions. If Sam tosses
it and ends up rolling a “1”, then the demon will bring about the Good (Pleasure).
But if Sam tosses it and ends up rolling anything but a “1”, then the demon will
bring about the Bad (Pain). And finally, if Sam refuses the demon’s offer to toss the
die, then the demon will leave the world pretty much the way it is: neither
particularly good nor particularly bad. Once again, the fate of the world is in Sam s
hands.
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Suppose that Sam our dedicated consequentialist of the objective variety
—
again opts to play it safe, refusing the demon’s offer to toss the die. Now a series of
interesting questions might be asked. When Sam chose to do the latter of the
following alternatives:
al: toss the die
a2: don’t toss the die,
did he do the morally right thing from an objective consequentialist perspective?
I’m inclined to think that he did What do subjunctive versions imply about the
normative statuses of the alternatives in the case? What about possibilist versions9
The answers to these latter questions, I will now argue, pose serious problems for
extant versions of objective consequentialism. They just can’t generate the required
results.
6.2 Leveling the Objection against Subjunctive Versions of Objective
Consequentialism
Subjunctive versions of objective consequentialism come in many varieties.
I will consider here a naive, sample subjunctive version to illustrate the trouble that
our case (and billions of cases like it) brings about for any extant subjunctive form of
objective consequentialism
According to our subjunctive version (call is ‘SUB’), let an alternative, a, be
morally right just in case a ' s outcome is such that no alternative to a has a better
outcome than a has. Let the outcome of an alternative, a, be everything that would
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result, were a performed. 1 Now a subjunctive evaluation of Sam’s case can be
provided.
The normative statuses of Sam’s alternatives are determined—according to
SUB—by the values of their outcomes. If one alternative has a better outcome than
the other, then that alternative is deemed right and the other wrong. If their
outcomes are equally valuable, then each alternative is deemed morally permissible.
It’s been stipulated that the outcome of a2 is neither good nor bad. Sam
refused the offer to toss the die, and the demon left the world alone How the
outcome of al is to be evaluated, however, seems to be a tricky matter.
The outcome of al is everything that would have happened had Sam tossed
the die. Much of what would have happened had Sam opted to perform al is of little
importance: Sam’s hands would have moved in a die-tossing fashion, a die would
have flown through the air before bouncing on the ground, etc. The only feature that
seems to be of any particular moral importance in the outcome of al is which side of
the die, if any, faces upward as a result of Sam’s toss. If Sam would have rolled a
“1”, then the value of al’s outcome is greater than the value of a2’s outcome,
implying al to be morally obligatory by SUB. But if Sam would have rolled
anything other than a “1”, then, of course, the value of a2’s outcome is greater than
the value of al’s outcome, implying a2 to be the morally preferable option by SUB.
If there is no fact of the matter as to which side would have turned up had Sam
tossed the die, then—I will later argue—either the value of the outcome of al is
1
This subjunctive formulation of consequentialism is very similar to the formulation
that G. E. Moore presents in his (1912). See Vallentyne (1987) and Carlson (1995)
for surveys of various explications of the concept of an outcome of an alternative.
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undefined or the values of the two alternatives might very well be identical Either
possibility presents insurmountable difficulties for SUB.
Whether or not there is a fact of the matter as to which side would have
turned up had Sam tossed the die might be displayed through an investigation of
some of the most relevant counterfactual conditionals to the case. Here are two
counterfactuals that seem to be particularly relevant:
Cfl : If Sam had tossed the die, then he would have rolled a “1”.
Cf2: If Sam had tossed the die, then he would have rolled something other
than a “1”.
If Cfl is true, then SUB implies al to be morally obligatory If Cf2 is true, then
SUB implies a2 to be morally obligatory. But are there any good reasons to believe
that either of these counterfactuals with underspecified antecedents and incompatible
consequents is true? My view is that there aren’t.
There is a plethora of different fully specified ways in which Sam could have
satisfied the antecedents of these counterfactuals. (I referred to these ways as/-
props in the previous chapter.
2
) But Sam lacks the requisite dexterity to select and
then perform any particular f-prop. Furthermore, Sam lacks the ability to guarantee
that some one or other f-prop whose performance leads to a result of a “1” coming
up (or a “2” or a “3” or any particular side, for that matter) would have been realized
had he tossed the demon’s die. In virtue of these facts, there is no fact of the matter
as to which side would have turned up had Sam tossed the die
2
See Section 5.2 of “Counterfactuals for Consequentialists’’.
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This claim can be further illustrated through consideration of the way that
these counterfactuals might be evaluated via David Lewis’s semantics for
subjunctive conditionals. Lewis’ view is that a wo/z/J-counterfactual of the form rIf
it had been that A, then it would have been that O is (non-vacuously) true at a
world, /, just in case the consequent, C, is true at all of the closest accessible
antecedent worlds to i. (“Antecedent worlds” are worlds where the antecedent is
true.)
L: A \ l-> C is non-vacuously true at / iffC is true at all the closest
accessible ,4 -worlds to /. 3
How close an antecedent world is to a world where a counterfactual is being
evaluated is cashed out in terms of comparative overall similarity. 4 Roughly, when
evaluating counterfactuals we are interested in what occurs in the antecedent worlds
that, given a context, are “most similar” (in relevant respects) to the world where the
counterfactual is being evaluated
In order for either Cfl or Cf2 to be true according to Lewis’s semantics,
either all of the closest antecedent worlds under consideration must be “1 ’’-worlds or
all them must be other-than-“l ’’-worlds. But given Sam’s inability to ensure that die
tosses produce the results of his choice, there don’t appear to be any factors
3
Lewis (1973a) and (1979). Notice that L doesn’t quite capture Lewis’s preferred
view. L invokes the Limit Assumption—an assumption that Lewis rejects since it
amounts to ignoring the possibility of infinite chains of more and more similar
worlds. Invoking the Limit Assumption for simplicity’ sake is harmless in this
context, for it won’t be playing any role in the upcoming arguments. For Lewis’s




indicating that “1 ’’-worlds are more similar to the world of evaluation that other-
than-‘T’-worlds are, and vice versa 5 Thus, it seems that some of the closest
accessible antecedent worlds are “1 ’’-worlds; others are “2”-worlds; still others are
“3”-worlds, and so on. This, of course, prevents either Cfl or Cf2 from being true
on a Lewis-style evaluation.
Notice that this evaluation of Cfl and Cf2 doesn’t necessarily depend upon
Lewis’s semantic account of subjunctive conditionals. Any adequate semantics for
counterfactuals should recognize that certain would-counterfactuals with
underspecified antecedents are not true Given that there is no particular fully
specified way in which their antecedents would be satisfied and that Sam lacks the
ability to guarantee the results of his die tosses, neither of the counterfactuals
appears to be true 6
The fact that neither Cfl nor Cf2 is true poses an interesting problem for
SUB. Since there is no fact of the matter as to what the demon would have done had
Sam tossed the die, then it seems that the value of the outcome of al is either
indeterminate or perhaps identical in value to that of the outcome of a2. Either
possibility renders SUB implausible
5 Of course, in other cases it might not only be features about agents’ abilities that
play a role in determining the truth values of morally relevant subjunctive
conditionals. The agents’ dispositions to utilize their abilities for good or evil might
also play an important role Fred Feldman brought this point to my attention
6
For similar evaluations from those who hold semantic views differing from
Lewis’s, see Stalnaker (1984), pp. 164-165 and Ayer (1972), p. 116.
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First assume that Cfl and Cf2 are neither true nor false but indeterminate. 7 If
it’s indeterminate whether the demon would have brought about the Good (or would
have brought about the Bad) had Sam rolled the die, then the value of the outcome of
al is also indeterminate, and thus undefined 8 Without a definite value for the
outcome of al, SUB fails to assign normative statuses to the alternatives in the case.
In failing to assign such statuses in moral situations, SUB renders itself implausible.
If the value of the outcome of al is indeterminate, then SUB lacks the complete
generality required of plausible normative theories.
Now assume that Cfl and Cf2 are false. 9 On this assumption, neither of their
consequents is contained in the outcome of al If this is so, then it may very well be
the case that the value of the outcome of al is identical to that of the outcome of a2,
indicating each alternative to be morally permissible according to SUB In the
outcome of a2, the demon refrains from doing anything to the world. The outcome
of al is slightly different. On the assumption that Cfl and Cf2 are false, the demon
does do something to the world in the outcome of al, but it’s not the case that he
does something beneficial to the world, nor is it the case that he does something
detrimental to the world. Thus, given our assumption, the outcome of a2 seems to be
very similar to that of al in all morally interesting respects, which suggests that the
two outcomes may very well be identical in value. In the least, there don’t appear to
7
Those attracted to Stalnaker’s semantics for subjunctive conditionals might be
inclined to evaluate Cfl and Cf2 as indeterminate. For a complete account of
Stalnaker’s theory, see his (1984), esp. ch. 7.
8
Fred Feldman suggested this SUB evaluation of the case.
9
Lewis’s semantics suggest this evaluation
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be any good reasons suggesting that one of the outcomes is more valuable than the
other. If this is so—as it seems to be—then SUB implies each alternative to be
morally right, indicating that Sam didn’t have an interesting moral decision to
make. 10 But he did.
Imagine that the demon’s die were 20-sided, or perhaps even 100-sided. It
still wouldn’t be the case that something other than a “1” would have turned up had
Sam rolled the die. Yet it’s doubtful that anyone sympathetic to an objective form of
consequentialism would suggest that this fact renders the normative status of rolling
the die identical to the normative status of refraining from rolling. If Sam had
performed al, he would have posed a huge, seemingly morally unjustifiable risk to
the world. This morally relevant feature of the case just doesn’t seem to be given the
required consideration by theories like SUB. 11 Theories like SUB appear incapable
of delivering plausible implications (or any implications at all!) when none of the
most morally relevant would-counterfactuals to a case is true. Possibilist theories, I
will now argue, fare no better.
10
Michael Zimmerman suggested this SUB evaluation of the case.
11 Contemporary theorists attracted to SUB-versions of objective consequentialism
—
notably Vallentyne (1987) and Sosa (1993)—have suggested that taking a dangerous
risk might be considered to be harmful in itself, and thus intrinsically bad in a way
that could affect the values of the outcomes of risk-taking alternatives. In our case,
Sam takes a dangerous risk in the outcome of al whereas he doesn’t in the outcome
of a2. And perhaps it is this feature that would lead contemporary SUB-theorists to
deem a2 morally obligatory. But I think this way of dealing with the case gets things
backwards. The taking of a dangerous risk doesn’t seem to be bad in itself. If an
alternative turns out to be morally wrong in virtue of the fact that it involves taking a
dangerous risk, then its being wrong seems to be determined by what might happen
should that alternative be performed This violates the spirit of SUB, which explains
the rightness or wrongness of an alternative in terms of what would happen should
that alternative be performed. Theories like SUB just aren’t suited to explain how al
involves Sam taking a morally unjustifiable risk
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6,3 Leveling the Objection against Possibilist Versions of Objective
Consequentialism
Possibilist versions of objective consequentialism were introduced to deal
with some independent formal problems plaguing their subjunctive counterparts. 12
In overcoming many such problems, possibilism has proved to be a success. But
extant versions of possibilism seem to be no better suited to deal with the problems
posed by our case than SUB is. Consideration of a paradigm possibilist view will
illustrate why.
Possibilists don’t make use of the problematic would-conditionals used to
explicate the concept of an outcome in subjunctive versions of objective
consequentialism. Instead, a modal accessibility relation and a world-ranking
system are utilized to elucidate the normative status of an alternative Let’s consider
the pioneering, paradigm possibilist theory introduced by Fred Feldman. 13
Roughly, Feldman’s view is that a person, .S’, is morally obligated to do
something, P
,
at a time, /, just in case S does P in all of the best accessible worlds to
S at t. A “best” accessible world is one than which no other accessible world is
better. The accessibility relation is left undefined as a conceptual primitive; its role
is to articulate what an agent can do at a time, that is, which possible worlds an agent
12
See Feldman (1975) and Chapter 1 of Feldman (1986) as well as the next chapter
of this dissertation.
13
Also see Zimmerman (1996).
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can keep open as live options for actuality. 14 Call this rough version of Feldman’s
view TOSS’.
POSS, somewhat surprisingly, implies that Sam was morally obligated to roll
the demon’s die. Why? Because Sam rolls the demon’s die in all of the best
accessible worlds to him at the time. Sam obviously could have rolled the die; thus,
worlds were accessible to him (in the relevant sense) in which he in fact rolls it In
each of these accessible “die-rolling” worlds, the top of the die displays a particular
numeral. Some of these worlds are “1 ’’-worlds, worlds in which Sam’s toss results
in a “1” coming up. Others are “2”-worlds; still others are “3”-worlds, and so on.
As stipulated by the case, all of the best accessible worlds to Sam at the time were
“l”-worlds, worlds in which Sam’s roll of the die leads to the demon’s bringing
about the Good. Since Sam rolls the demon’s die in all of best accessible worlds to
him at the time (in all of the “l”-worlds), POSS implies that Sam is morally
obligated to roll the die. But surely this implication isn’t consonant with what the
spirit of objective consequentialism requires.
The problem with POSS’s evaluation of the case is that it grants no moral
relevance to the fact that Sam doesn’t have the requisite ability to ensure that he
would have accessed a best accessible world had he rolled the die He might have
accessed a worst accessible world had he taken up the demon’s offer Our lack of
ability to secure certain results prevents us from accessing the best worlds accessible
to us in many cases. And this fact must be accommodated by any plausible,
objective consequentialist theory. Unfortunately, it isn’t accommodated by POSS.
14
See Chapter 2 of Feldman’s (1986) for a precise characterization of the normative
theory sketched here.
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POSS, too, fails to provide plausible implications when none of the most morally
relevant would-counterfactuals to a case is true.
6 4 Making the Case Indeterministic Won’t Help the Consequentialist Cause
One might be led to believe that introducing the notion of an objective
probability might prove helpful to the objective consequentialist cause Perhaps if a
theory like SUB or POSS were modified so that objective probabilities played
essential roles in determining the normative statuses of alternatives, then the
problems posed by our case would be overcome. It’s unlikely, however, that
introducing such probabilities, as they are usually interpreted, will generate the
desired results.
Objective probabilities have traditionally been used to map indeterministic
features of the world. In our case, however, the assumption is that determinism is
true, implying that there are no indeterministic features relevant to the case that
objective probabilities might be used to map. But what if this deterministic
assumption were dropped? Would objective probabilities then be capable of coming
to the rescue? I don’t think so
Suppose that there is some kind of quantum indeterminacy in Sam’s world.
Then we would be able to map such indeterminacy with objective probabilities. But
the problems posed by our modified case would still be very much independent of
indeterministic concerns. It’s Sam’s inability to secure desired results in die tosses
that generates the problems. It’s not as it the demon handed Sam a quantum die,
one such that indeterministic quantum events would have been solely responsible for
preventing Sam from guaranteeing the desired result. Indeterminacies might further
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complicate matters, but using objective probabilities to map them out leaves the
troubles posed by Sam’s inabilities still to be dealt with. Subjunctive probabilities
(or perhaps probabilistic subjunctive conditionals), on the other hand, might prove
capable of dealing with both of these problems. 15
6.5 “Objective”. Subjunctive Probabilities
Something like subjunctive probabilities, it seems, must be utilized in order
to deal with the problems that Sam’s inabilities pose The type of subjunctive
probability that seems most relevant to our case is a kind of conditional probability.
Neither Cfl nor Cf2 is true; there is no fact of the matter as to what the demon would
have done had Sam tossed the die. But there does seem to be a fact of the matter as
to what the probability is that the demon would have brought about the Good (or the
Bad, for that matter) had Sam rolled the die
Consider the following sentences.
R: Sam rolls the demon’s die
G: Sam rolls a “1”, and the demon brings about the Good
B: Sam rolls something other than a “1”, and the demon brings about the
Bad
What we’re interested in here is the relevant probabilities ofG given R and B given
R
15
1 owe a special debt of gratitude to Phil Bricker for suggesting that I implement
either probabilistic subjunctive conditionals or subjunctive probabilities in a solution
to our problematic case.
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To start off, let’s consider these probabilities to be subjective probabilities. 16
Note first of all that these conditional probabilities are not the same as those
traditionally utilized in theories of rational belief. The conditional probability ofB
given A, under the interpretation used in theories of rational belief, is usually defined
in this way:
p(B/A) =df p(A & B)/p(A)
But obviously this interpretation won’t suit our purposes. According to this
interpretation, the likelihood that R will obtain plays an important role in
determining the conditional probabilities p(G/R) and p(B/R). But what we’re
interested in here is whether or not Sam should see that R obtains from the
perspective of objective consequentialism. The probability that Sam will in fact do
something shouldn’t play any role in determining whether or not Sam should or
shouldn’t do that something. 17 This is a point that Donald Nute has made clear in his
discussion of subjunctive probabilities:
Presumably in this case we are trying to decide whether or not to do
such and such. One important consideration is whether B will result
from doing such and such. Is the important probability, then, p(B/we
do such and such)? If so, we must despair, for we surely cannot
determine the probability of the antecedent as an intermediate step in
making our decision in such a case since what we are trying to decide
is whether or not to bring it about that the antecedent is true
Whatever this conditional probability is, it must not be the standard
16 How to make these probabilities as “objective” as possible is on the horizon.
17
There are other problems with interpreting our conditional probabilities in this
way. What if the p(R) = 0? Sam may have very well assigned that probability to R.
But that would leave the important probabilities p(G/R) and p(B/R) undefined
according to this standard interpretation of conditional probabilities. This, in turn,
would lend no help to the problems Sam inabilities pose for objective forms of
consequentialism.
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conditional probability of which Adams treats since otherwise it can
in no wise enter into our deliberations. 18
It’s subjunctive conditional probabilities that we’re interested in here, different in
kind from the conditional probabilities utilized elsewhere.
To distinguish them from other kinds of conditional probabilities, let
subjunctive conditional probabilities be represented in this way: p(£/A4). 19 I have no
intention of providing a semantics for subjunctive probability statements here; 20
none will be needed for our purposes. However, adopting the possible worlds
framework introduced in Lewis’s semantics for subjunctive conditionals, p(BUA) can
roughly be described as a measure of the proportion of the closest accessible
antecedent worlds relevant to a particular subjunctive probability statement in which
the consequent is true. For example, p(G//R) might be thought of as a measure of
the proportion of the closest accessible R-worlds to Sam’s world in which G is
true. Now let’s turn to Sam’s subjunctive probability assignments.
What probabilities might Sam have assigned to p(G//R) and p(B//R) that led
him to refrain from rolling the demon’s die? If Sam were fully rational and had
complete knowledge of all of the relevant circumstances—and let’s assume that he
was and did—then the probabilities would be 1/6 and 5/6, respectively. And these
18
Nute (1980), pp. 124-125.
19
Nute introduces this symbol in his (1980).
20
For those interested in various semantics for subjunctive probability statements,
see, for example, Ch. VIII of Pollock (1976) and Ch VI of Nute (1980).
21
Pollock provides an informal description almost identical to this on pp. 2 1 9f ot his
(1976). Also, a “weakly-centered” interpretation of the phrase ‘closest accessible
antecedent world’ is required here. See my “Counterlactuals tor Consequentialists,
the previous chapter in this dissertation.
166
probabilities are perfectly capable of capturing Sam’s inability to guarantee the
desired results of his die tosses. But a problem remains. These probabilities are
subjective. Objective consequentialist theories provide normative implications
without appealing to subjective elements. How might this problem be overcome?
Perhaps by showing how these subjective, subjunctive probabilities are determined
by objective features of the world
There is a sense in which it seems that the subjective probabilities Sam
assigned to p(G//R) and p(B//R) are identical to “objective” probabilities. 22 It’s
already been assumed that Sam was fully rational and possessed all the knowledge
relevant to his situation. If we gave Sam complete knowledge of his world, he still
wouldn’t alter his probability assignments. Given Sam’s epistemic situation and
rational disposition, purely objective features of his world—namely, his inabilities
—
were responsible for his probability assignments. Sam’s probability assignments
matched up perfectly with the seemingly “objective” probabilities of p(G//R) and
p(B//R).
There are billions of cases like Sam’s, cases in which none of the most
morally relevant would-counterfactuals is true. Many of these cases are much more
complicated than Sam’s. Athletes wonder whether they should attempt feats on the
borders of their abilities; snipers whether they should try to secure hits just beyond
their ranges in complicated situations. In all of these cases, it seems that objective
subjunctive probabilities play some role in determining what is morally required
from an objective consequentialist perspective. But unlike Sam’s case, the
22
Others also seem to believe this; see Nute (1980), p. 120. Again, I owe special
thanks to Phil Bricker for suggesting this to me.
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probabilities assigned by the agents in these choice situations most likely diverge
from the relevant objective probabilities, the reason being that they lack huge chunks
of knowledge relevant to the case.
Let an agent be in an ideal epistemic state relative to a choice situation just in
case that agent has complete knowledge concerning all of the circumstances of the
situation and complete causal knowledge. The “objective”, subjunctive probabilities
in one of these troublesome cases might then be identified with the subjunctive
probabilities that a perfectly rational agent in an ideal epistemic state relative to the
choice situation would assign to the relevant statements. We could feel comfortable
treating these probabilities as objective because (i) they are determined entirely by
purely objective features of the world (for such features are the only things that a
fully rational agent in an ideal epistemic state would rely upon in assigning her
probabilities), and (ii) given the epistemic status of the agent and the fact that she is
perfectly rational, no relevant objective feature of the world would be left out or
“mishandled” in the probability assignments
With the concept of an objective, subjunctive, conditional probability in
hand, various ways in which it might be implemented in the construction of an
objective form of consequentialism capable of generating the correct implications in
Sam’s case (and others like it) can be explored.
6.6 Transforming Subjective Versions of Consequentialism into Objective Ones
Decision theorists have long relied upon subjective, subjunctive, conditional
probabilities in their theories of instrumental rationality. In recent years
consequentialists have borrowed these decision-theoretic devices in the construction
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of subjective versions of consequentialism Perhaps the objective version of
consequentialism that we are after can be constructed by replacing the subjective,
subjunctive probabilities in one of these subjective versions of consequentialism
with objective ones.
Frank Jackson has presented a theory capable of the proposed transformation:
a subjective version of expected act utility consequentialism Here’s how Jackson
explains how Sam should have ranked his alternatives from the viewpoint of his
subjective, consequentialist theory:
The obvious answer is to take a leaf out of decision theory’s book and
take the results of multiplying the value of each possible outcome of
each contemplated action by [Sam’s] subjective probability of that
outcome given that the action is performed, summing these for each
action, that then designating the action with the greatest sum as what
ought be done. 23
Jackson isn’t explicit about how these subjunctive, conditional probability
statements are to be interpreted He is sympathetic to the view that they be
interpreted as probabilistic conditionals provided that the conditional connective “is
read correctly.”
24
I think that a weakly-centered version of David Lewis’s semantics
25
for subjunctive conditionals is capable of providing the correct interpretation.
Substituting in objective
,
subjunctive probabilities for Jackson’s subjective ones
transforms Jackson’s subjective version of expected act utility consequentialism into
an objective version.
23




See my “Counterfactuals for Consequentialists,” the preceding chapter of this
dissertation.
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How our objective version generates the correct implications in Sam’s case is
fairly clear. Our theory implies that an alternative is morally right just in case no
alternative to it has a higher expected act utility than it has. The expected act utility
of an alternative is the result of multiplying the value of each possible result of the
alternative by the objective, subjunctive probability of that result obtaining given
that the alternative is performed, and then summing these products. 26
Sam’s alternatives were R and ~R.
R: Sam rolls the demon’s die
There was only one relevant possible result of ~R: the demon leaves the world alone.
Let the value of this result be zero. Thus, the expected act utility of ~~R is zero
There were two relevant possible results of R:
G: Sam rolls a “1”, and the demon brings about the Good
B: Sam rolls something other than a “1”, and the demon brings about the
Bad
In order to determine the expected act utility of R, the values of the possible results
ofR must be multiplied by the relevant probabilities and then summed Let the
value ofG be some very large but finite number, call it ‘n’. Let the value of B be -n.
Recall that p(G//R) is 1/6, and p(B//R) is 5/6. The sum, then, representing the
expected act utility of R is l/6n + -5/6n, a number much lower than zero. Sam, by
26
Mirroring Jackson’s formal account of his subjective version of expected act
utility consequentialism, we can say that an alternative is morally right according to
the objective transformation of his theory just in case it maximizes l,P(()i//Aj
)
x
V(Ri), where P is the objective probability function, Lis consequentialism’s value
function, Ri are the possible results, and Aj are the possible actions. Jackson (1991),
pp. 136-137.
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doing ~R, thus did the morally right thing according to our objective version of
expected act utility consequentialism.
Is this objective consequentialist theory then the answer to our
consequentialist woes? It handles Sam’s case wonderfully and is perfectly suited to
deal with all of the cases in which agent inabilities render the most morally relevant
would-counterfactuals not true.
Unfortunately, while I think our theory is a step in the right direction, it still
isn’t satisfactory. I argue in the next chapter that this theory (which is a probabilistic
relative to SUB) suffers from mistaking morally irrelevant features in various closest
antecedent worlds for morally relevant ones, something possibilist consequentialist
theories don’t do. How to integrate the theoretically attractive features of these
different kinds of consequentialism into a plausible objective consequentialist theory
isn’t clear to me. But one thing’s for sure: objective, subjunctive probabilities will
have to play an essential role in the construction of any plausible version of objective
consequentialism to come.
CHAPTER 7
DEFENDING THE POSSIBILIST PROGRAM IN CONSEQUENTIALIST
THOUGHT
There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following
deontic principle:
DC: O(a&b) -> 0(a) & 0(b)
The principle states that for any acts (or any bearers of normative status) a and b
,
if it
is obligatory for a specific agent to do the conjunctive (or compound) act a&b
,
then
that agent is obligated to do a and is also obligated to do b—the deontic operators
distribute over conjunction. Possibilists 1—those who believe that we should always
pursue a “best” possible course of action available to us
2
—accept the principle as
true. Actualists —those who believe that certain future facts about the actual world
can generate obligations incompatible with the best possible course of action
available to us—reject the principle as false. And recent commentators on the
dispute—some who endorse DC, others who reject it—have attempted to dig out and
1 The possibilist camp includes Goldman (1978), Greenspan (1978), Thomason
(1981), Humberstone (1983), Feldman (1986), Zimmerman (1996), and Vorobej
(2000). Note that Thomason (1981), Humberstone (1983), Zimmerman (1996), and
Vorobej (2000) aren’t necessarily consequentialists, but consequentialist
interpretations of their positions are available.
2 A “best” possible course of action available to an agent at a time is one than which
no other course of action available to the agent at the time is better.
3 The actualist camp includes Goldman (1976), Sobel (1976) and (1982), Jackson
and Pargetter ( 1 986), Goble (1993), and perhaps Vallentyne (2000).
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defend intermediary positions, suggesting that extreme versions of each view are
unsatisfactory.
4
I’m out to defend DC from the actualist attack. In what follows, I briefly
present the central actualist argument against DC. I then show that possibilism has
all of the resources to explain the phenomena with which actualists are so concerned.
And finally, I attempt to diagnose the actualists’ malcontent: the relevance of certain
subjunctive conditionals to consequentialist reasoning has been vastly
overemphasized.
7 1 An Actualist Argument against DC
The actualists’ problem with DC stems from concerns of agency; in
particular, with whether or not certain future acts that an agent will actually perform
bear in any way upon her present moral obligations. Actualists believe that, to some
extent, they do. An example will suffice to illustrate how.
Consider the case of Fran and Stan." Fran and Stan are pals. Fran has helped
Stan out of binds in the past: lending him money, volunteering her services, etc. But
this time, Fran is in a bind. She has come down with an extraordinarily painful
medical condition. There is a drug that can relieve her symptoms, but unfortunately
4
Carlson (1995) and (1999) reject DC but are hesitant to be included among the
actualists, for the rejection rests upon the precise nature of the bearers of normative
status and performability requirements. Vorobej (2000) calls himself a “prosaic
possibilist,” but his acceptance of a restricted actualist interpretation of forms of
factual detachment as valid might suggest that he holds an intermediary position
rather than full fledged possibilism.
5
This example is a variant of the ‘Jack and Jill’ case presented by Carlson (1999),
which, in turn, is structurally similar to the ‘Procrastinate’ and ‘Journal Referee’
cases presented by Jackson and Pargetter (1986) and Thomason (1981), respectively.
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it isn’t covered by her health insurance plan Furthermore, she doesn’t, at present,
have the financial means to acquire the drug. So she approaches Stan, begging her
only financially stable friend for a loan. She promises to repay it, and she has a
perfect record with respect to keeping promises. Now a question emerges: Upon
Fran’s asking Stan for the loan, what ought Stan to do? Should he indicate to her
that he will grant her the request? Should he then, in fact, lend Fran the cash?
Should he indicate to her that he will grant the loan request and lend Fran the cash?
Consequentialists agree that Stan should bring about the Best. 6 And let’s
assume that Stan’s indicating to Fran that he will grant the loan request and then
lending Fran the cash would be best. So actualists and possibilists alike agree about
the following obligation claim:
0(Y & L), 7 where
Y: Stan indicates to Fran that he will grant her loan request
L: Stan lends Fran the money required to acquire medication.
But there are some complications. While Stan is exceedingly generous with his time
and effort, he is not so with respect to his cash. Stan is as stingy as they come, a
miser among misers. Furthermore, he knows himself well enough to know that even
6 More carefully: most consequentialists do. “Satisficing” consequentialists are the
exception to the norm. They don’t believe that we are required to bring about the
best; rather, we are merely required to do that which is “good enough .” Slote (1984)
and Slote (1989) are paradigm satisficers. Flurka (1990) seems sympathetic to
satisficing versions of certain subjective forms of consequentialism. Critics ot
satisficing versions of consequentialism include Pettit (1984) and Mulgan (1993).
7
This obligation statement might be considered to be incomplete in some respects.
It should also, perhaps, explicitly indicate whose obligation it is and when the
obligation is in effect. I will leave these features to be gleaned from the context.
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if he were to indicate to Fran that he would lend her the money, he in fact wouldn’t
So the following subjunctive conditional is true, and Stan knows it to be true 8
SC: Y -> ~L (If Stan were to indicate to Fran that he will grant
her loan request, then it would not be the case that Stan lends Fran the
money required to acquire medication.)
The moral relevance of subjunctive conditionals like SC is, as I see it, at the
core of the dispute between actualists and possibilists over principle DC. 9 Actualists
appear sympathetic to the idea that consequentialism requires us to do that which
would bring about the best. That’s why they believe that Stan is obligated to do both
Y and L. But the truth of conditionals like SC has led actualists to reject DC. The
fact that it would be better if Stan were to provide a negative response to Fran’s loan
request and not lend Fran the money than it would be for him to indicate that he
Some might believe that letting Stan know that he won’t lend Fran the cash
regardless of what he agrees to do somehow undermines the case. I’m guessing that
such folks find the following moral principle plausible.
K~0: If S knows that S will not perform act, A
,
then S cannot be obligated to
do A.
But K~0 is an unacceptable moral principle. Michael McKenna brought the
following example to my attention to illustrate why.
Frank is a racist. He hates all G-colored people. He knows that if he goes to the
market, he will be obligated to perform an action of type X for a G-colored person.
Knowing himself well, he knows that, for any G-type person, he will not X. Of
course, he knows that he can X for a G-colored person. But he would never stoop so
low.
Is Frank not obligated to X because he knows that, for racist reasons, he simply
won’t? I think not. The same goes for Stan. He knows that he can lend Fran the
money; it’s just that he won’t.
9
Cf. Zimmerman (1996), p. 189.
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would grant the request and then fail to lend Fran the money has influenced
actualists to reject the claim that Stan is obligated to provide an affirmative response
to Fran’s loan request. In virtue of the truth of SC, the best wouldn 7 be brought
about were Stan to do Y. Thus, actualists believe that while 0(Y & L) is true, 0(Y)
is false—entailing their rejection of DC.
Furthermore, since Stan knows that he won’t lend Fran the money regardless
of what he tells her, actualists believe that he shouldn’t indicate to her that he will 10
A brief investigation of the deontic inferences that actualists accept makes this
reasoning explicit.
Actualists (as well as possibilists) believe that the following statement of
conditional obligation is true:
0(~Y/~L),
where 0(~Y/~L) is read It is obligatory that ~Y given ~L. And some actualists
(contra possibilists) also seem to believe that factual detachment for conditional
obligation is valid—that from 0(~Y/~L) and ~L we can infer 0(~Y).
Actualists reason that since Stan won’t infact give Fran the money, and since
Stan is obligated not to tell Fran that he will lend her the money
—
given that he
won’t—Stan is obligated to refrain from telling Fran that he will lend her the cash
It’s the moral importance attributed to the future fact about the actual world that
Stan won’t lend Fran the money conjoined with the fact that he wouldn’t lend her the
10
Curiously, Carlson (1999), a writer who rejects DC, believes that the act
consisting of Stan doing Y lacks normative status while the act consisting of Stan
doing ~Y comes out morally wrong. For details, see §1 of his (1999).
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money even if he were to say, or otherwise indicate, that he would that separates the
actualists from the possibilists.
It’s important to note that it is in virtue of the actual fact that Stan simply will
not do what’s best—that he won’t do right by lending Fran the cash whatever he
ends up saying, or otherwise indicating, to her—that actualists believe that Stan is
not obligated to indicate to Fran that he will grant her loan request. On an actualist
account, future wrongdoings have normative implications upon the present.
Possibilists, of course, reject any such implications. Possibilists believe we should
always do the best we can. And since Stan still can (i) indicate to Fran that he will
grant her request and (ii) lend her the cash, possibilists believe he ought to do each
7 2 Can Possibilists Explain the Actualists’ Worries Away?
The central difficulty that actualists foist upon themselves is a problem of
incompatible obligations. 1
1
If 0(Y & L) is true, then it seems that Stan ought to do
Y. But if Stan were to do Y, then he wouldn’t do L. And since doing ~Y and ~L is
better than doing Y and ~L, actualists contend that it’s not the case that Stan ought to
do Y. So which is it? Ought Stan to do Y or not? Actualists seem to be in a bit of a
bind here
Distinctions have been introduced to disarm the problem: primary vs.
secondary obligations,
12




Cf. §6.2. 1 ofZimmerman (1996) where Zimmerman presents a list of principles
that actualists are committed to rejecting.
12 McKinsey (1979) suggests that there are different “levels” of obligation that will
disarm the problem of so-called incompatible obligations.
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has a primary obligation to do Y & L, but since he won’t do L—regardless of what
he says he’ll do—a secondary obligation to do ~Y is generated. But problems
remain. Are primary obligations more important that secondary obligations? 14 Can
we ever be justified in failing to do our primary duties by attending to our secondary
duties? And if so, then how? And if not, then it seems that our primary duties are
the only ones we really ought to be worried about fulfilling. Thus, the problem of
incompatible obligations remains. What ought Stan to do? Actualists don’t appear
to have a clear response to this question. But possibilists do! And, moreover,
possibilists have the resources to explain why some are pulled the actualist way.
Take a paradigm possibilist view: Fred Feldman’s for example. 1 ^ Feldman
elucidates his version of consequentialism by way of a possible worlds framework.
Roughly, Feldman’s view is that a person, S, is obligated to do something, P, at a
13
Jackson and Pargetter (1986) claim that something may be deemed obligatory in
light of a certain set of options, but should that set of options be reduced to a smaller
set, different—in fact incompatible—obligations might emerge. Apparently,
Jackson and Pargetter (1986) believe that in certain situations, what we actually
ought to do is behave in accordance with the obligations generated by the “smaller”
sets, and that this somehow disarms the problem of incompatible obligations. We
might consider “restricted obligations” to be those that are generated by the smaller,
restricted sets of options.
14 McKinsey (1979) seems to believe that obligations of different levels are equally
important:
By saying that an obligation is secondary (or tertiary, or /7-ary, where
n>l), I do not mean that it is any less of an obligation than a primary
one. In my view, it is just as incumbent upon a person to fulfill his
secondary obligations, as it is incumbent upon him to fulfill his
primary ones. (391)
15
Other possibilist constructions would work equally well. For example,
consequentialist versions of the theories presented by Humberstone (1983) and




just in case S does P in all of the best accessible worlds to S at t. A “best”
accessible world is one than which no other accessible world is better. The
accessibility relation is left undefined as a conceptual primitive; its role is to
articulate what an agent can do at a time, that is, which possible worlds an agent can
keep open as live options for actuality. 16
It’s clear what Feldman’s view implies concerning the Stan and Fran case.
Since Stan indicates to Fran that he will grant her loan request (Y) and Stan lends
Fran the money required to acquire medication (L) in all of the best accessible
worlds to Stan at the time, Stan is morally required to do both Y and L. Whether or
not Stan would do L were he to do Y has no normative implications on Feldman’s
view. (Notice that Feldman doesn’t make use of subjunctive conditionals in the
formulation of his theory) Possibilists believe that we should always do the best we
can. Since the best can only be brought about by Stan’s doing both Y and L,
possibilists contend that Stan is obligated to do Y, and he is also obligated to do L.
But what about the actualists’ worries? What can possibilists say about the
actualists’ intuition that Stan shouldn’t indicate to Fran that he will grant her loan
request in light of the actual fact that Stan isn’t going to lend her the cash regardless
of what he says, or otherwise indicates? Why does there seem to be something right
about Stan’s refusal to tell Fran that he’ll lend her the cash, given that he won’t lend
it to her? I think that this “rightness” that is detected in Stan’s refusal is in fact
conditional rightness.
16
See Chapter 2 of Feldman (1986) for a precise characterization of the normative
theory sketched above.
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Recall the statement of conditional obligation that both actualists and
possibilists agree upon:
0(~Y/~L)
Both camps agree that Stan is obligated to refrain from indicating to Fran that he will
grant her loan request given that he isn’t going to lend her the money: Stan is
conditionally obligated to do ~Y. And I suspect that it is in virtue of this fact that
actualists have come to view ~Y as obligatory for Stan. But what is the nature of
this conditional obligation^ And what implications, if any, does the truth of
0(~Y/~L) have upon the normative status of
The nature of Stan’s conditional obligation can be elucidated in this way. 17
Following Feldman, we can say that a person, S, is obligated to do P given O at a
time, /, just in case S does P in all of the best accessible O-worlds to S at /.
lx
To
apply this principle to our case, we must first consider all the worlds accessible to
Stan where Stan doesn 't lend Fran the cash Call these worlds ‘~L-worlds’. Now,
from this restricted set of worlds, we can ask ourselves: Which worlds are better?
The ones in which Stan does Y? Or the ones in which Stan does ~Y? The answer.
17
The analyzing of conditional obligation has an interesting history. Initial attempts
were made by Rescher (1958) & (1962) and von Wright (1964) & ( 1965).
Substantial criticisms and improvements were introduced by Hansson (1969). Lewis
(1973) provided further substantial improvements; see §5. 1 of his (1973)—perhaps
the most popular analysis of conditional obligation via a possible worlds framework.
Notice also that some possibilists, notably Humberstone (1983), advocate
that we analyze conditional obligation in the way Lewis (1973) suggests. See §4. 4
of Feldman (1986) for a fully general consequentialist account of conditional
obligation. See Chapter 4 of Zimmerman (1996) for a deontically neutral account of
conditional obligation.
18
See §4.4 of Feldman (1986). The account presented in Chapter 4 ofZimmerman
(1996) would work just as well
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of course, is clear. Among the ~L-worlds accessible to Stan, all the ~Y-worlds are
better than all of the Y-worlds. Thus, the statement of conditional obligation under
consideration here is true on a standard possibilist reading.
Possibilists can also think of Stan’s conditional obligation in this way. If it
were the case that only ~L-worlds were accessible to Stan, then Stan would be
obligated to do ~Y. 19 But it doesn’t follow from the truth of such a conditional that
Stan is obligated to do ~Y. L-worlds are accessible to Stan. And among all of the
L- and ~L-worlds accessible to Stan, the ones in which he does Y are best. Stan
appears to be obligated to do Y.
Actualists might respond, and some have in fact responded, that factual
detachment for conditional obligation is valid; that from 0(~Y/~L) and ~L we can
infer 0(~Y). 2 ° But it isn’t. 21 If the “antecedent” of the conditional obligation (~L)
19
I suspect that the truth of this sort of counterfactual conditional has led theorists
such as Jackson and Pargetter (1986) to endorse the view that Stan is obligated to do
~Y: among the restricted set of accessible worlds (the ~L-worlds), ~Y worlds are
best.
20
Jackson and Pargetter (1986), pp. 238-239. Jackson and Pargetter distance
themselves from this claim in their (1987), but, by doing so, they seem to be
distancing themselves from actualism as well. See §6.3.3 of Zimmerman (1996) for




Consider what would follow from treating factual detachment for conditional
obligation as valid. Imagine you’re faced with a set of alternatives, one of which
would clearly bring about the best. But suppose that this optimizing alternative
requires a considerable amount of self-sacrifice, so much so that you simply decide
not to do it. From there, you could reason about which alternative you are morally
obligated to perform given that you won’t be performing the best available
alternative. Then, by factual detachment for conditional obligation, you could infer
that the second best alternative is, in fact, morally required. But if you decide not to
do the second best alternative, then you could use the same procedure to generate
obligations more suited to your tastes. Clearly, this is an unacceptable form ol moral
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were true and Stan were unable to alter its truth value, then an obligation to do ~Y
would be in effect. 22 But, again, Stan does have the ability to alter the truth value of
It’s just that he won’t. My guess is that actualists have either mistaken the
conditional obligatoriness of ~Y for obligatoriness simpliciter23 or have illegitimately
inferred 0(~Y) from 0(~Y/~L) and ~L via factual detachment for conditional
obligation. Either way presents substantial problems.
Consider what you yourself would say when Fran gives you a call, reporting
her chagrin in Stan’s refusal. Would you think, well, Stan did the right thing; he was
obligated to tell her that he wouldn’t lend her the cash given that he won’t. I doubt
it. It’s more likely that you’d think he was a jerk, that he failed to do his best and
thereby did wrong by Fran. You might also recognize that he could have done
worse:
24
he could have told Fran that he would lend her the money and then failed to
do so. But the fact that he could have done worse by no means vindicates what he in
fact ends up doing.
reasoning, for it makes acting morally “ridiculously easy” in Michael Zimmerman’s
terminology; cf. his (1996), p. 117
22 Arguments of this sort for the invalidity of factual detachment for conditional
obligation and for the validity of a modified version of the factual detachment rule
can be found in Greenspan (1978), pp. 81-82, Humberstone (1983), pp. 20-23,
Feldman (1986), pp. 90-92, and Chapter 4 of Zimmerman (1996).
23 Feldman also believes that this might be at the root of the disagreement between
actualists and possibilists; see his (1986), pp. 53-55.
24
Perhaps it is this feature—that Stan could have done much worse—that leads
some actualists to endorse his act as morally permissible.
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7 3 A Diagnosis of the Actualists’ Woes?
In rejecting principle
DC: O(a&b) -» 0(a) & 0(3),
actualists strap themselves with the problem of incompatible obligations, a problem
from which there appears to be no easy way out, save abandoning actualism
altogether. Possibilists have no such worries. They endorse DC, and furthermore,
they have the resources to explain away the actualists’ intuitions: the distinction
between obligations simpliciter and conditional obligations provides for a clear
understanding of the phenomena that actualists are so concerned about So why, in
virtue of these facts, do actualists continue to stand their ground? I think their
reasons might have to do with the role that subjunctive conditionals have
traditionally played in consequentialist reasoning.
Subjunctive conditionals are utilized in virtually every formulation of
consequentialist normative theories.
25
All of these theories attempt to characterize
the moral status of an act in terms of what would occur were it performed when
compared to what each of its alternatives would bring about were it performed.
Thus, when confronted with the truth of the subjunctive conditional we considered
earlier:
SC: Y -> ~L (If Stan were to indicate to Fran that he will grant
her loan request, then it would not be the case that Stan lends Fran the
money required to acquire medication ),
25 The only exceptions of which I’m aware can be found in Feldman (1986) and
Zimmerman (1996).
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some might be led to believe that Y isn’t morally obligatory. It’s not the case that
were Stan to do Y, then the best would be brought about (~Y-and-~L-worlds are
better than Y-and—L-worlds). But notice that just because Stan wouldn’t lend Fran
the cash were he to indicate to her that he would doesn’t excuse Stan from both
providing an affirmative response to Fran’s loan request and lending Fran the cash. 26
It’s not as if Stan has to refrain from lending the money. 27 Fie could grant the loan,
but he won’t.
Take a closer look at SC. Notice that the consequent is a proposition about a
future action that Stan will actually perform, an action within Stan’s control either to
do or fail to do. Should we, as good consequentialists, be worried about conditionals
like SC? In determining the obligations of an agent, should we reason with
subjunctive conditionals whose consequents are about future actions within that
agent’s control 7 In my modest opinion we shouldn’t, and it’s certainly true that we
needn’t. Contemporary possibilists have shown us a way to dispense with these
subjunctive conditionals from our moral reasoning altogether? 8 Their importance
to consequentialist reasoning has, it seems, been greatly exaggerated
26
This point is made in Humberstone (1983), p. 23.
27
Virtually the same point is made in Feldman (1986), p. 53.
28
But I argue elsewhere that certain subjunctive conditionals are indispensable to
any consequentialist’ s program.
29 Note that subjunctive formulations of consequentialism are plagued with
independent formal problems—all the more reason to reject them. See Chapter 1 of
Feldman’s (1986) for a sample of such problems.
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7.4 Conclusion
Among consequentialists, actualists alone face the seemingly insurmountable
problem of incompatible obligations. Furthermore, the “levels” of obligation that
many actualists are willing to posit in attempts to disarm this problem can, to a
degree, be accommodated within the possibilist framework without inconsistency. 30
Possibilists utilize a notion of conditional obligation that, in many respects, is very
much like the notions of “restricted” or secondary (or for that matter, / 7-ary, where
n>l) obligation that actualists tend to adopt. And finally, the subjunctive
conditionals that might play some role in motivating actualist maneuvering appear to
be expendable in consequentialist reasoning; contemporary possibilists have shown
us how to attend to our consequentialist reasoning without them. So why reject DC?
The reasons appear to be lacking, and the theoretical support for DC impressive.
30 Zimmerman does just this in §4.4.2 of his (1996). On this possibilist account,
however, failing to attend one’s primary obligations by attending to one’s secondary
obligations is never justified.
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